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Corporate Governance and the
Feminization of Capital
Sarah C. Haan*
Abstract. At the start of the twentieth century, women made up a small proportion of
shareholders in American publicly traded companies. By 1956, women were the majority
of individual shareholders. Although this change in shareholder gender demographics
happened gradually, it was evident early in the century: Before the 1929 stock market
crash, women shareholders had come to outnumber men at some of America’s largest and
most influential corporations, including AT&T, General Electric, and the Pennsylvania
Railroad. This Article synthesizes information from a range of historical sources to reveal
an overlooked narrative of corporate history—the feminization of capital, or the
transformation of American public-company shareholders from majority male to
majority female. It charts the growing proportion of women shareholders over the first
half of the twentieth century, describes the business community’s response to this trend,
and explores the impact of the rise of intermediation on the gender politics of corporate
control.
Corporate law scholarship has never before acknowledged that the early decades of the
twentieth century, a transformational era in corporate law and theory, coincided with a
change in the gender composition of the shareholder class. Scholars have not considered
the possibility that shareholders’ gender—which was being tracked internally at
companies, disclosed in annual reports, and publicly reported in the press—might have
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influenced business leaders’ views about corporate organization and governance. This
Article considers the implications of this history for some of the most important ideas in
corporate law theory, including the separation of ownership and control, shareholder
“passivity,” stakeholderism, and board representation. It argues that early-twentiethcentury gender politics helped shape foundational ideas of corporate-governance theory,
especially ideas concerning the role of shareholders. Outlining a research agenda where
history intersects with corporate law’s most vital present-day problems, this Article lays
out evidence showing that the feminization of capital shaped changing ideas about the role
of shareholders in corporate governance. In so doing, it invites scholars to begin a
conversation about gender, power, and the evolution of corporate law.
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Introduction
In 1951, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T)
became the first corporation in America with one million stockholders.1 The
company celebrated the milestone with a publicity campaign, flying the onemillionth stockholder—a Michigan couple who had bought the stock jointly—
to New York for a publicity tour.2 Photos from the campaign showed the
company’s president, Leroy Wilson, presenting a stock certificate to a young
automobile salesman, Brady Denton, as the couple’s school-age sons looked on.
Behind them all, partly obscured by Wilson’s arm as it reached past her, stood
Dorothy Denton, Brady’s co-owner, gazing into the camera lens with a
strained smile.3 The image celebrated a young couple’s entrance into the
stockholder class, but it also depicted Dorothy as marginalized in the
transaction. Newspapers around the country memorialized the event and
proclaimed the democratization of AT&T’s shareholder class: It had become “a
cross section of America, including farmers, businessmen, clerks, mechanics,
clergymen, merchants, teachers, housewives, doctors, lawyers, Civil Service
workers, people who [had] retired, widows, home-town folks and neighbors.”4
But this picture—the staged photo, the list of shareholder occupations that
emphasized “farmers” and “businessmen,” even AT&T’s choice of a married
couple as its millionth stockholder—was misleading. By 1951, most of AT&T’s
individual stockholders were women.5 They outnumbered individual men
stockholders by almost two to one.6 In fact, women stockholders had
1. AT&T Fetes 1,000,000th Stockholder, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1951, at A9; see also Thomas P.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

Swift, Million Mark Near in A.T.&T. Holders: 75-Year-Old Company Will Be First to Boast
that Number of Owners of Its Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1951, at F1.
AT&T Fetes 1,000,000th Stockholder, supra note 1.
See Million Now Own Telephone Stock: Couple Buys 7 Shares at $1,078 and Company Gives
Gala Tour of New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1951, at 42. At a dinner hosted by AT&T to
mark the occasion, AT&T director Arthur Page addressed Brady Denton as if he were
the sole owner of the couple’s shares. See Arthur W. Page, Director, Am. Tel. & Tel.,
Speech Presented at the Millionth Stockholder Celebration of the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company: Trusteeship in Business (May 15, 1951) (on file with author)
(“Mr. Denton, you have entrusted your savings to American enterprise which is
somewhat different from enterprise anywhere else in the world.”).
Harold Walsh, March of Finance: AT&T Milestone Points Up Democracy of Ownership, L.A.
TIMES, May 17, 1951, at A10; see also One in a Million !, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 1951, at 49; Bell
System Has Millionth Stockholder, POST (Big Stone Gap, Va.), May 17, 1951, at 4.
See Walsh, supra note 4; AM. TEL. & TEL. CO., ANNUAL REPORT 1950, at 15 (1951)
[hereinafter AT&T 1950 ANNUAL REPORT]; LEWIS H. KIMMEL, BROOKINGS INST., SHARE
OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 15 & n.13 (1952).
Wayne Oliver, AT&T To Make History with Millionth Holder, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 10, 1951, at 27 (reporting that 244,200 of AT&T’s shareholders were men and
483,700 were women); Walsh, supra note 4. These numbers did not include joint
footnote continued on next page
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outnumbered men stockholders at AT&T since at least 1910.7 As recently as
1948, AT&T had disclosed that 43% of its stock was owned by women,
considerably more than the 26% owned by men.8 In 1951, individual women
stockholders held 12 million shares,9 about 41% of AT&T’s stock—more if you
included stock held jointly. Women comprised AT&T’s largest stockholder
demographic whether you counted shareholders by the head or by the share.10
That year, the New York Times described AT&T’s April shareholder
meeting, held at the company’s Manhattan headquarters, as “Ladies Day.”11 At
least half of the stockholders who attended were women.12 During the

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

husband-and-wife accounts, which comprised roughly 23% of AT&T’s stockholders. See
Walsh, supra note 4.
AM. TEL. & TEL. CO., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS OF AMERICAN TELEPHONE &
TELEGRAPH COMPANY TO THE STOCKHOLDERS FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1910,
at 17 (1911) [hereinafter AT&T 1910 ANNUAL REPORT]; AT&T 1950 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 5, at 15; Women Stockholders: Feminine Army of 310,000 Holds Stock in 252
Corporations, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Feb. 1, 1914, at 21; see also JULIA C. OTT, WHEN
WALL STREET MET MAIN STREET: THE QUEST FOR AN INVESTORS’ DEMOCRACY 154
(2011) (describing the “feminization of the AT&T stockholder” by the 1920s).
AM. TEL. & TEL. CO., ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1948, at 9 (1949) [hereinafter AT&T
1948 ANNUAL REPORT] (noting that another 12% was held by joint accounts); see also
Purely Gossip—ATT Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1941, at 15 (reporting that at the
end of 1940, 42% of AT&T’s stock was held by women, 30% by men, 5% in joint
accounts, and 21% by trustees and institutions, with the balance held in the name of
brokers).
This statistic about women’s share ownership was widely reported in May 1951 and
probably originated in AT&T’s promotional materials about its millionth stockholder.
See, e.g., Bell Telephone Fetes Millionth Stockholder, ARLINGTON HEIGHTS HERALD, May 18,
1951, at 2; Private Ownership, DAILY REPUBLICAN (Kane & Mt. Jewett, Pa.), May 21, 1951,
at 4; see also AM. TEL. & TEL. CO., ANNUAL REPORT 1951, at 35 (1952) [hereinafter AT&T
1951 ANNUAL REPORT]. Jointly held stock was typically assumed to be stock held by a
married couple, which in the 1950s meant one man and one woman. See Wayne Oliver,
AT&T Shortly Expects Its Millionth Stockholder, AUSTIN STATESMAN, Apr. 10, 1951, at A-8
(describing joint holdings as those between “man and woman”).
As explained more fully below, AT&T was one of several large public companies that
celebrated a milestone stockholder in the early 1950s. In each case, the company
organized a public-relations campaign around a milestone stockholder who was a
young, white, male, married, middle-class wage earner. See infra note 405 and
accompanying text. In fact, in 1952, American stockholders were evenly divided
between men and women, and most were fifty or older. See KIMMEL, supra note 5, at 8992 (presenting demographic data). These celebrations presented idealized images of
shareholders, not accurate ones.
Women Enliven Meeting of A.T.&T. But Their Move to Make One of Them a Member of
Board of Directors Loses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1951, at 58 [hereinafter Women Enliven
Meeting] (“It was ‘Ladies Day’ at the annual meeting of stockholders of the
$12,000,000,000 American Telephone and Telegraph Company yesterday, but they
came off second best.”).
Id.; Charles F. Speare, Stock Market Shows Vitality in Face of Unsettled News, MUNCIE
STAR, Apr. 22, 1951, at 31 (noting that “the presence of women was a conspicuous
footnote continued on next page
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meeting, Wilma Soss, a well-known shareholder activist and the founder of
the Federation of Women Stockholders in American Business, gave a short
speech.13 She pointed out that women comprised not only 48% of AT&T’s
stockholders but also more than 60% of its nearly 650,000 employees. 14 Soss
argued that women deserved representation on AT&T’s board of directors, and
that the company would benefit from it. She nominated to the board a Nevada
businesswoman who owned half as much AT&T stock as all seventeen of
AT&T’s directors combined.15 Soss’s nomination was a protest gesture. There
was no way for a floor nomination to succeed because there were not enough
shares represented at the meeting to win a vote.
When Soss was done presenting in favor of her nominee, a second woman,
Cathrine Curtis, who headed a different organization of women investors, rose
to speak.16 She nominated a second woman candidate to the board.17 Like Soss,
Curtis understood that her candidate stood no chance of election. Ballots were
circulated while the company’s president moved on to other subjects, and then
the defeat of the women candidates—and the successful election of seventeen
men—was confirmed.18
But the meeting wasn’t over. President Wilson invited another investor,
Ella Aronstam, to present a proposal she had submitted for the shareholders’

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.
18.

feature” at the meeting). At the preceding year’s meeting, some newspapers reported
that women stockholders had “far outnumbered” the men. See, e.g., Pride of Ownership,
KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Apr. 30, 1950, at 36.
Nomination of Grandmother to AT&T Board Defeated, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 20,
1951, at 40; Broadway Revue, COUNCIL COMPASS (Council of W. Elec. Tech. Emps.,
Newark, N.J.), May 1951, at 1. For general background on Soss, see Janice Traflet, Queen
of the Corporate Gadflies: The Unstoppable Wilma Soss, 119 FIN. HIST. 20, 21-23 (2016).
Women Enliven Meeting, supra note 11; Nomination of Grandmother to AT&T Board
Defeated, supra note 13; J.R. Nevarez, A Few “Firsts” That Russia Won’t Claim, L.A. TIMES,
July 17, 1951, at A5 (noting that AT&T had 650,000 employees, and that more than 20%
of AT&T stock was owned by roughly 250,000 of its employees).
Nomination of Grandmother to AT&T Board Defeated, supra note 13. The nominee,
Theresa Noble, had formerly served as the chair of the board of directors of the
American Silk Spinning Company. Id.; see also Women Stockholders Want Board Member,
MIA. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 5, 1952, at 12-B (describing Noble as “treasurer of a textile
firm”).
Broadway Revue, supra note 13; Women Guard Funds: Investors Learn Finance, S.F.
EXAM’R, Oct. 25, 1938, at 16 (identifying Curtis as the founder and national director of
Women Investors in America, Inc.); Charles F. Speare, Rail Stocks Reach New High
Average; Market Trading Up, MUNCIE STAR, May 25, 1952, at 30 (identifying Curtis as
the organization’s “head”).
Broadway Revue, supra note 13, at 1.
Increase Earnings and Reduce Debt: AT&T Fiat, S.F. EXAM’R, Apr. 19, 1951, at 26; Broadway
Revue, supra note 13 (“Mr. Wilson directed the attendants to distribute ballots to the
stockholders. While the voting was in progress the President read his message on the
state of the Company.”).
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consideration.19 Taking advantage of a rule enacted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) only nine years earlier, Aronstam had asked
AT&T to add her resolution to the materials that the company sent to its
million stockholders in advance of the meeting.20 The company had included
Aronstam’s proposal in its proxy statement, alongside its instruction that
stockholders vote against her.21
Tiny and white-haired, Aronstam was a retired schoolteacher from
Brooklyn who owned 100 shares.22 Her proposal asked the company to expand
the board by one member—and to fill the vacant position with a woman.23 “I
don’t expect the resolution to pass this time,” she told a reporter before the
meeting, “but we will put up a good fight.”24 When the votes were tallied, more
than a million shares of AT&T stock were cast in favor of Aronstam’s
proposal—just over 5% of all the shares that were voted.25 Management had
voted all of the proxies it had collected against the proposal.26
AT&T’s vibrant 1951 annual meeting—alive with women, the dominant
shareholder demographic, rising to give speeches, propose resolutions, and
demand representation—was, in many ways, typical for its time, although it
defies our present-day understanding of corporate history.27
19. Fred Klann, Off the Beaten Path: From 2 Employees to 602,466, MOLINE DAILY DISPATCH,

Mar. 22, 1951, at 19; Broadway Revue, supra note 13, at 3-4 (suggesting that the author
Fannie Hurst spoke on Aronstam’s behalf).
20. See SEC Rule X-14A-7, Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942), 7 Fed. Reg. 10,655,
10,656 (requiring reporting companies to print shareholder proposals in proxy
statements).
21. See A.T.&T. Shies from Women as Directors, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 1951, at 29; see also New
Fight Planned to Seat Woman on AT&T Directorate, S.F. EXAM’R, Mar. 14, 1951, at 30.
22. See Robert H. Prall, Ella Girds for the Second Round: Little Woman vs. Big Business, N.Y.
WORLD-TEL. & SUN, Apr. 17, 1951, at 22 (reporting that Aronstam was four feet nine
inches tall and 103 pounds). The article noted that after Aronstam’s proposal was
published in the proxy, a “Connecticut farmer” sent her a letter telling her to stick to
knitting, since AT&T’s officers were doing a good job “without any women to mess up
the works.” Id.
23. See id.; A.T.&T. Meeting Told Company Is Striving to Increase Earnings, WALL ST. J., Apr.
19, 1951, at 18.
24. See Prall, supra note 22.
25. Increase Earnings and Reduce Debt: AT&T Fiat, supra note 18. More than 18 million
shares were voted against. Id.
26. AT&T Shies from Women as Directors, supra note 21.
27. See, e.g., Saw Dawson, Influence of Women in Business Increasing, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,
1950, at 25 (“The womenfolk have discovered recently what fun they can have at a
stockholders’ meeting, just by asking questions.”). Women were active in shareholder
governance throughout this period. For example, among the first thirteen individuals
to utilize the SEC’s shareholder-proposal rule in 1943 was Harriett Skipwith, who
owned 3,700 shares of common stock of the White Sewing Machine Company and
submitted six proposals on subjects related to the company’s corporate governance. See
footnote continued on next page
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Over the first half of the twentieth century, the percentage of women
among individual shareholders at American public companies continuously
grew until, sometime between 1952 and 1956, women became the majority.28
The trend was documented over six decades in ad hoc studies conducted by
government agencies, journalists, investment firms, and eventually the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In 1956, the NYSE published the first
comprehensive study finding that women constituted a majority of
shareholders across the U.S. public capital markets.29 But the trend received
almost no recognition in the academic literature—not in economics, corporate
law, or business management, the three academic disciplines in which scholars
studied and published information about the expanding shareholder class and
the role of shareholders in corporate organization. This silence contrasts
strongly with the scholarly attention lavished on the rise of institutional
holders starting in the 1950s—a time when women’s shareholding was
reaching a high point.30
Women’s market-wide majority status may have been less important than
the feminization of shareholding at individual companies. Before the 1929
stock market crash, women shareholders outnumbered men at some of
America’s largest and most influential public companies, including AT&T,
General Electric, and the Pennsylvania Railroad—the “blue-chip” companies
whose CEOs and directors formed an elite cadre of business leaders.31 As the

28.
29.
30.
31.

Rolf Enno Wubbels, Regulation of Stockholder Proxies 106 tbl.4 (1949) (Ph.D. thesis,
New York University) (on file with author). Around this time, women board
candidates were nominated from the floor of the annual meetings of several
companies, including Radio Corporation of America, General Motors, and U.S. Steel.
See Andy Logan, Hoboken Must Go !, NEW YORKER, Mar. 17, 1951, at 34, 48; U.S. Steel
Annual Meeting Covers Girth, Mirth, Women—and Upturn in Business, WALL ST. J., May 4,
1954, at 11. At other companies, stockholders made demands for women directors
during shareholder meetings. See, e.g., STANDARD OIL CO. (N.J.), STENOGRAPHIC REPORT
OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE STOCKHOLDERS 25-26 (1947); 950 at Its Stockholders’
Meeting, A Record in History of A.T.&T., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1950, at 45. Shareholder
proposals demanding female representation on corporate boards were published in the
proxy statements of Alex Smith & Sons Carpet Co. (1950), the American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp. (1950 and 1951), Bayuck Cigar, Inc. (1950 and 1951), Borden Co.
(1951), and AT&T (1951). See Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, The SEC Proxy
Proposal Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 807, 817 (1952) (summarizing the
proposals). In 1966, Wilma Soss was forcibly removed from IBM’s annual meeting after
she “stubbornly continued to try to nominate a woman director” from the floor.
Traflet, supra note 13, at 21-22.
See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
N.Y. STOCK EXCH., WHO OWNS AMERICAN BUSINESS? 1956 CENSUS OF SHAREOWNERS 6
(1957) [hereinafter N.Y. STOCK EXCH., WHO OWNS AMERICAN BUSINESS?].
See infra Parts I.E, I.H.
See supra note 7 (AT&T); infra note 145 (General Electric); infra note 189 (Pennsylvania
Railroad).
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gender of their companies’ shareholders changed—a process that began before
the crash and continued after it—these men watched their managerial
leadership become accountable to an expanding population of women. This
change would have been apparent not only from stockholder lists, but in realworld shareholder meetings where women’s increasing presence was visible
and where women’s voices were audible. But the feminization of shareholding
occurred during a period in American history in which—due to thenprevailing gender bias—women were widely regarded as unsuited to
participate in business management.
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, several large public
companies tracked and disclosed the gender of their own stockholders, and the
financial press wrote numerous articles proclaiming the growing number, and
common stockholding power, of women investors. Business experts expressed
anxiety about women’s expanding role, sometimes suggesting that the influx
of women shareholders had significance for corporate organization. Corporate
law scholarship has never before acknowledged that this early period, in which
control of widely held corporations shifted from shareholders to managers,
coincided with a change in the gender of the stockholder class. This Article
tells the forgotten story of the feminization of capital32—the transformation of
public-company stockholders from majority male to majority female—and
argues that early-twentieth-century gender politics played a role in shaping
corporate-governance theory.33 The Article lays out the evidence showing,
32. This Article’s argument that capital “feminized” during the early twentieth century is,

implicitly, an argument about what “capital” means. Though an economist may think
of capital merely as an input—an asset put to productive use—this Article presents
capital as a group of human actors, in the same way that we sometimes use “labor” to
refer to the workers in a firm and “management” to mean the people managing the
enterprise. Using “capital” to refer to human actors in corporate organization is useful
because it allows legal theorists to focus on the social relations that shape collective
enterprise through the corporate form. This article describes the “feminization” of a
major category of corporate actors during a period in which sex discrimination against
women was pervasive. To discern how corporate law and theory were grappling with
this change, this Article examines the human identities behind the category of capital.
Indeed, the sleight of hand in legal scholarship that has transformed human
shareholders (that is, risk bearers) into depersonalized interests has obscured how
power is expressed through corporate organization. Cf. MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE
CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916, at 7 (1988)
(“Property in its capitalist form . . . is a complex social relation . . . that involves a system
of authority inextricably interwoven with the legal and political order as well as with
the broader system of legitimacy, the prevailing norms of emulative morality and
behavior, and the hierarchy of power.”).
33. At the end of the twentieth century, an important article in the Columbia Law Review
investigated “the interrelation of social norms and corporate law,” including “cultural
attitudes,” and concluded that “[c]hanges in the belief-systems of corporate actors cause
shifts in norms. These shifts, in turn, are translated into the fabric of corporate
institutions and corporate law.” Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms,
footnote continued on next page
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among other things, that the feminization of shareholding encouraged
corporate law experts to view shareholders as “passive” actors, and justified
laws and practices that shifted power away from shareholders toward
corporate managers.
During the early decades of the twentieth century, ownership of the
nation’s biggest corporations became “widely scattered.”34 In the conventional
narrative, the dispersion of stockholding caused “passive” shareholders to lose
the power of control, and a new and growing cadre of technocratic managers
to gain it.35 The separation of ownership and control reflected the triumph of
centralized corporate management over the dispersed, small shareholder.36
The separation framework introduced a “separate spheres” dichotomy to
corporate-governance theory that not only survives to this day, but became
the basis of modern corporate law. In recent years, some scholars have
questioned the timing of the separation of ownership from control.37 Virtually
everyone agrees, however, that ownership did eventually separate from
control—and that reducing the resulting “agency costs” has become the
singular focus of modern corporate law.38 Indeed, the choice to view the

34.

35.
36.
37.

38.

99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1254, 1292 (1999). Though Eisenberg’s work did not consider
gender as a source of social norms, this Article shows that cultural attitudes about
gender difference have been relevant to the evolution of modern corporate law. See
generally Patricia Yancey Martin, Gender as Social Institution, 82 SOC. FORCES 1249, 1266
(2004) (arguing that using gender to construct social relations is useful “primarily
because of its extensive pervasiveness and intertwining with other social realms”).
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 9-10 (1977); see also Frederick H. Wood, The Small Investor and
Railroad Ownership and Management, 11 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. CITY N.Y. 433, 433 (1926)
(“In each of the last two decades the number of stockholders [in eighteen companies]
has approximately doubled.”).
See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 59 (1932) (describing the separation of ownership and control).
Id.
See, e.g., Eric Hilt, The Berle and Means Corporation in Historical Perspective, 42 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 417, 420 (2019) (stating that “ownership was separated from control to a lesser
extent among 1930s corporations studied by Berle and Means than among the public
companies of the 1870s and even the 1820s”); Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and
Means Really a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 443, 445-58 (2009) (mapping the literature).
See, e.g., Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of
the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New
Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 301 (2017) (describing “an overwhelming consensus
that since the second half of the twentieth century corporate ownership in the United
States is by and large fragmented and dispersed”); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in
Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2013) (describing agencycost analysis as “the dominant framework of analysis for corporate law and corporate
governance today”); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby,
70 BUS. LAW. 1, 14 (2014/2015) (asserting that a “fixation on agency costs [has] taken
root and flourished within the corporate law academy”). For an early and important
footnote continued on next page
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separation of ownership and control as naturally occurring and inevitable has,
for nearly a hundred years, led corporate law to operate within a framework of
perpetually warring camps of “strong managers” and “weak owners.”39 This
Article is the first work of corporate law scholarship to suggest that the study
of shareholder gender sheds light on these narratives.
The idea of the passive shareholder took off after Adolf Berle, Jr., and
Gardiner Means presented it in their 1932 book, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property.40 This Article argues, among other things, that the
shareholder-passivity thesis relied on gender stereotypes and may have
misrepresented the desire of small stockholders, including many women, to
actively participate in shareholder governance. In the first half of the twentieth
century, the typical shareholder held stock in only a few companies.41 With
governance rights in only a handful of firms, shareholders had the time and
resources to attend to corporate-governance matters. Evidence suggests that
shareholder interest was there as well.42 During this period, however, corporate
law evolved in a direction that de-emphasized mechanisms for shareholder
collective action. The choice to view shareholder passivity as natural and
inevitable helped turn corporate law away from control-based reforms, which
would have empowered shareholders. Instead, shareholder passivity pushed
corporate law toward market-based solutions, a trend that was formalized in
New Deal securities legislation.43 The passivity thesis helped to justify the

39.
40.

41.

42.
43.

contribution to the agency-cost genre, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 357 (1976).
See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994) (discussing the origins of this framework).
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 347-48. As described in further detail in Part II.B
below, Berle and Means did not introduce the concept of shareholder passivity, but
they were largely responsible for popularizing the idea among corporate theorists in
the United States.
See, e.g., TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., 76TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF
ECONOMIC POWER: THE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 200 LARGEST
NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, at xvii (Comm. Print 1940) (stating that the average
stockholder held shares in “about two and one-half corporations”). Almost twenty
years later, the NYSE found that the average stockholder held stock from only 3.5
different stock issues—fewer than in 1956, when the average was 4.25 issues. N.Y.
STOCK EXCH., SHARE OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA: 1959, at 5 (1959). But see Harold S. Sutton,
Who Are a Company’s Stockholders? Utility Company Survey Discloses Wide Ownership in
All Classes, 87 TRS. & ESTS. 9, 9 (1948) (showing that a 1948 survey of stockholders of the
Consolidated Edison Company of New York found that 5% owned no other stocks; 12%
owned two or three other stocks; 37% owned three to ten; and 51% owned over ten).
See infra notes 362-68 and accompanying text.
Morton Horwitz dates “the beginning of the shift away from ‘the traditional point of
view’ of shareholders as ‘the ultimate owners, the corporate equivalent of partners and
footnote continued on next page
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much-celebrated shift in corporate power away from shareholders, a group
that included many women, to corporate managers, a group that was
exclusively male.
Although most stock today is owned by large institutions (such as asset
managers and insurance companies), this was not true during the first half of
the twentieth century, when most stock was held by individuals.44 During
these decades, human shareholders—individual women and men, and joint
husband-and-wife accounts—comprised the vast majority of shareholders.45
For example, in 1951, 96% of AT&T’s million stockholders were individuals.46
The human identity of shareholders, who were viewed as members or
“owners” of the corporation, was important to ideas about shareholders’ rights
and interests within corporate organization. Thus, although women never
collectively owned more stock than men during this period across the market,
shareholders’ identities, including gender, mattered to corporate

proprietors’ ” to the turn of the century. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 95 (1992) (quoting A.A.
Friedrich, Stocks and Stock Ownership, in 14 ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 403, 403
(E. Seligman ed., 1934)); see also id. at 100 (“[M]odern decisions tend toward an emphasis
of the directors’ absolutism in the management of the affairs of large corporations . . . .”
(quoting HOWARD HILTON SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW
GOVERNING CORPORATE DIRECTORS 5 (1931))). Ariela Dubler has argued that New
York’s legislature abolished common law marriage in 1933 in part because the “sociolegal conventions of female dependency” upon which the doctrine was premised had
become “out of sync” with women’s changing position in the economy. Ariela R.
Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 99798 (2000). Dubler’s work shows how, in the 1920s and 30s, women’s evolving social and
economic roles were reshaping family law—a process that was similar to, and
contemporaneous with, the corporate law shifts discussed in this Article.
44. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1275 (2008) (explaining that in 1932 “most shareholders were individuals”);
Janette Rutterford, The Shareholder Voice: British and American Accents, 1890-1965, 13
ENTER. & SOC. 120, 121 (2012) (“Up to the 1960s and 1970s, individual shareholders were
far more numerous than institutional investors and in many companies owned the
vast majority of shares.”); ROE, supra note 39, at 6 (noting that “[i]n the Berle–Means era,
shareholders were mostly individuals”); EDWIN BURK COX, TRENDS IN THE
DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK OWNERSHIP 1 (1963) (“At the end of 1957 individuals owned
directly 70 per cent of the corporate stock outstanding and not owned by another
corporation.”).
45. For example, a 1948 survey of major manufacturing corporations found that 91% of
common stockholders were individuals, and that those individuals (men, women, and
joint accounts) held a combined average of 59% of outstanding issues. Who Owns “Big
Business”? Analysis of Stockholdings in Largest Corporations: Part 1—Manufacturing, 87 TRS.
& ESTS. 5, 6 (1948) (analyzing data from sixty-two companies).
46. AT&T 1951 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 21.
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organization.47 As late as the 1950s, some companies were reporting the results
of shareholder voting on both a pro rata (share) and a per capita (shareholder)
basis, reflecting a continuing adherence to the traditional view in which
shareholders were cognizable as people.48 Most experts peg the shift to
institutional stockholding to the 1970s or later, even though it was recognized
earlier as a development on the horizon.49 The intermediation of stockholding
after the midcentury was itself gendered in effect. Since intermediary holders
were managed by men,50 the rechanneling of retail stockholding through them
restored male voting control over women’s stock.
What explains the rise of women’s stockholding in the first half of the
twentieth century?51 Although many factors likely played a role—including
the fact that women could and did participate in shareholder governance in
large companies at a time when their participation in political governance was
limited—this Article highlights an economic explanation. Women experienced
sex discrimination in labor markets, but the dividends paid on a share of stock
did not vary with the identity of the share’s owner.52 That is, the return on
47. Women did own more stock than men at individual companies, however. See infra

48.

49.

50.
51.

52.

notes 270-72 and accompanying text (describing how women’s pro rata shareholding
exceeded men’s at AT&T and U.S. Steel).
See, e.g., STANDARD OIL CO. (N.J.), STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE STOCKHOLDERS 45 n.*, 46 (1948) (providing vote totals on both a pro rata and per
capita basis). In addition, some companies continued to use a voice vote to decide
substantive motions brought at shareholder meetings, effectively giving each
shareholder a single vote. In 1946, for example, when a shareholder of Standard Oil
New Jersey moved for a vote to switch from semiannual dividends to quarterly
dividends, a floor vote of shareholders resolved the matter. See STANDARD OIL CO. (N.J.),
STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE STOCKHOLDERS 24 (1946). The
motion failed. Id. at 25.
See, e.g., David M. Kotz, The Significance of Bank Control over Large Corporations, 13 J.
ECON. ISSUES 407, 409 (1979) (“Whereas in 1929 less than one-tenth of outstanding U.S.
corporate stock was held by financial institutions, by 1974 financial institutions held
over one-third.”); COX, supra note 44, at 2 (noting “the emphasis which has been placed
on the growing importance of institutional investors in the market during the 1950s”
but observing that “in 1960 individual owners continue to represent the most
important group of holders of equities”); J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN
STOCKHOLDER 246-47 (1958) (recognizing the significance of institutional investors).
See infra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.
This Article is only a preliminary effort at answering this important question, which
deserves book-length treatment. A longer work would help explain where twentiethcentury American women obtained wealth (for example, through inheritance, wage
labor, or other means), and how and why women saved or invested that wealth,
particularly in light of then-existing gender norms, legal constraints on women’s
property ownership, differences between the life expectancies of men and women, and
the exclusion of women from politics.
See generally ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (2003) (describing sex discrimination in the U.S. labor
market).
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women’s capital was not discounted for their sex. The fact that women could
expect equitable returns for their investment of capital in stock, but not for
their labor, may have encouraged women to save and invest in stock when
possible.53 The dynamic effects of sex discrimination across labor and capital
markets may help explain why, over the first half of the twentieth century,
women came to outnumber men as common stockholders in the United
States.54
Shareholders’ race is also relevant to this story. In the first half of the
twentieth century, the great majority of American shareholders probably were
middle-income and wealthy white women and men. Some women
shareholders were the beneficiaries of inherited wealth, while others were
investors of income earned in labor markets that were segregated not only by
sex, but also by race.55 Unfortunately, data on shareholders’ race and ethnicity
during this period is thin. It is fair to assume, however, that the feminization of
shareholding was shaped by racial discrimination and bias.
Part I synthesizes information from a range of historical sources to present
a history of twentieth-century shareholding that pays attention to gender. It
offers an original and important contribution to the fields of business history,
women’s history, corporate law, socioeconomics, and the study of capitalism,
and a fascinating “lost history”56 that may surprise readers because, until now,
there has been little recognition that women played any kind of significant
role in early-twentieth-century corporate capitalism.
Part II considers the implications of this history for some of the
foundational ideas in corporate law theory. These include the separation of
53. See, e.g., infra note 173 (describing a 1929 financial-advice article in Good Housekeeping

that revealed how the economic reality of 1920s womanhood related to women’s
investment risk tolerance). Stocks, of course, provided better returns than bonds. The
fact that women had fewer options than men did to generate income over a lifetime—
because women were essentially excluded from high-wage jobs—may have encouraged
some women to rely on the high returns on stocks as their primary means of growing
wealth.
54. See, e.g., Women Outrank Men Stockholders: Corporation Canvass Shows They Predominate
in Many of the Largest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1927, at 26 [hereinafter Women Outrank Men
Stockholders]; Woman’s Investment Invasion: Overtopping Facts and Figures (pt. 2), WALL ST.
J., Aug. 12, 1927, at 15.
55. The transmission of wealth from one generation to the next in white families would,
of course, have reflected economic advantages conferred by centuries of American
racial discrimination as well as the institution of slavery. See, e.g., STEPHANIE E. JONESROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS SLAVE OWNERS IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH, at xvii (2019) (exploring the ways in which “slave-owning women
invested in, and profited from their financial ties to, American slavery and its
marketplace”).
56. See Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1252 n.28
(1999) (“One of the projects of feminism has been to recover women’s ‘lost’ history.”).
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ownership and control, the “passive” shareholder, stakeholderism, the law’s
reliance on the archetype of the “average” or “reasonable” investor, and board
composition. As the Article shows, women became the majority of American
public-company stockholders not only at a crucial time in the development of
corporate theory, but also at a time when American culture viewed women as
“ill-fitted” to play a role in the management of business.57 Considered together,
these facts suggest a new interpretation for the intellectual foundations of
modern corporate law.
I.

The Feminization of Capital

“We are in a period of wide distribution of stock,” one Wall Street lawyer
wrote in 1929.58 “Many thousands of new holders are persons of moderate
means.”59 Today, the growth of stockholding is mostly remembered this way:
as a socioeconomic transition that expanded shareholding beyond the
wealthiest classes to middle-income Americans.60 But it was also significantly
about the mobilization of women’s wealth. Though historians of business have
not presented it this way, the expansion of shareholding reflected a decadeslong transformation of the gender of shareholding—the feminization of capital,
decades before labor or management at public companies reflected large
proportions of women.61
Relying on a range of historical sources, including corporate reports,
government reports, newspaper articles, and transcripts and photos of
stockholder meetings, this Part sketches the gender demographics of American
public-company shareholding from the turn of the twentieth century until the
rise of institutional investing after the middle of the century. The history of
women as corporate shareholders could go back much further than this.

57. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 129 (1927) (asserting that women

“are ill-fitted by training—begging the moot point of sex—to govern” corporations).
58. JOHN H. SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 215 (1929).
59. Id.
60. Julia Ott has documented the mass-investment movement of the early decades of the

twentieth century. See Julia Ott, What Was the Great Bull Market? Value, Valuation, and
Financial History, in AMERICAN CAPITALISM: NEW HISTORIES 63, 71 (Sven Beckert &
Christine Desan eds. 2018) (describing a “new narrative about the promise of mass
investment” after World War I); OTT, supra note 7, at 7 (exploring the “phenomenon of
mass investment” and its political significance).
61. Indeed, women have never constituted a large proportion of corporate management at
U.S. public companies. See DELOITTE GLOB. CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, PROGRESS AT
A SNAIL’S PACE: WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM—A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 38-39 (7th ed.
2022) (reporting that in 2021, women held 23.9% of board seats and constituted 5.7% of
CEOs in the United States).
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Stockholding by women is evident in the historical record long before 1900.62
For example, when it was chartered in 1791, at least twelve of the 194
stockholders of the Bank of New York were women.63 Collectively they
owned only 6.7% of the bank’s total stock, but a woman, Temperance Green,
was the bank’s second-largest shareholder.64 One early American corporate law
treatise noted that a corporation “may consist of both men and women,
provided, its institution is not repugnant to the condition and modesty of
women.”65 An 1849 Pennsylvania statute forbade stockholders who lived
within ten miles of the meeting place from voting by proxy, “females
excepted.”66 In 1877, the Banker’s Magazine and Statistical Register published a
small survey of the sex of stockholders in ten national banks in central New
York, reporting that women constituted almost 41% of stockholders and held
31% of shares.67 By 1878, there were already so many women shareholders of
the Pennsylvania Railroad that the corporation distributed dividends by sex;
women shareholders could receive their payments a day before the men.68

62. For a summary of evidence from the 1700s and 1800s, see ROBERT E. WRIGHT,

FINANCIAL EXCLUSION: HOW COMPETITION CAN FIX A BROKEN SYSTEM 233-46 (2019).
63. ALLAN NEVINS, HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NEW YORK AND TRUST COMPANY: 1784 TO 1934

64.

65.

66.
67.

68.

app. at xi-xiii (1934). This source lists women stockholders at the time of the Bank of
New York’s 1791 incorporation: Julia Bunyan (2.5 shares); Jane Byrne (1.5 shares); Mary
Daubney (3 shares); Temperance Green (25 shares); Maxwell & Berry, Attorneys for
Ann Robertson (5 shares); Unus McIvers (1 share); Ann Mullen (3 shares); Mary
Phillips (1 share); Sarah Robinson (3 shares); Helena Scott (1.5 shares); Ann Van Horne
(1 share); Cornelia Van Horne (1 share). Id. app. at xiii.
See id. app. at xi, xiii. Green held twenty-five shares; only one stockholder, “Alex.
Robertson,” held more stock—thirty-four shares. (Note that I am assuming “Alex.
Robertson” was a man.)
JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE 51 n.1 (Morton J. Horwitz & Stanley N. Katz eds. Arno Press 1972) (1832);
see also A.B. Johnson, Advantages and Disadvantages of Private Corporations, 23 MERCHS.’
MAG. 626, 630 (1850) (noting that “some” stockholders “are women”).
Act of Apr. 7, 1849, ch. 909, § 4, 1849 Pa. Laws 1173, 1174.
This was the earliest published study of stockholder gender that I found in researching
this Article. See Females as Stockholders in National Banks, BANKER’S MAG. & STAT. REG.,
June 1877, at 987, 987. By the 1870s, women were common enough among stock
speculators to be described with their own monikers. See John T. Flynn, How to Make
Money in Wall Street, WOMAN’S HOME COMPANION, Jan. 1930, at 25, 26 (referring to
woman speculators as “ladybulls”); “Mudhens”: How the Brokers’ Clerks Designate the
Female Stock-Operators, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 15, 1876, at 2 (“ ‘Mudhens’ is the
euphonious and rather peculiar epithet applied by the brokers’ clerks to that class of
females that engage in the fascinating but uncertain game of stock speculations.”).
See Giving Women Stockholders Precedence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1878, at 2; see also Little
Schuylkill Navigation R.R. & Coal Co., Advertisement, N. AM. (Phila.), Jan. 8, 1884, at 3
(advertising a dividend for the company to “be paid to women stockholders in person”
on an upcoming date).
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Readers may be surprised to learn that some public companies tracked the
sex of their own shareholders and disclosed it in their annual reports. Some
government agencies also tracked and reported on the sex of stockholders in
the early twentieth century, particularly for the manufacturing industry and
national banks. Leading financial journalists reported on shareholders’ sex,
going so far as to conduct investigative reporting. These practices suggest that
business leaders believed that shareholders’ sex mattered—and that information
about shareholders’ sex shed light on business itself.
A. Women Shareholders in the New Century
At the turn of the twentieth century, several government agencies were
tracking and reporting on the gender of corporate shareholders. Both
Massachusetts and New Jersey tracked the gender of shareholders of in-state
manufacturing companies.69 In Massachusetts, women constituted nearly a
third of shareholders,70 while in New Jersey, the percentage of women started
lower, at 16.2% in 1900, and grew to 21.4% by 1906.71
From at least 1897 to 1921, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
periodically reported on the sex of shareholders in national banks.72 In 1904,
69. See, e.g., MASS. BUREAU OF STAT. OF LAB., THE ANNUAL STATISTICS OF MANUFACTURES

1898, at 5, 9 (1899); BUREAU OF STAT. OF LAB. AND INDUS. OF N.J., TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF NEW JERSEY FOR
THE YEAR ENDING OCTOBER 31ST, 1902, at 18 tbl.1 (1903) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY
TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT].
70. Women constituted not a third of individual stockholders, but a third of all
stockholders, including trusts and other institutional investors. From 1898 to 1905, the
percentage of female stockholders ranged from 31.65% to 33.35%. See MASS. BUREAU OF
STAT. OF LAB., supra note 69, at 7; MASS. BUREAU OF STAT. OF LAB., THE ANNUAL
STATISTICS OF MANUFACTURES 1899, at 81 (1900); MASS. BUREAU OF STAT. OF LAB., THE
ANNUAL STATISTICS OF MANUFACTURES 1900, at 75 (1901); MASS. BUREAU OF STAT. OF
LAB., THE ANNUAL STATISTICS OF MANUFACTURES 1901, at 53 (1902); MASS. BUREAU OF
STAT. OF LAB., THE ANNUAL STATISTICS OF MANUFACTURES 1902, at 54 (1903). These
statistics included both privately held and publicly traded manufacturing firms
incorporated in Massachusetts.
71. See NEW JERSEY TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 16 tbl.1; BUREAU OF
STAT. OF LAB. AND INDUS. OF N.J., TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF
STATISTICS OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF NEW JERSEY FOR THE YEAR ENDING OCTOBER
31ST, 1906, at 17 (1906).
72. See Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, Dec.
5, 1904, BANKERS’ MAG., Jan. 1905, at 62, 63 [hereinafter Comptroller Report of Dec. 5, 1904];
Ellen M. Henrotin, Women in Finance, NAT’L MAG., October 1897, at 51, 53-54 (showing
that the Comptroller of the Currency was tracking the sex of stockholders in national
banks as early as 1897). After 1921, the Comptroller’s Office issued reports on the
national banks that no longer broke out male versus female stockholders. The reports
are available online. See Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency: 1863-1980,
FRASER, https://perma.cc/5TWU-BPEQ (archived Feb. 12, 2022). Comparing the 1904
and 1921 reports indicates that women constituted 32.8% of national bank stockholders
footnote continued on next page
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for example, it reported that around a third of shareholders in national banks
were women.73
In November 1909, when sugar-trust investigations were making
headlines, reports surfaced that half of the stockholders of American Sugar
Refining Company were women.74 A few months later, when railway rates
were under fire, newspapers published similar reports about women’s
stockholding at the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad.75 One
in July 1904, but only 30.58% at the end of 1920. See Comptroller Report of Dec. 5, 1904,
supra, at 63; OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 62 (1921) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER ANNUAL REPORT
1921]. But women’s pro rata stockholding had grown: Women owned 21.04% of shares
in 1904 and 22.15% in 1920. See Comptroller Report of Dec. 5, 1904, supra, at 63;
COMPTROLLER ANNUAL REPORT 1921, supra, at 62.
73. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY TO THE THIRD SESSION OF
THE FIFTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 17 (1904). The 1904 data indicated
that women were a much greater proportion of national bank stockholders in some
regions than in others. For example, women were almost 43% of all stockholders in the
New England states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, and Vermont). See id. at 86 tbl.11.
74. See American Sugar Refining Co.: Women Make Up About Half the Stockholders as Shown at
the First of the Year, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1909, at 5 (noting that women were 50.20% of
stockholders); Congress May Probe the Sugar Scandal: Revelations Give Cannon a Chance to
Square Accounts with Parsons, It Is Said, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1909, at 2 (describing an
upcoming trial of sugar-company executives on November 29, 1909 in federal court in
Manhattan). Two years later, Edwin Atkins, American Sugar’s acting president, told
the Hardwick Committee that 10,000 of the company’s 18,000 New England
shareholders were women, many of them “school marms.” Sugar Trust Good Now:
Committee Also Told Women Are Principal Owners, BALT. SUN, June 13, 1911, at 11.
George Robb has estimated that “around 20-25%” of American shareholders were
women in 1910. GEORGE ROBB, LADIES OF THE TICKER: WOMEN AND WALL STREET
FROM THE GILDED AGE TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION 8 (2017).
75. See, e.g., More Women than Men: Interesting Statistics About the New Haven Stockholders,
BOS. GLOBE, June 21, 1910, at 13 (“There are more women than men shareholders in the
New York, New Haven & Hartford railroad company, according to an official
compilation made by that corporation under date of May 1, 1910.”); Women Holding
New Haven Stock: Females Number 7,087 and the Male Shareholders 5,746, BRIDGEPORT
EVENING FARMER, June 16, 1910, at 5 (reporting the same). The managers of the railroad
may have issued the data in an effort to influence the Mann–Elkins Act, which was
enacted on June 18 and impacted railroad companies’ ability to increase rates. See
Mann–Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910). For later data on the New Haven
Railroad’s women shareholders, see N.Y., NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD R.R. CO., GENERAL
STATEMENT OF THE AFFAIRS OF THE NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN, AND HARTFORD RAILROAD
COMPANY, FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1914, at 33 (1914) (containing data going back
to 1912); New Haven Shows Broad Distribution of Its Shares: Average Holdings on January 1,
1914 Were 59.9 Shares Against 69 Shares in 1913, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1914, at 2 (stating
that women still outnumbered male stockholders in 1914); Women as Shareholders. With
Guardians and Trusts Have 60 Per Cent. of the New Haven Stock., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1912,
at 11 (reporting that 60% of the 22,106 shareholders of the New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad Company were “women, trusts, and guardians”).
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report stated that officials of the railroad were “said to be considerably alarmed
over the last report which shows that women stockholders outnumber the
men by 5 per cent.”76 The editors noted that it was “a time when the railroad
would like to have none but the hardest-headed business men concerned in its
affairs, and privately the officials admit that the large percentage of female
holders constitute a menace.”77
The first major investigative reporting on women’s shareholding appeared
in 1913, when both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal published
sex-disaggregated data from surveys of the stockholder lists of major
companies.78 The New York Times study found that more than 40% of
76. Railroads Fears Women, MONTGOMERY TIMES, June 30, 1910, at 2.
77. Id. Another newspaper reporting on the same issue wrote that there was “good cause

for excitement” among the New Haven Railroad’s officials “as to what might happen if
the women should demand a seat in the directors’ meeting.” Announcements, MT.
CARMEL MORNING REG., July 1, 1910, at 4.
78. How American Stocks Are Owned.: Corporations Representing Eight Billion in Capital Give
Details About the Holdings of Investors, the Speculative Supply of Stocks, and Amounts Held
Here and Abroad., in N.Y. TIMES, ANN. FIN. REV. AFR4, AFR4 (1913) [hereinafter How
American Stocks Are Owned] (asserting that, from 1900 to 1912, “the number of blocks of
stock held in women’s names” among 193 large corporations had “quadrupled”); Owners
in Six Companies Increased 12.3% This Year: In Twelve Years Capitalization Increased 81.5
Per Cent and Number of Stockholders 204.7 Per Cent, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1913, at 1
(providing data for American Sugar Refining Company, Standard Oil New Jersey,
Pennsylvania Railroad, AT&T, and United States Rubber Company); In 63 Corporations
Women Own Nearly 166,000 Shares: The Hand That Rocks the Cradle Already Has the
Suffrage at the Corporation Polls, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1913, at 2 [hereinafter In 63
Corporations Women Own Nearly 166,000 Shares]. Both newspapers had published earlier
articles on women shareholders, but those articles provided only ad hoc numbers. See,
e.g., Giving Women Stockholders Precedence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1878, at 2 (reporting that,
according to the Pennsylvania Railroad’s assistant treasurer, “probably $500,000” in
dividends was paid to women shareholders on a day set aside for payments to women
exclusively); Many Holders of Stocks: Shares of Various Corporations Very Widely
Distributed, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1899, at 1 [hereinafter Many Holders of Stocks] (reporting
that “[a]bout one-half of the stockholders” of Western Union were women; “about 30
per cent. of the shareholders” of Consolidated Gas Company of New York were
“women and children”; and that a “goodly proportion of the Harlem Railroad
stockholders” were “women, savings banks, and trustees of estates”); Many New Holders
of Railroad Stock: Recent Depression in Prices Brought Many Buyers of Railway Securities,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1907, at 12 (reporting that the Pennsylvania Railroad had 25,100
men shareholders and 22,400 women shareholders); 28,000 Women Stockholders: They
Own $148,000,000 of Pennsylvania Road Shares—6,117 Since Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
1908, at 1 [hereinafter 28,000 Women Stockholders] (reporting that women shareholders
of the Pennsylvania Railroad numbered “about 28,000”); Women in Wall Street, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1909, at SM2 (reporting “nearly 25,000” women shareholders in the
Pennsylvania Railroad and 104,000 women shareholders of national banks); Country’s
Shareholders Show Heavy Increase in 10 Years: Since 1901, Shareholders of Railroad and
Industrial Corporations Have Been Trebled, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1911, at 2 (asserting that
“from 30% to 50% of the shareholders of the great corporations are women”); Heavy
Gains in Shareholders Are Reported by Corporations: Great Northern Shows Remarkable
footnote continued on next page
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individual shareholders in 193 companies were women; women held almost
one-sixth of the companies’ stock.79 The influx of women to shareholding was
viewed skeptically by some investors. As one explained, the fact that “women,
proverbially poor investors, are now more numerous than ever before on the
stock books of the companies” meant that those companies’ stocks were “out of
the hands that used to protect them in the market.”80
The next year, the Wall Street Journal published the results of a large study
of stockholders at American companies.81 At 199 industrial and utility
companies for which sex-disaggregated data was available, women comprised
40% of holders.82 At fifty-five railroad companies (and one airline), women
constituted 39.5% of stockholders.83 The Journal’s data revealed that women
made up a higher percentage of holders at companies with large numbers of
stockholders: At industrial companies with fewer than 500 stockholders,
women were 29.7% of the total, while at companies with more than 2,000

79.
80.
81.

82.

83.

Increase and Has 6,263 Women Share-Holders As on List, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1911, at 1
(reporting that women stockholders at the Great Northern Railway Co. had grown by
over 1,000% since 1901); Shareholders of Corporations Continue to Show Increases, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 4, 1911, at 1 (stating that in 1901, Boston Wharf Co. had 50,000 shares of stock
that was “largely held by trustees and women”); Corporation Shareholders Now Nearing
the One Million Mark: Feature of To-Day’s Installment is Report of Erie Railroad, Revealing
10,000 Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1911, at 2 (“[I]t is estimated that women own
35% of the outstanding shares of the leading corporations.”); Railroad and Industrial
Corporations with $9,000,000,000 Capitalization Owned by 873,000 Shareholders, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 31, 1911, at 6 (noting, among other statistics, that “[a]bout 50 per cent of the
shareholders of the American Sugar Refining Co. are of the so-called weaker sex”).
See How American Stocks Are Owned, supra note 78, at AFR4.
Of Interest to Investors, 8 INVESTMENT 231, 278 (1913).
See In 252 Corporations Women Shareholders Number 310,000, of Whom 130,000 Are
Railroad Shareholders and 180,000 Are Industrial Investors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1914, at 8;
Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders: Table No. 1—Railroad Corporations, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 28, 1914, at 8 [hereinafter Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders: Table No. 1];
Tabulation of Corporation Shareholders: Table No. 2—Industrial, Public Utility and
Miscellaneous Corporations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1914, at 6 [hereinafter Tabulation of
Corporation Stockholders: Table No. 2].
See Tabulation of Corporation Shareholders: Table No. 2, supra note 81. Data for 1913 shows
that women were a majority of holders at sixteen companies, comprising almost 8% of
companies that reported sex-disaggregated data: Adams Express (55.0%), American
Bank Note (51.1%), American Express (51.1%), American Sugar Refining (52.9%), AT&T
(52.5%), Cambridge Gas Light (55.2%), D.L. & W. Coal (50.7%), Eastman Kodak (65.2%),
Kings Co. Electric Light & Power (50.5%), Mergenthaler Linotype (53.8%), National
Biscuit (51.9%), Newark Consolidated Gas (50.7%), Otis Elevator (52.0%), Pennsylvania
Salt Manufacturing (60.0%), Union Natural Gas Corp. (51.5%), and United Fruit (50.2%).
Id.
See Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders: Table No. 1, supra note 81. Women were a
majority of stockholders at the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway. Id.
Sex-disaggregated data was available for a smaller set of forty companies for 1912;
women made up 40.1% of stockholders in that dataset. See id.
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stockholders, 42.2% were women.84 When the Journal published an update for
1914 (covering a mostly overlapping set of 200 industrial, utility, and railroad
companies), the percentage of women stockholders was 41%.85
The railroad industry in particular had relatively high numbers of women
investors.86 At the Pennsylvania Railroad, the largest and most influential
American railroad company,87 40% of stockholders were women by 1896.88

84. See Tabulation of Corporation Shareholders: Table No. 2, supra note 81. A similar, though

85.

86.

87.

88.

less pronounced pattern was evident for railroads. Women were 33.5% of stockholders
at railroads with fewer than 500 stockholders, but 40% of stockholders at railroads with
more than 2,000 stockholders. See Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders: Table No. 1,
supra note 81.
European Holdings of American Securities, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1914, at 7 (providing data
on women shareholders as of June 30, 1914). In addition to companies mentioned in
note 82 above, this 1914 data identified ten more companies where women were a
majority of stockholders: American Book (56%), American Telephone & Cable (56.5%),
Massachusetts Electric Company (52%), National Carbon (53%), Northwest Yeast (55%),
Standard Oil California (65%), Standard Oil Indiana (65%), Standard Screw (55%), Union
Oil of California (53%), and Western Union (51%). Id.
One of the earliest railroad companies in which women stockholders were reported to
outnumber men was the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company, which had 494
women shareholders and 345 men shareholders in 1908. See Frank Fayant, The Real
Owners of America, 12 APPLETON’S MAG. 664, 667-68 (1908); Frank M. Fayant, Real
Owners of America Shown in Stock Holdings: Banks, Railroads, Industrials and Other
Corporations Largely in Hands of the Small Investors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1908, at 6. In the
late nineteenth century, the most influential shareholder of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad was a woman. See Editorial Notes, 29 WOMAN’S J. 417, 417 (1898). In 1926, the
New York Times identified Emma Kennedy as the largest individual stockholder of both
the Northern Pacific Railroad and the Great Northern Railway Company. James Chief
Owner of Northern Roads: His Corporations Head Lists of Stockholders—Three Women
Among Leading Twenty., N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1927, at E11.
See George Brooke Roberts, Ten Pages, PHILA. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1897, at 4 (describing the
Pennsylvania Railroad as “the largest corporation of the continent”); see also Gardiner
C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44 Q.J. ECON. 561, 563
(1930) (identifying the Pennsylvania Railroad as one of the three largest corporations
in the country, and the only railroad among the top three).
See Solomon Huebner, The Distribution of Stockholdings in American Railways, 22 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 475, 486 (1903) (“[T]he Pennsylvania Railroad Company
reported that 40 per cent of its shareholders were women.”). A quarter of stockholders
of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad were women by 1900. See Women as
Stockholders, MINERS’ J. (Pottsville, Pa.), June 18, 1900, at 2. These percentages are
roughly consistent with the findings of a recent study of United Kingdom railroad
companies over the same period. See Graeme G. Acheson, Gareth Campbell, Áine
Gallagher & John D. Turner, Independent Women: Shareholders in the Age of the
Suffragettes 3 (Queen’s Univ. Ctr. for Econ. Hist., Working Paper No. 2018-09, 2018)
(finding that “women represented about 30 to 40 per cent of shareholders in each
railway company in our sample” during the suffragette movement in the United
Kingdom).
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Women moved into the majority temporarily in 1913 and again in 1927.89
Over the course of the 1920s, they also came to outnumber men at the Southern
Pacific Railway,90 and approached half of the shareholders at the Union Pacific,
Southern, and Norfolk and Western railroads.91 The high proportion of
women among railroad stockholders was recognized early on as having
implications for railroad companies’ corporate governance. It was viewed as
raising the “fiduciary burden” on managers because of women’s perceived
dependence on men to run the business.92 The Railway Age-Gazette argued that

89. The rise and fall of women stockholders at the Pennsylvania Railroad can be traced

through coverage in newspapers and other publications. See Pennsylvania Dividends.
How Widely the Distribution of Profits This Month Will Spread—Many Women
Stockholders., WALL ST. J., May 17, 1907, at 6 (reporting that 46.2% of stockholders were
women in 1907); 28,000 Women Stockholders, supra note 78 (47.7% women in 1908); Wide
Distribution of Pennsylvania Railroad Stock, 71 INDEPENDENT 616, 667 (1911) (47.02%
women in 1911); In 63 Corporations Women Own Nearly 166,000 Shares, supra note 78
(over 50% women in 1913); Woman’s Ownership of Corporations, CURRENT OP., Apr. 1914,
at 304, 304 (48% women in 1914); Foreign Liquidation in Railroad Securities: Statistics So
Far Indicate Small Selling Abroad, but Later Returns May Show a Change, WALL ST. J., Jan.
28, 1916, at 2 (48.6% women in 1916); Pennsylvania Railroad Shareholders 105,630: Increase
of 8,635 from November a Year Ago, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1918, at 2 (49.3% women in 1918);
H.W. SCHOTTER, THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD
COMPANY: A REVIEW OF THE CHARTER AND ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
RAILROAD COMPANY 1846 TO 1926, INCLUSIVE 441 (1927) (49.85% women at the end of
1926); Woman’s Investment Invasion: Overtopping Facts and Figures (pt. 2), supra note 54
(50.38% women in 1927); A.K. Darby, Influence of Women Gains in Corporations.,
EVENING SUN (Balt.), Dec. 16, 1927, at 50 (50.68% women by the end of 1927); see also
WRIGHT, supra note 62, at 239 (noting that the Pennsylvania Railroad “became known
as the ‘Petticoat Line’ because more than half of its shareholders were female”). The
percentage of women shareholders fell again in 1929. See Women Hold Less Stock in
Pennsylvania Road, OLEAN EVENING TIMES, Nov. 25, 1929, at 8 (attributing the fall to a
“recent employes [sic] stock allotment”).
90. Women Outrank Men Stockholders, supra note 54 (noting that 45.53% of stockholders of
the Southern Pacific Railway were women, while 44.99% were men).
91. See, e.g., Union Pacific Stockholders: Women 43% of 51,016 Stockholders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25,
1924, at 4 (noting that women accounted for 43% of shareholders); S. Ry. Sys.,
Advertisement, Woman Becomes a Partner in American Business, ATLANTA CONST.,
Feb. 21, 1929, at 6 (emphasizing that “[n]early one-half” of stockholders were women);
Women Outrank Men Stockholders, supra note 54 (reporting that 48.66% of stockholders
of Norfolk and Western Railway were women).
92. See Broadening Basis of Confidence, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1908, at 1 (suggesting that at the
Pennsylvania Railroad, “the fiduciary burden is all the greater, because its holders . . .
are women”). This notion was expressed by corporate managers for many years. See,
e.g., Traction Control Plan to Be Revised: McAneny Heeds Expert Views on the Need of
Changes in Placing Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1921, at 5 (quoting H. Hobart
Porter, Vice President of the Brooklyn City Railroad Company, as stating that “[a]bout
half of the stockholders are women, and we [the directors and officers], therefore, have
an unusual responsibility”).
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women constituted a “large dependent class” of railroad shareholders.93
Women were “a dependent class in two senses—financial and mental,” it
asserted.94
Louis Brandeis mentioned women stockholders three times in his 1914
book, Other People’s Money.95 Investors’ dependence upon banking experts had
been growing, Brandeis wrote, “since women and others who do not
participate in the management, have become the owners of so large a part of
the stocks and bonds of our great corporations.”96 Later, Brandeis emphasized a
connection between the proliferation of women stockholders and the general
lack of aptitude of small investors. He wrote:
The small investors, particularly the women, who are holding an ever-increasing
proportion of our corporate securities, commonly buy on the recommendation of
their bankers. The small investors do not, and in most cases cannot, ascertain for
themselves the facts on which to base a proper judgment as to the soundness of
securities offered. And even if these investors were furnished with the facts, they
lack the business experience essential to forming a proper judgment.97

Around the same time, William Cook, author of the popular legal treatise
known as Cook on Corporations,”98 then in its seventh edition, offered a similar
assessment. Years earlier, Cook had declared that “The Corporation Problem”
was “one of the great social questions of the age” and argued that the solution
lay in reinvigorating the role of the shareholder in corporate governance.99
This idea—that shareholder empowerment was the key to solving the
corporation problem—was commonly expressed by business experts at the
beginning of the twentieth century. In 1905, the Wall Street Journal proclaimed
93. Half the Stockholders Are Women, ST. LOUIS DAILY GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, Feb. 26, 1912, at 7

(summarizing undated statements in the Railway Age-Gazette).
94. Id.
95. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 8, 133, 199

(1914).
96. Id. at 8.
97. Id. at 199-200. Brandeis also pointed out that women were a majority of stockholders at

American Sugar Refining and nearly half at two major railroads. Id. at 8.
98. WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL

STOCK (Little, Brown & Co. 7th ed. 1913) (1887).
99. See WILLIAM W. COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM: THE PUBLIC PHASES OF
CORPORATIONS, THEIR USES, ABUSES, BENEFITS, DANGERS, WEALTH, AND POWER, WITH A
DISCUSSION OF THE SOCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS TO
WHICH THEY HAVE GIVEN RISE 87-91, 118 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1891); see also
Walter Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means
Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 391 (1977) (articulating Cook’s belief that
shareholders “needed a more effective voice in selecting the board and overseeing its
actions” and describing Cook’s arguments in favor of cumulative voting, shareholder
power to remove directors at will, shareholder approval of dividends, and greater
shareholder information rights).
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on its front page that “[a]nything that could be done to increase the interest of
stockholders in the active management of the corporations” was worth
trying.100
By the 1910s, however, Cook and other experts were changing their minds
about the value of shareholder empowerment. In 1914, around the time that
Brandeis published Other People’s Money, Cook argued that reformers of the
corporation should not rely on more active participation by stockholders. “You
might as well ask the clouds in the air to propel the railroad locomotives,” he
wrote dismissively.101 “The stockholders are multitudinous, widely scattered,
many of them women and estates. They give their proxies to whomsoever is in
control—blindly and automatically. Even when their confidence is abused they
are helpless and take their losses.”102 The writings of Brandeis and Cook
connected the rise of women’s stockholding in the 1910s to stockholders’
subordination and helplessness.103 Both men suggested that corporate law
should strive not to empower shareholders, but to shift power elsewhere.104
Around this time, newspapers also popularized a “war of the sexes”
metaphor for shareholding that alluded to women’s claims for political
citizenship. The Wall Street Journal observed on its front page that “[w]ere the
100. The Old Colony Way, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1905, at 1 (proposing that shareholders select

101.
102.
103.

104.

regional delegates to attend the annual shareholders’ meeting or that “important
questions of policy might be submitted to the stockholders who could cast their ballots
by mail”).
William W. Cook, A Plan for the Nationalization of Railroads, 24 YALE L.J. 370, 374
(1915).
Id.
Other writings, both earlier and later, made similar associations. See, e.g., Johnson, supra
note 65, at 630 (stating that when a corporation had many “corporators,” “[s]ome also
are women, some infants, and not a few are superannuated rich men, who desire relief
from the management of their property”); Natl. Conduit Shareholders Missed Opportunity:
Failure to Take Action Jeopardizes the Remaining Equity, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1922, at 8
(asserting that stockholders were “gradually losing their equity through failure to take
concerted action to protect their interests” and that “[o]f total stockholders, slightly less
than 50% were women with small holdings”).
BRANDEIS, supra note 95, at 92, 188 (advocating “publicity” and “decentralization” rather
than shareholder empowerment); Cook, supra note 101, at 374 (proposing to
nationalize the railroads rather than empower shareholders). In at least two
documented instances, companies were alleged to have taken steps to eliminate women
stockholders—and, in one of the two, Asian stockholders as well. See Adams Express
Company Wants Its Own Stock. Sends Letters to Stockholders Offering to Pay 190 a Share for
Holdings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1901, at 1 (describing a stock buyback scheme at Adams
Express targeting only women shareholders); “Freeze Out” Charged Against Big Oil Co.:
Minority Stockholders Make Serious Allegations About Officers of Hercules Oil Refining Co.,
L.A. REC., Jan. 16, 1904, at 3 [hereinafter “Freeze Out” Charged Against Big Oil Co.]
(describing a shareholder lawsuit alleging that officers and directors of the Hercules Oil
Refining Company initiated a scheme to “get rid of all of the women and Chinamen
stockholders”).
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holders of the shares of the American Sugar Refining Co. marshalled together,
the women on one side, the men on another, the latter would find themselves
considerably outnumbered.”105 This sentence, which imagined female and male
stockholders positioned like opponents on a battlefield, captured something of
the gender politics of the era.106 At the time, women were fighting, against
significant opposition, for the right to vote as citizens in political elections.107
Women would not win that right until 1920—and then only on the basis of a
single vote.108 They would, however, continue to be excluded from juries in
some states until 1968, reflecting continuing limits on women’s authority in
the public sphere.109
By the 1910s, business writers were already contemplating the managerial
control implications of a large body of women shareholders. The Wall Street
Journal observed that it was “unusual” for women stockholders to attend
stockholder meetings, but reported “a number of women in attendance” at the
1912 annual meeting of an unidentified “well-known company,” noting that
the women had “manifested an unusual amount of interest in the company’s

105. Million and a Quarter Owners in 327 Companies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1914, at 1.
106. See ROBB, supra note 74, at 59 (describing how women investors were perceived as

“invading masculine space”). The New York Times, in discussing women’s stockholding
in 1913, predicted that “[t]he rapidity of increases is such as to suggest the presence soon
of women in corporation Directorates,” and noted that the increase “suggests reasons
for the recent development of more generous policies in the treatment of employes
[sic].” How American Stocks Are Owned, supra note 78, at AFR4.
107. See generally OLIVIA COOLIDGE, WOMEN’S RIGHTS: THE SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA, 1848-1920 (1966) (describing the history of the suffrage movement before
1920).
108. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Essay, The History of the Women’s Suffrage Movement, 49
VAND. L. REV. 657, 668 (1996) (describing how a single vote cast by twenty-four-yearold Tennessee state representative Harry Burn resulted in the Nineteenth
Amendment’s ratification).
109. The Nineteenth Amendment did not make women eligible for jury service, and some
jurisdictions continued to exclude them. For example, women became eligible to serve
as jurors in New Jersey state court in 1921 and were excluded from federal juries in the
state until late 1936. See Comment, Women Jurors, 71 U.S. L. REV. 61, 76-77 (1937). When
Berle and Means published The Modern Corporation in 1932, women were still excluded
from state-court juries in Massachusetts, Florida, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, Texas,
and many other states. William B. Aycock, Courts—Jury—Exclusion of Women from the
Jury List, 25 N.C. L. REV. 334, 336 n.11 (1947) (listing sixteen states that did not permit
women to serve on juries as late as 1947). Women did not become eligible to serve as
jurors in Mississippi state court until 1968. See Women on Mississippi Juries, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 1968, at 33. Only in 1994 did the Supreme Court make it clear that striking a
juror solely on the basis of sex violated the Equal Protection Clause. See J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that, in a case concerning the
exclusion of men from a jury, peremptorily striking a juror solely on the basis of sex
violates the Equal Protection Clause).
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affairs.”110 In 1914, a Washington Herald headline announced that “women
could control public utilities of capital.”111 The article stated that women
owned “sufficient shares of the Washington Railway and Electric Company,
Capital Traction Company, and Washington Gas Company to overturn the
present managements.”112
The Wall Street Journal again focused on stockholders’ sex in a series of nine
articles beginning in early 1916, which together comprised another large study
of stockholder demographics.113 In these articles, the Journal reported that at
the beginning of 1916, women were 35% of stockholders at major copper
companies114 and major oil companies,115 37% of stockholders at industrial and
miscellaneous companies,116 40% of stockholders in tobacco companies,117 and
55% of stockholders of wire companies.118 Women were 48% of the common

110. Women Stockholders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1912, at 3. Smoking was prohibited at a 1917

111.
112.
113.

114.

115.
116.

117.
118.

DuPont Company stockholder meeting due to “women stockholders being present.” See
Seventy-One Per Cent. of Du Pont Stock Voted Against Purchase by Company of Disputed
Shares; Great Victory for Defendants, EVENING J. (Wilmington, Del.), Oct. 10, 1917, at 1.
Women Could Control Public Utilities of Capital: Own Sufficient Stock to Overturn the Present
Managements, WASH. HERALD, Mar. 1, 1914, at 20 (capitalization altered).
Id.
The year before, the Journal had also published data on the gender of stockholders at
companies like Pure Oil Company, International Rubber and Paper, and Wells Fargo &
Company. See, e.g., European Holdings of American Securities: Various Companies Report
Small Holdings of Their Stock Abroad, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1915, at 5; European Holdings of
American Securities, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1915, at 7.
Stock Ownership of the Copper Companies: On January 1 Six Had 14,765 Share-Owners,
Against 15,642 Last June, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1916, at 2. The presentation of the data is a
bit confusing, because some companies broke out their common and preferred
stockholders separately and had an additional third category for “women
stockholders.” Thus, it is not clear whether the women stockholders held preferred
stock or common stock or both. The Journal nonetheless included those companies’
total stockholders in the calculation of the percentage of stockholders who were
women—so the reported percentage was lower than the true percentage for companies
reporting sex-disaggregated data. In the text above, I use the Journal ’s reported
percentages. Some companies did not report the number of women stockholders for
1916 at all.
Oil Companies Stock Ownership Off 6%: Total of 38,733 Shareowners on Jan. 1 Compared with
41,055 June 30, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1916, at 6.
Stock Ownership in Industrial Companies: Twenty-Two Corporations Show an Increase of
6.6% in 18 Months, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1916, at 7 [hereinafter Stock Ownership in
Industrial Companies].
Stock Ownership of the Tobacco Companies: Small Foreign Holdings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7,
1916, at 3.
Stock Ownership in the Wire Companies: Four Telephone and Telegraph Corporations, Stock
209,060,700, Had 27,757 Stockholders Jan. 1, an Increase of 33% in Eighteen Months, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 9, 1916, at 5 [hereinafter Stock Ownership in the Wire Companies].
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stockholders of General Electric119 and 59% of those at Western Union.120
They also comprised 51% of stockholders at American Express121 and 62% of
those at Eastman Kodak.122 Though only two years had passed since the
Journal’s study of shareholding in 1914,123 this data showed meaningful growth
in the percentage of women shareholders—and confirmed a continuing
interest among the Journal’s readers in the gender of shareholding.
B. Women as Shareholder Activists
Louise de Koven Bowen, the daughter of a Chicago banker, became an
early pioneer of shareholder activism by leveraging her considerable
stockholding at several big companies to improve the companies’ labor
policies.124 Bowen was a social reformer and leader in Illinois’s women’s
suffrage movement when, around 1911, she began making demands on behalf
of workers at the Pullman Company, where she was a stockholder.125 Bowen’s
memoir, published in 1926, provides a unique firsthand account of her
shareholder activism.126 After hearing about abysmal worker safety
conditions, Bowen organized other Pullman shareholders, collected their
grievances, and wrote repeatedly to the president of the company, threatening
to “object to . . . [a] share of the profits because conditions were bad” for
workers.127 Pullman’s management responded by spending a large sum to build
a hospital and hire physicians for its workers; Bowen reported that workers’
health improved and she found the results of her activism “most gratifying.”128

119. Stock Ownership in Industrial Companies, supra note 116.
120. Stock Ownership in the Wire Companies, supra note 118.
121. Stockownership Figures for 12 Industrials: Corporations Named Including Miscellaneous Show

a Gain of 4% for Eighteen Months, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1916, at 2.
122. Stock Ownership in Industrial Companies, supra note 116 (appearing to include both
123.
124.

125.
126.

127.
128.

common and preferred shareholders).
See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
Today we would define Bowen’s activism as environmental, social, and corporategovernance (ESG) activism because it is related to social goals. Information about
Bowen’s activism is drawn from three sources: Alice Hamilton, What a Pullman
Stockholder Did: Made Managers Look Out for Men’s Health, MERIDEN MORNING REC.,
June 3, 1912, at 7; What One Woman Stockholder Did, INTER OCEAN (Chi.), Nov. 24, 1912,
at 6; and LOUISE DE KOVEN BOWEN, GROWING UP WITH A CITY 166-67 (1926).
BOWEN, supra note 124, at 166.
Indeed, the chapter of Bowen’s book that described her shareholder activism, titled
“Suffragists and Stockholders,” expressly links political and corporate suffrage. Id. at
157-70.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 167.
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“Flushed with my victory,” as she put it, Bowen began a new activism
campaign at the International Harvester Company, whose women employees
worked all night in the company’s twine mills.129 When Bowen protested the
practice in a letter to the company president, she was told that the president
“felt they should not employ women at night but that all the other directors
did not feel the same way, and now that a stockholder had objected he would
take [the matter up] with the board of directors.”130 International Harvester
ended the practice, so Bowen made another demand: a “minimum wage for
women.”131 The company implemented one. Bowen went on to join a
shareholder campaign at U.S. Steel that sought to eliminate the twelve-hour
workday, but reported that the campaign foundered when the United States
entered World War I.132 In her memoir, Bowen described her philosophy of
shareholder activism:
Stockholders are partners in a business in which they own shares; if they are
indifferent to the conditions under which their employees work they are as
culpable as if they were the actual employer, and while it is difficult to know the
details of a business in which one owns stock, it is always possible to acquire this
knowledge and to protest or approve at the annual meeting of the company to
which all stockholders are bidden.133

Bowen’s own activism took place behind the scenes rather than at shareholder
meetings. The press reported that Pullman’s management had asked her “why,
if she thought so badly of the company, she did not sell her stock and free her
conscience?”134 Rejecting this early articulation of the Wall Street Rule—that
dissatisfied investors should simply leave—Bowen replied that she would “keep
[her stock] and do something to better the conditions for the men who were
working for her.”135
C. The Expansion of Shareholding and the Great Bull Market
The bull market of the 1920s galvanized investors and placed Wall Street
at the center of the popular imagination.136 By all accounts, women
129. Id.
130. Id. at 167-68.
131. Id. at 168.
132. Id. at 169-70.
133. Id. at 170; see also id. at 165-66 (“I could not help but feel that, as a stockholder and

deriving my income from the profits of these corporations, I was at least partially
responsible for the grievances of which I was constantly aware, and it seemed to me
that as a stockholder I ought to bring about better conditions among working people.”).
134. What One Woman Stockholder Did, supra note 124.
135. Id.
136. Stockholding grew significantly during the 1920s; Julia Ott has written that “[t]he
number of U.S. households owning equity may have increased as much as sixteenfold”
footnote continued on next page
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participated eagerly as investors.137 Prestigious New York hotels, including the
Plaza and the Waldorf–Astoria, had suites reserved for women investors.138 A
“trope of women-in-the-market” became popular and brokerages began hiring
women to sell stock, bonds, and investment advice to female clients.139 As
historian Julia Ott has explained, the idea of women as investors “underscored
both the modernity and inclusivity of the Great Bull Market.”140 But, she
points out, those who deployed the women-in-the-market trope “sought to
defuse any radical implications” it might present, presumably because the role
of women as stockholders remained controversial.141 Henry Clews, who
founded the Wall Street brokerage Henry Clews & Co. in the nineteenth
century, expressed “militancy against woman’s participation in the business
world” until near the end of his life, when he professed that he had erred.142
“The woman investor has become not only a reality,” he asserted around 1922,
“but . . . before long I expect to see her a factor in national corporation
management.”143

137.

138.

139.
140.
141.
142.

143.

over the decade. See Ott, supra note 60, at 63-64. Several factors account for the steep
rise in the number of Americans who owned public-company stock after World War I.
These include the Liberty Bond movement, which introduced millions of Americans to
securities investment; the end of the bucket shop industry, which freed up money to be
invested on national stock exchanges; and the proliferation of employee stockpurchase plans. See ROBB, supra note 74, at 67-70; see also Ott, supra note 60, at 82
(“During the Great Bull Market, corporate stock distributors launched marketing,
advertising, and public relations initiatives that drew upon war loan precedents to
associate share ownership with political and economic liberty.”); Harwell Wells, The
Modernization of Corporation Law, 1920-1940, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573, 586-88 (2009)
(discussing the rise of stock investing in the 1920s). In addition, the enactment of a
federal income tax in 1913 helped encourage Americans to purchase stocks and bonds.
ROBB, supra note 74, at 69.
See ROBB, supra note 74, at 67 (noting that during World War I and over the next
decade, “women’s importance as investors continued apace” with growth in
stockholders).
GORDON THOMAS & MAX MORGAN-WITTS, THE DAY THE BUBBLE BURST: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF THE WALL STREET CRASH OF 1929, at 71-73, 204-05 (1979); see also Eunice
Fuller Barnard, Ladies of the Ticker, 227 N. AM. REV. 405, 406 (1929) (describing women
investors as “stenographers, heiresses, business women, housewives”); ROBB, supra
note 74, at 74-75 (providing detailed descriptions of women’s trading rooms).
OTT, supra note 7, at 186-88; see ROBB, supra note 74, at 71.
OTT, supra note 7, at 187.
Id. at 187-88.
Henry Clews, 65 Years Notable in Wall Street: Among Recognized Factors Before Arrival of
Vanderbilt, Gould, Fisk, Sage or Rockefeller, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1923, at 9 (suggesting that
Clews’s reversal came sometime between 1920 and 1922).
Id.
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In 1923, Owen Young visited the headquarters of General Electric with its
president, Gerard Swope, and addressed a group of the company’s foremen.144
A journalist later recounted how Young spoke about the apparently wellknown fact that more than half of General Electric’s stockholders were
women.145 Young “provoked laughter” by pointing out “that all the men in the
Company were working for women, both in the shop and at home.”146 This
anecdote is revealing not only because it evidenced widely shared knowledge
within General Electric that women were major holders of its stock, but also
because it suggested that male business leaders sometimes openly joked about
women’s stock ownership as subverting traditional gender roles. The
punchline, of course, was that women were expected to express authority in
the home, but not in business.
Other business leaders insinuated that women stockholders were a
problem for corporate capitalism. Clarence Barron, the founder of Barron’s
magazine, opined that “[w]idows and orphans, as shareholders, are the curse of
enterprise.”147 The same year, Alfred Sloan, Jr., the head of General Motors,
wrote of his worry that, at some point, the “diffusion of stock ownership must
enfeeble the corporation by depriving it of virile interest in management upon
the part of some one man or group of men to whom its success is a matter of
personal and vital interest.”148 Although Sloan did not mention women
directly, his word choice suggests a gendered meaning. He would have known,
144. Herman Bernstein, Owen D. Young: The New Type of America’s Industrial Genius, An

Interview, 2 MCCLURE’S MAG. 384, 385 (1926).
145. Id. General Electric was disclosing sex-disaggregated data about its shareholders in its

annual reports around this time. According to this data, women stockholders
outnumbered men for the first time in 1921, but the percentage of women stockholders
had dropped to 43% by the end of 1923. Compare GEN. ELEC. CO., THIRTIETH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 8 (1922) [hereinafter GEN. ELEC. CO.
THIRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT], with GEN. ELEC. CO., THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 10 (1924). 1921 was the last year in which General
Electric disclosed the exact number of women stockholders in its annual report;
thereafter it reported only percentages or ballpark estimates. See, e.g., GEN. ELEC. CO.,
FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 14 (1934) (“On
December 29, 1933, there were 188,316 holders of common and special stock, of which
number approximately one-half (exclusive of corporations, institutions, etc.) were
women.”).
146. Bernstein, supra note 144, at 385.
147. C.W. Barron, Wall Street Sermons: Orphanitis, or the Disease that Kills Big Corporations,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1926, at 1. Barron argued that the dispersion of stockholding put
companies into the “morgue for widows and orphans.” “It was this morgue that
swallowed up the New England railroads,” he argued. “Had business men owned [the
New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad] they would have fought for their
property and their profit.” Id.
148. Alfred Pritchard Sloan, Jr., Modern Ideals of Big Business: An Article on the New
Leadership—As Described to French Strother, 52 WORLD’S WORK 694, 697 (1926).
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in 1926, that women stockholders were surging into his own company. A few
years earlier, the Wall Street Journal had reported that approximately one out of
every four General Motors stockholders was a woman.149 By 1928, 38% of
General Motors’s shareholders were women and, by the late 1940s, women had
become a solid majority of the company’s individual shareholders.150
It was “readily understandable” that women would invest in companies
that produced products and services used by women, like National Biscuit,
American Sugar, and AT&T, asserted the Wall Street Journal.151 “But by what
call do the ladies roam into air brakes, steel mills, lead manufacture?”152 A
recurring theme was that women only had legitimacy as shareholders when
the company produced products and services used by women. One author of an
early book on stockholders wrote that “[t]he woman stockholder should be
given prominence in the classification for some companies, particularly
corporations dealing in household products, food stuffs, and clothing, where
such companies desire to develop the stockholder-customer idea.”153 Yet
149. General Motors Stockholders, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1921, at 8 (providing this statistic and

150.

151.
152.
153.

noting that as of October 1921, women were 21% of all common stockholders and
owned 6% of “the entire issue outstanding”). Soon afterward, the New York Times
reported a significant surge in stockholders at General Motors between October 5,
1920 and April 15, 1921. According to the Times, the number of women common
stockholders more than doubled over that period, from 3,459 to 8,110—an increase of
4,651. Gen. Motors Common Now Owned by 37,787: Number of Shares Held by 8,110 Women
on April 15 was 1,467,368, Average 180 Each., N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1921, at 24. Then,
between April and October 1921, 2,114 new women stockholders became owners of
shares of common, preferred, and debentures at General Motors, increasing the total
number of women shareholders to 17,230. Many Women in General Motors: At Last
Statement 17,230 Women Were Holders of Stock, EVERY EVENING (Wilmington, Del.),
Nov. 30, 1921, at 12. From October 1920 to October 1921, then, the increase in women
shareholders for General Motors exceeded 6,000.
See Women Hold Stock, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1928, at 8 (noting that women held “over 13
per cent of the entire outstanding capitalization of [GM]”); Big Concerns’ Stockholders All
Over U.S., CHI. SUNDAY TRIB., May 1, 1932, at A7 (indicating that 40% of General
Motors’s common stockholders were women at the end of 1930); Many Women Holders
of Stocks in Big Business, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1936, at 14 (noting that at the end of 1935,
women were 47% of all General Motors stockholders); GEN. MOTORS CORP., FORTIETH
ANNUAL REPORT 1948, at 22 (1949) (noting that at the end of 1948, 83% of General
Motors’s stockholders were individuals, and 56% of these were women).
Woman’s Investment Invasion: Quality Preferences (pt. 5), WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1927, at 14.
Id.
SEARS, supra note 58, at 61. The same idea surfaced in connection with calls for women
directors. “[Q]ualified women could undoubtedly make valuable contributions to
corporate earnings” on the boards of companies such as “the foodstuff and textile
companies, which make products which are sold largely to women,” a San Francisco
Examiner article argued in 1931. Who Owns American Business?, S.F. EXAM’R, June 16,
1931, at 24. At Standard Oil New Jersey’s 1950 stockholder meeting, a stockholder
remarked, “They also tell you that the National Dairy has put a woman on the board. I
think, since it is a national milk business, it is splendid to put a woman on the board. I
footnote continued on next page
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women remained prevalent as equity investors in many major American
industries, fundamentally challenging stereotypes about gender, business, and
financial economy.154
The influential Harvard economist William Ripley was particularly direct
in his critique of women stockholders.155 In his view—expressed only seven
years after the Nineteenth Amendment gave women the right to vote in
political elections—shareholder governance was less appropriate for women’s
participation than political governance:
The average stockholder is entirely unqualified to engage actively in
management. For a surprisingly large number of great corporations more than
half of the shareholders are women—in American Telephone for 1926, 200,000 of
the 366,000 were on the distaff side. Such a multitude are ill-fitted by training—
begging the moot point of sex—to govern directly, less so than in politics. These
business issues are far less simple, far less moral, and they make less appeal to the
imagination than those in the field of government.156

Contradicting Ripley’s view, however, was the fact that women had won the
right to vote in shareholder elections before they were granted the right to vote
in political elections.157 Ripley’s opinion that women were suitable to “govern

154.
155.

156.

157.

don’t think the petroleum business has any use for women directors . . . .” STANDARD
OIL CO. (N.J.), ANNUAL MEETING: JUNE 7, 1950, at 20 (1950). Four years later, a
stockholder of U.S. Steel opposed the nomination of a woman to the board: “Until U.S.
Steel has a nylon-making subsidiary, steel working is no job for the petticoats.” U.S.
Steel Annual Meeting Covers Girth, Mirth, Women—and Upturn in Business, supra note 27.
See infra note 160.
Though prominent as a corporations scholar, Ripley remains a troubling figure in
American corporate law. His writings on racial anthropology were as influential as his
work on economics; Ripley developed the “cephalic index,” a modern version of
phrenology, in his 1899 book The Races of Europe. See WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, THE RACES OF
EUROPE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 37-57 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1899). Madison
Grant acknowledged Ripley’s work in the bibliography of his book The Passing of the
Great Race. See MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE: OR, THE RACIAL BASIS
OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 281 (4th rev. ed. 1921); see also ALLAN CHASE, THE LEGACY OF
MALTHUS: THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE NEW SCIENTIFIC RACISM 96 (1977) (describing how
advocates of scientific racism used Ripley’s “cephalic index” as a “rationale for the
destruction of Jews, Italians, Slavs, and other non-Aryans”).
RIPLEY, supra note 57, at 129-30. The “distaff side” was a (now-obscure) reference to
women. See Distaff, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (last updated Dec. 2021),
https://perma.cc/X2Y5-PQQX (to locate, select “View the live page”) (defining “distaff”
as, inter alia, “symbolically, for the female sex, female authority or dominion”); see also,
e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act 3, sc. 2, ll. 117-18 (Paul Yachnin & Anthony
B. Dawson eds., 2011), https://perma.cc/HW99-M9SY (to locate, select “View the live
page”) (“[A]gainst thy state; Yea distaff-women manage rusty bills . . . .”).
For example, New York had, by statute, given married women the right to vote their
stock since 1851. See Act of June 30, 1851, ch. 321, 1851 N.Y. Laws 616 (authorizing
“married women who may be members or stockholders of any incorporated company,
to vote at elections of directors and trustees”).
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directly” only matters that were “simple” and “moral” reflected common gender
stereotypes of the era.158
In 1927, the Wall Street Journal published a five-part series under the
headline “Woman’s Investment Invasion,” extending the gender battle
metaphor from its reporting a decade earlier.159 In some detail, the articles
documented the growing proportion of female stockholders at particular
companies.160 For example, U.S. Steel reported to the Journal that in the ten
years from 1917 to 1927, its male stockholders had increased by 10.6%, while its

158. See, e.g., SARA M. EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 71-72,

179 (Free Press 1997) (1989) (describing the nineteenth-century origins of stereotypes
about “women’s moral superiority” and how, in the 1920s, women started breaking out
of the “strictures of Victorian morality”).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06; Woman’s Investment Invasion: Pioneering
Picturesqueness (pt. 1), WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1927, at 15; Woman’s Investment Invasion:
Overtopping Facts and Figures (pt. 2), supra note 54; Woman’s Investment Invasion:
Outstanding Personalities (pt. 3), WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1927, at 8; Woman’s Investment
Invasion: Ownership Distribution (pt. 4), WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1927, at 11; Woman’s
Investment Invasion: Quality Preferences (pt. 5), supra note 151. In the years leading up to
the New Deal, the idea that women were “invading” business was a recurring theme of
writings on business. See, e.g., Louis D. Brandeis, Our New Peonage: Discretionary Pensions,
73 INDEPENDENT 71, 71 (1912), reprinted in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 71 (William S. Hein
& Co. 1996) (1914) (describing “the invasion of women into industry”); Carol Bird,
Women to Rule in the Financial World: Wealth of the Near Future, and with It the Command
of Industry, to Be in Hands of Fair Sex if Present Trend Continues, Says Mrs. Bessie Q. Mott,
of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1928, at SM10 (quoting
Bessie Mott as saying that “[m]en always felt that woman . . . would never invade” the
field of finance, “[a]nd yet she has, and is”); Women Invading Every Business: Even
Professions Thought Sacred to Males Find Feminine Job Seekers, TRIBUNE (Scranton, Pa.),
July 22, 1924, at 3 (observing that “[b]usiness sanctums of men barricaded against
feminine intrusion these many years are being . . . invaded on every hand today by
pioneering women”); Alice E. Cutter, Bond Houses Aid Women Investors: Entry of Fair Sex
into World of Business Compels Special Service to Cater to Needs, S.F. EXAM’R, Oct. 6, 1924, at
16 (stating that “today from every walk of life we find women invading the business
world”); Each Career an Individual Problem, AUSTIN STATESMAN, Mar. 9, 1924, at 8
(quoting a prominent woman stating “I do not approve of women invading the
business world unless it is financially necessary”).
160. See Woman’s Investment Invasion: Pioneering Picturesqueness (pt. 1), supra note 159
(describing the appearance of women on Wall Street, with details about Victoria
Woodhull and Tennie C. Claflin); Woman’s Investment Invasion: Overtopping Facts and
Figures (pt. 2), supra note 54 (summarizing sex-disaggregated data for numerous
companies); Woman’s Investment Invasion: Outstanding Personalities (pt. 3), supra note 159
(reporting stories about early women investors, such as Catherine Wilkinson and
Hetty Green); Woman’s Investment Invasion: Ownership Distribution (pt. 4), supra note 159
(noting, for example, that 43% of the stockholders of Union Pacific Railroad were
women); Woman’s Investment Invasion: Quality Preferences (pt. 5), supra note 151 (noting,
for example, that at American Tobacco, women constituted 40% of common
stockholders and outnumbered men as preferred stockholders).
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women stockholders had increased by 25.4%.161 Over the course of a single
year, National Biscuit Company saw its stockholder list grow by 3,359, of
whom 2,030 were women.162
Robert Lovett, chairman of the Union Pacific Railroad, told the Wall Street
Journal that he suspected published reports undercounted women
stockholders.163 He explained that companies and journalists determined the
gender of stockholders from stockholder lists—they simply counted up the
number of feminine names.164 However, Lovett pointed out, many names on
the typical stockholder list gave initials in place of a first name, and initialed
first names were “always, uniformly” assumed to be a man’s name.165 Since
some women used initials in place of their first names, too, Lovett believed that
women accounted for a greater percentage of stockholder rolls than published
statistics suggested.166
161. Women Outrank Men Stockholders, supra note 54 (quoting U.S. Steel’s disclosure that

162.
163.
164.

165.

166.

“[w]hile men increased 7,921, women increased 10,950” over the ten-year period);
Woman’s Investment Invasion: Overtopping Facts and Figures (pt. 2), supra note 54. An even
more dramatic story had played out at General Motors, where more than 6,000 women
became stockholders in one year, from October 1920 to October 1921. See supra
note 149.
Women Outrank Men Stockholders, supra note 54.
Woman’s Investment Invasion: Quality Preferences (pt. 5), supra note 151.
See, e.g., id. On naming practices for the registration of stock, see Frederick A.
Wiseman, Stock Issue Problems—Registering Subscriptions, CORP. PRAC. REV., Mar. 1929, at
12, 22 (noting that women stockholders should be registered with a prefix of “Miss” or
“Mrs.” and that a married woman should be identified by her own name, not her
husband’s).
Woman’s Investment Invasion: Quality Preferences (pt. 5), supra note 151 (“When a stock
certificate is entered by initials in lieu of the full ‘first name’ of its owner, always,
uniformly, that certificate is officially taken to be in the name of a man—and, thus, it
comes about . . . that while a list of woman stockholders is bound to be a list in which
the given names are women indisputably, only, a list of male stockholders is a list of
men certain plus all the initialed uncertain ones.”); see also Women Stockholders Growing
in Power, ST. LOUIS GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, Aug. 12, 1927, at 12 (describing the 1927 series as
“a canvass of large corporations which has been conducted by Harry Alloway of the
Wall Street Journal”). Business law professor J.S. Nelson confirmed, based on personal
experience, that this gendered assumption endures in the twenty-first century. See, e.g.,
Hannah Sparks, Microsoft Patents New Software That Can Detect When Employees Are Lazy,
N.Y. POST (updated Dec. 3, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://perma.cc/C56K-F7CM (assuming
erroneously that law professor J.S. Nelson is a man).
See Woman’s Investment Invasion: Quality Preferences (pt. 5), supra note 151. In addition, it
is possible that women were the primary beneficiaries of stock held in trust. Although
this seems to have been a widespread assumption at the time, I have found no empirical
studies of the sex of trust beneficiaries from this period. Since stock held in trust was
voted by the trustee, not the beneficiary, companies categorized it separately from
stock owned by individuals. See LILLIAN DORIS & EDITH J. FRIEDMAN, CORPORATE
MEETINGS, MINUTES, AND RESOLUTIONS: CONTAINING FORMS AND PRECEDENTS AS WELL
AS A COMMENTARY UPON THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN QUESTIONS REQUIRING
footnote continued on next page
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The Waterbury Republican noted that if the trend continued, “we shall reach
a point where our largest industries are controlled by women.”167 Barron’s
magazine scoffed at this suggestion: “There is not the least prospect or
likelihood of any such petticoat majority as the Waterbury Republican
assumes,” Barron’s wrote, deploying a common pejorative term for women.168
Women’s stockholding was “not likely to be a decisive voting factor in the
lifetime of any reader of these notes.”169 Representation of women among
shareholders was “rather like their exercise of the franchise,” Barron’s argued:
“Not 25% of them take the trouble to register.”170
On the eve of the Great Crash, women were active as brokers, as investors,
and as shareholders.171 Twenty-two brokerage houses in New York had
women partners, as did nine in Los Angeles, three in San Francisco, and two in

167.

168.
169.
170.
171.

CORPORATE ACTION 21-22 (rev. ed. 1941) (discussing how shares held in trust were
voted). Even if the beneficiaries of stock held in trust were mostly women, the trustees
empowered to vote the stock were likely to be men. In some jurisdictions, as late as the
1940s, the law required trustees to vote stock in person—proxies were not valid—
which likely meant that many shares held in trust were never voted at all. See id. at 26
n.142 (collecting cases).
Stock and Votes for Women, BARRON’S, Aug. 29, 1927, at 12 (providing comments from
the Waterbury Republican); see also Darby, supra note 89, at 50 (noting that women “are
in position to wield tremendous influence in the election of directors if they choose to
pool their holdings” at various companies). The Independent argued that the Wall Street
Journal ’s findings about women stockholders had “social import”: “Women are much
more sentimental than men. Conscious of their control of American industry they
might effect some interesting changes in the relationship of capital and labor.”
Editorial, The Sexes in Industry, 119 INDEPENDENT 221, 221 (1927). In contrast, a
corporate lawyer at Sullivan & Cromwell, who opposed nonvoting common stock,
acknowledged that “recognition of the voting rights of all common stockholders may
lead to greater control by employees or customers,” but argued that “the social
consequences of changing the law . . . will be beneficial.” Eustace Seligman, The Relation
of Law to the Modern Developments in Property Ownership, PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. CITY N.Y.
442, 443 (1926).
Stock and Votes for Women, supra note 167.
Id.
Id.
In 1931, the New York Evening Post published an original study of stockholders’ gender
at forty-four large corporations, a group that included railroads, industrial companies,
and utilities, for the four years from 1928 to 1931. The study concluded that women
were about 41% of stockholders at these companies. See Otto W. Helbig, Women’s
Holdings Rise in Stock Lists, N.Y. EVENING POST, June 13, 1931, at 1 (financial section).
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Philadelphia.172 Women of modest means were purchasing common stock.173
Women also asserted an active role in shareholder governance by participating
in stockholder meetings, especially in defense of workers.174 One writer
predicted that when the history of the bull market was written, it would
recognize that “women for the first time in this country on a large scale
financially became people,” that is, an acknowledged part of the “vast new
trading capitalist class.”175
172. Flynn, supra note 67, at 26; see also ROBB, supra note 74, at 76 (“The number of women

stockbrokers more than quadrupled during the 1920s . . . .”). This was a change from
just a decade earlier, when, for example, the Consolidated Stock Exchange of New
York, the primary competitor of the New York Stock Exchange, specifically banned
its members from “in any way cater[ing] or encourag[ing]” securities dealing by
women. CONSOL. STOCK EXCH. OF N.Y., BY-LAWS art. III, § 15, reprinted in Regulation of
the Stock Exchange: Hearings on S. 3895 Before the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 63d
Cong. app. at 783 (1914).
173. Good Housekeeping, which offered advice to a young widowed mother about how to
invest her savings of $15,000, provided a snapshot of the trend. See Ruth Boyle, Your
Money’s Worth: A Widow’s $15,000, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Jan. 1929, at 96, 209. The
magazine consulted two investment advisers—one a man, the other a woman. See id.
The male adviser, emphasizing preservation of capital, recommended only bonds; his
proposed investments would have yielded $775 annually. See id. The woman adviser,
seemingly concerned about the widow’s future economic prospects and independence,
proposed investments of greater risk with “promise of increasing in value.” See id. She
advocated including preferred and common stock in the widow’s portfolio, a mix that
would have yielded a yearly income of $805. Id. The article revealed how gender
politics were shaping both the advice given to investors and investors’ choices, and
how the economic reality of 1920s womanhood related to women’s investment risk
tolerance. See id.
174. See, e.g., Fight Is On. Fitchburg Stockholders in Session, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 21, 1900, at 5
(describing nearly twenty women present among 300 at a special meeting of the
stockholders of the Fitchburg Railroad, and describing a woman stockholder, Mrs.
French, taking the floor to give remarks and making and later withdrawing a motion);
Pay for Jobs Lost Through Merger. Women Stockholders of Steamboat Company Remember
Faithful Employes [sic]., NEW-YORK TRIB., Oct. 15, 1904, at 1 (describing two women
stockholders insisting that merger proceeds be set aside for workers who lost their
jobs); supra Part I.A (describing the activism of Louise de Koven Bowen); Make Appeal
for Carmen: Mrs. Evans Proposes Arbitration., BOS. DAILY GLOBE, June 25, 1912, at 10
(describing a woman stockholder of the Boston Elevated Railway Company criticizing
management decisions related to labor relations and demanding that the company
allow its employees to unionize); B. & M. Holds Its Annual Meeting: Mr Bogigian Demands
Facts and Figures, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 10, 1917, at 11 (describing two women stockholders
at the Boston & Maine Railroad’s annual meeting, at least one of whom spoke); Am. Tel.
& Tel. Develops Along Normal Lines: Increase in Capital Necessary to Take Care of
Contingencies Coupled with the Continued Growth, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1923, at 2
(describing “a big sprinkling of women” at AT&T’s 1923 annual meeting); Stalemate
Ends Final Parley. Traction Interests Fail to Reach Compromise., CIN. ENQUIRER, Feb. 9,
1924, at 20 (describing a “protective association” formed among more than 4,000
“women stockholders” to “look after the rights” of the Cincinnati Street Railway
Company).
175. Barnard, supra note 138, at 406 (emphasis added).
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D. The Modern Corporation and Private Property
In 1932, Adolf Berle, Jr., a law professor, and Gardiner Means, an
economist, published what would become the single most influential book in
American corporate law: The Modern Corporation and Private Property.176 The
pair collaborated on the book from 1927 to 1932.177 A core insight of their
work was that, as America’s productive wealth was being concentrated into
large, publicly held corporations, ownership of corporations was separating
from control.178 “Economic power,” they wrote, was “tending more and more
to concentrate in the hands of a few corporate managements.”179 No company
better exemplified the separation of ownership and control than AT&T,
“perhaps the most advanced development of the corporate system.”180 The
Modern Corporation also repeatedly characterized small, dispersed shareholders
as “passive agents,” “passive owners,” and owners of “passive property.”181
1.

Gender and companies under “management control”

A major section of Berle and Means’s book was devoted to classifying
“control” at the 200 largest American companies at the beginning of 1930.182
176. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35. In 1991, Peter Drucker called The Modern Corporation

177.
178.
179.
180.

181.

182.

“arguably the most influential book in U.S. business history.” Peter F. Drucker,
Reckoning with the Pension Fund Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 106, 114.
Thomas K. McCraw, In Retrospect: Berle and Means, 18 REVS. AM. HIST. 578, 580-81 (1990)
(book review).
See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 3.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 3; see also id. at 4-5 (“Separation of ownership and control becomes almost
complete when not even a substantial minority interest exists, as in the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company whose largest holder is reported to own less than
one per cent of the company’s stock.”). Berle and Means’s “favorite example” of the
trends they memorialized in the book was AT&T, which between 1927 and 1932 was
among the American companies with the highest proportion of women stockholders.
McCraw, supra note 177, at 582 (describing AT&T as Berle and Means’s “favorite
example”); see also Helbig, supra note 171.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 66 (“passive agent”); id. at 346-48 (“passive property”
and “passive wealth”); id. at 354-56 (“passive property owner,” “owners of passive
property,” and “passive owner”); cf. Jennifer G. Hill, Images of the Shareholder—
Shareholder Power and Shareholder Powerlessness, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
SHAREHOLDER POWER 53, 57 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015)
(describing the “classic Berle and Means image of shareholders as powerless”). Part II.B
below discusses Berle and Means’s use of the word “passive,” the origin and gendered
meaning of the term, and its continuing influence on corporate law theory.
They found that “ultimate control” resided with the management of 44% of the 200
companies they analyzed. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 94. This group included
“management control—no single important stock interest” (the group analyzed in
Table 1 below), “majority of stock believed to be widely distributed and working
control held either by a large minority interest or by the management, presumably the
footnote continued on next page
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(Some other important contributions of the book are explored at greater
length in Part II below.) As part of their empirical analysis, Berle and Means
identified twenty-one companies “known to be” under management control
because their stock was so widely dispersed.183 Table 1 provides data on the
gender of stockholders at these twenty-one companies. For twelve of the
twenty-one, data on stockholder gender was published on at least one date
between 1920 and 1932. Among these twelve companies, women stockholders
outnumbered men at six, and the other six had large proportions of women
stockholders, ranging from 37% to “nearly half.”184 For seven of the remaining
nine companies, data on stockholder gender was published at least once before
1920 (but not after 1920); at all seven, significant proportions of women
stockholders were reported before 1920, ranging from 25.34% at the Missouri–
Kansas–Texas Railroad Company (1913) to 45.7% at the New York Central
Railroad Company (1916). Figures are reported to the closest ascertainable
decimal place.

latter,” and a subset of companies drawn from three categories: “minority control
through ownership of an important minority block of stock—remaining stock
believed to be widely distributed,” “joint control by two or more minority interests—
large public interests,” and “jointly controlled by other companies—virtually no public
interest.” BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 90-118.
183. Id. at 94, 107-09 tbl.7.
184. Although women stockholders outnumbered men stockholders at General Electric in
1921, the percentage of women stockholders later dropped. See supra note 145
(describing data on stockholder sex published in General Electric’s annual reports).
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Table 1
Berle and Means’s Twenty-One Companies Under “Management Control”
Company Name
AT&T
Western Union Telegraph
General Electric
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway
Pennsylvania Railroad
Southern Pacific
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Great Northern Railway
Northern Pacific Railway
Union Pacific Railroad
Southern Railway
U.S. Steel

Women Stockholders
Women outnumber men in 1910185
Women outnumber men in 1914186
Women outnumber men in 1921187
Women outnumber men in 1926188
Women outnumber men in 1927189
Women outnumber men in 1927190
44% women in 1929191
44% women in 1931192
43% women in 1931193
43% women in 1931194
“Nearly one-half” women in 1929195
37% women in 1930196

185. AT&T 1910 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 17.
186. Stock Ownership in the Wire Companies, supra note 118.
187. GEN. ELEC. CO. THIRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 145, at 8 (reporting figures

188.

189.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

showing that women were 50.15% of all stockholders); see also Herman Bernstein, Owen
D. Young: The New Type of America’s Industrial Genius, 2 MCCLURE’S 384, 385 (1926).
Atchison’s Stock Is Widely Held, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1926, at 3 (“[O]f the individuals
owning Atchison stock, 25,939 are men, with a total of 1,375,984 shares and 30,083 are
women, owning 995,357 shares.”).
See Woman’s Investment Invasion: Overtopping Facts and Figures (pt. 2), supra note 54; A.K.
Darby, Union Trust Company Directors to Consider Increasing Capital Stock, BALT.
EVENING SUN, Dec. 16, 1927, at 50. By 1932, the percentage of women stockholders of
the Pennsylvania Railroad had dropped to 43%. P.R.R. Stockholders Up, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 26, 1932, at 1.
Women Outrank Men Stockholders, supra note 54 (reporting that 45.53% of stockholders
were women and 44.99% were men).
Women Hold 41 Pct. of America’s Wealth, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS & TIMES, Dec. 27, 1929,
at 18.
James Heads List of Great Northern, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1931, at 5.
Id.
Helbig, supra note 171.
S. Ry. Sys., Advertisement, BRISTOL HERALD COURIER, Feb. 20, 1929, at 5; S. Ry. Sys.,
Advertisement, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 21, 1929, at 6.
Flynn, supra note 67, at 25; see also William H. Crow, Some Aspects of Extensive Stock
Distributions, 4 CORP. PRAC. REV. 46, 54 (1932) (stating that women constituted 36% of
U.S. Steel’s stockholders in 1931).

553

Corporate Governance and the Feminization of Capital
74 STAN. L. REV. 515 (2022)

New York Central Railroad
Delaware & Hudson
Boston Elevated Railway
Chicago and North Western Railway
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and
Pacific Railroad

45.7% women in 1916197
45.65% women in 1913198
40.48% women in 1901199
39.18% women in 1913200

Consolidated Gas Co. of New York
Missouri–Kansas–Texas Railroad
Electric Bond and Share
St. Louis–San Francisco Railway

37.8% women in 1913202
25.34% women in 1913203
Insufficient data
Insufficient data

39% women in 1914201

The data establishes a correlation between companies under management
control and those with a high proportion of women shareholders, but Berle
and Means did not note this phenomenon. Indeed, though data on women’s
growing role as shareholders was widely available at the time, the whole
subject of women’s stockholding is missing from their book.204 The omission
197. Stock Ownership in Forty-Five Railroads, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1916, at 7; see also C.M.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Keys, People Have Faith in American Stocks Despite Conflict, ELMIRA STAR-GAZETTE,
Oct. 10, 1914, at 10 (estimating women stockholders at 37.5% for 1914).
Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders, Table No. 1—Railroad Corporations, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 28, 1914, at 8.
Stock List’s Increase., BUFF. EVENING NEWS, Apr. 19, 1901, at 4.
Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders, Table No. 1, supra note 81.
European Holdings of St. Paul Stocks Over 7 %, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1914, at 5. At the time,
this was the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad.
Tabulation of Corporation Shareholders, Table No. 2, supra note 81.
Tabulation of Corporation Stockholders, Table No. 1, supra note 81.
Berle and Means did identify two women among the twenty largest stockholders of the
Pennsylvania Railroad. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 85 tbl.10. They would
certainly have been aware of the growing proportion of women stockholders. For
example, in April of the year that The Modern Corporation was published, the Corporate
Practice Review asserted that women constituted “30 to 50% of the aggregate
shareholders of most listed corporations.” Crow, supra note 196, at 54. The preceding
year, the Wall Street Journal had published articles revealing that most stockholders at
IBM were women, that 48% of the stockholders of General Foods were women
(including individual and joint stockholding), and that more than 100,000 women
stockholders at the Pennsylvania Railroad owned one-third of its stock. See I.B.M.
Holders Gain: Increase 20% During 1930, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1931, at 7; General Foods
Holders: About 48% of 44,400 Owners of Company Shares Are Women, WALL ST. J., June 19,
1931, at 17; Pennsylvania Average Holdings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1931, at 9. Berle and
Means noted that they relied upon newspapers as a source of information on stock
holdings of the companies they studied, which suggests that they would have seen
news coverage of the feminization trend. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 91.
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of women is particularly noteworthy in light of Berle and Means’s admonition
that “[t]he passing of ownership from the hands of the managing few to the
hands of the investing many raises the question of who these multitudinous
investors may be, from what income classes they are drawn—in other words,
who the owners of the nation’s industries now are.”205 Berle and Means did not
answer their own question.206 Who were these “multitudinous investors”? An
increasing proportion were women.
2.

The customer stockholder

Berle and Means did opine briefly that “two comparatively new
developments” had “contributed in very large measure to the increase in the
number of stockholders—ownership by customers and ownership by
employees.”207 Their discussion of customer stock ownership may have been
an oblique reference to women stockholders.208 Evidence from the 1910s and
1920s suggests that some business experts consigned women shareholders to
the category of “customer-stockholders,” or perhaps used the term
euphemistically to mean women. After all, it was as customers, rather than as
shareholders, that women’s participation in business conformed to gender
stereotypes.209 The value of women shareholders to a corporation was often
205. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 59.
206. One might think that legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s—a group to which Berle and

Means are sometimes assigned—would have noted the “social reality” of women’s rise
as stockholders. As William Bratton points out, however, scholars disagree about
whether Berle and Means truly were legal realists. See William W. Bratton, Berle and
Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 740-41 (2001). To a large
extent, the corporate law literature’s depiction of the expansion of stockholding in the
1920s—which has overlooked women completely—traces back to the work of a few
economists, including Gardiner Means, who studied the diffusion of stock ownership
in the 1910s and 1920s. See, e.g., Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in
the United States, 44 Q.J. ECON. 561, 591 (1930) (finding that “a great distribution of stock
ownership took place during the war and immediate post-war periods, increasing both
the number of stockholders and the proportion of corporate industry owned by
persons of moderate means”). For his part, Means presented the expansion of stock
ownership in terms of socioeconomic class, and never directly discussed women
stockholders. See, e.g., id. at 571 (contrasting stock ownership “by the rich” with
ownership “by the less well-to-do”). Means’s study expanded on an analysis published
by H.T. Warshow in 1924, which only briefly discussed women stockholders. See H.T.
Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the United States, 39 Q.J. ECON. 15,
33 n.2 (1924) (describing correspondence between the author and the National Biscuit
Company in which the company raised the subject of women shareholders).
207. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 56.
208. But see id. at 59 (discussing how “a new market for corporate securities was sought in
the man of smaller income, the employee and the local customer”).
209. See, e.g., OTT, supra note 7, at 166 (customer ownership programs “associated
stockownership with consumption and all its traditionally feminine connotations”).
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framed in terms of their consumer purchasing, rather than in terms of
shareholder governance or business oversight. For example, in 1918, Ward &
Mackey Biscuit Co. ran ads proclaiming that “We Want Women Stockholders,”
because women “do 90 per cent of the buying.” The ads explained,
It is women who say what should be bought and what should not be bought for
the home. Hence it is that we want women as our stockholders as well as men,
because women choose and buy the family Bread—and if they own an interest in
this Company they will naturally always demand its Superior Bread Products.210

National Biscuit Company took a similar view a decade later. Its corporate
secretary asserted that “[t]here is only one class of stockholder we are really
interested in keeping track of and that is, the number of women stockholders,
as they are the real purchasers of this company’s product.”211 And a decade after
that, one scholar wrote that business executives were “quick to realize the
importance” of women’s shareholding “in view of the fact that about 85% of the
retail purchasing is done by women.”212 Berle and Means discussed “customer
ownership” in a few paragraphs without ever mentioning women, asserting
that customer ownership did not “appear[] likely to affect an appreciable
proportion of all stock ownership.”213
E. Women Move into the Majority
The feminization of the stockholder class continued, unabated, after the
publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Studies in the 1930s
and 1940s continued to find that women were a growing proportion of
shareholders.214 In 1939, Monsanto Chemical Corporation published a detailed
210. Ward & Mackey Biscuit Co., Advertisement, We Want Women Stockholders—We Need
211.

212.
213.
214.

Them More Than We Need Their Money, PITT. PRESS, Mar. 12, 1918, at 12.
Warshow, supra note 206, at 33 n.2; see also SEARS, supra note 58, at 61 (“The woman
stockholder should be given prominence in the classification for some companies,
particularly corporations dealing in household products, food stuffs, and clothing,
where such companies desire to develop the stockholder-customer idea.”).
Crow, supra note 196, at 54.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 56.
For example, a 1936 study by Frazier Jelke & Co. found that 48% of the stockholders of
twenty-seven “representative” companies were women. Half of Stockholders of 27
Companies Women, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 24, 1936, at 15; see also MARY SYDNEY BRANCH,
WOMEN AND WEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF AMERICAN WOMEN 53
(1934) (noting that “women made up on the average 43 per cent of the stockholders”). A
1948 study of major manufacturing corporations reported that women stockholders
outnumbered male stockholders at 23 of 31 companies that had sex-disaggregated data
for their common stockholders. Extrapolating from this data, the survey’s authors
estimated that “women comprise 51% of all common stockholders” in a survey sample
of 120 corporations. Who Owns “Big Business”? Analysis of Stockholdings in Largest
Corporations: Part 1—Manufacturing, supra note 45, at 7. A study published the following
year found similar results for major banks. Women stockholders outnumbered men
footnote continued on next page
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study of its holders in the “typical American city” of Cincinnati, Ohio, home to
sixty women and forty-three men shareholders.215 Among the women
shareholders were teachers, secretaries, retirees, homemakers, a physician, a
musician, a photographer, and the treasurer of a local corporation.216 Although
the women shareholders outnumbered the men, the article featured more male
shareholders, and even showed a photo of one shareholder’s husband in her
place.217
The “ladies” had been “moving into the spotlight in many corporate
sessions,” the Wall Street Journal reported in 1949.218 Throughout this era,
corporate managers attended the annual meetings that put them face-to-face
with the company’s “bosses”—increasingly women.219 Contemporaneous

215.

216.

217.

218.

219.

stockholders at 31 of 66 banks with sex-disaggregated data on stockholding; among 62
banks that had sex-disaggregated data on pro rata shareholding, women owned more
stock than men at 11. Who Owns Big Business? Analysis of Stockholdings in Largest
Corporations: Part 2—Banking, 88 TRS. & ESTS. 208, 209-10 (1949). An additional 1949
study of utility companies found that “most” reported that women owned “between
40% and 50% [of] the common stock issued,” and estimated that women were 44% of
individual stockholders of utilities. Who Owns Big Business? Analysis of Stockholdings in
Largest Corporations: Part 3—Utilities; Transportation, 88 TRS. & ESTS. 600, 600 (1949). A
study of Merrill Lynch’s Los Angeles branch in 1939 and early 1940 found that 25% of
its 2,828 customer accounts belonged to women. EDWIN J. PERKINS, WALL STREET TO
MAIN STREET: CHARLES MERRILL AND MIDDLE-CLASS INVESTORS 153 (1999).
Who Owns Monsanto in Cincinnati? A Typical American City—The Middletown of
Monsanto, MONSANTO MAG., Jan. 1939, at 18, 18-20 [hereinafter Who Owns Monsanto in
Cincinnati?]; Howard A. Marple, Who Owns Monsanto, MONSANTO MAG., Jan. 1939, at 4,
4-5 (stating that Monsanto had 4,300 men shareholders, 4,084 women shareholders, and
2,708 “other stockholders,” including 387 joint holdings).
Who Owns Monsanto in Cincinnati?, supra note 215, at 20-30. All the shareholders shown
in photos appeared to be white; the descriptions suggested that all were middle-class or
wealthy.
Louise Gamble’s husband, Cecil Gamble, appeared in a photo in her place. The photo
caption made clear that it was Louise, and not Cecil, who owned stock in Monsanto. Id.
at 29.
Owners Arise ! Annual Meetings Draw Record Attendance and Pointed Questioning, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 27, 1949, at 1. The authors of a 1948 survey on stockholders in manufacturing
companies expressed surprise at the high proportion of women stockholders “not only
in the more lady-like type of business but in such rugged and sometimes variable
enterprises as copper mining, oil refining, steel, tobacco and aircraft manufacture.”
Who Owns “Big Business”? Analysis of Stockholdings in Largest Corporations: Part 1—
Manufacturing, supra note 45, at 7.
A number of accounts during this period reported that women equaled or
outnumbered men at annual meetings. See, e.g., Also Rationed: Gen. Foods Head Cites
Policy on Dividends, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1943, at 16 (reporting that General Foods
Corporation’s 1943 annual meeting “was attended by about as many women as men”);
Women of Steel Give Top Brass a Hard Time, LIFE, Mar. 13, 1950, at 46, 46 (stating that
women made up more than half of attendees at a 1950 shareholder meeting of U.S.
Steel); see also George Koether, GM’s Fifty Years of Men, Money and Motors, LOOK, Jan. 7,
1958, at 14, 23 (characterizing stockholders as directors’ “bosses”).
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photos of annual meetings of big companies—AT&T, General Motors, U.S.
Steel—show significant attendance by women, confirming firsthand accounts
that depicted women as active participants, not only on board representation
but on all matters of business.220
In 1954, the Chair of the SEC likened the pace of investment—and its social
impact—to “the rush to settle the West.”221 When G. Keith Funston took the
helm of the New York Stock Exchange in 1951, one of his first acts was to
commission a census of stockholders.222 This initiative grew into a series that
documented changes in the gender and socioeconomic demographics of stock
ownership. The first stockholder census reported that, in 1952, roughly the
same number of men and women owned public-company stock in the United
States across the market.223 Every successive census—in 1956, 1959, 1962, and
1965—found that women stockholders outnumbered men stockholders.224
220. Stockholders Have Share in Management Policy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 21, 1950, at 14

221.

222.
223.

224.

(containing a ten-photo spread showing many women in attendance at RCA’s 1950
annual meeting). See, e.g., Salaries of Rail Heads Attacked: Usually Passive Stockholders of
Pennsylvania Heckle Management at Meeting, OAKLAND TRIB., Apr. 13, 1933, at 21
(describing women stockholders of the Pennsylvania Railroad as “heckl[ing]” managers
regarding executive pay); Feminine Delegation Turns Borden Meeting into Labor Forum but
Stockholder’s Request Brings News of Big Gain in Earnings, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1936, at 8;
Gifford Assails A.T.&T. Report: Telephone Firm President Hits Rate Cut Study as
“Misleading,” EVENING STAR (D.C.), Apr. 20, 1938, at A17 (describing statements by a
woman stockholder at AT&T’s annual meeting referencing AT&T’s “400,000 women
stockholders”); Woman Investor, A.T.&T. at Odds on Equipment Sale, WASH. POST, Mar. 15,
1945, at 14; Koether, supra note 219, at 23 (containing a photo showing women in the
audience at General Motors’s 1957 annual meeting).
Ralph H. Demmler, Chairman, SEC, Address Before the Pittsburgh Chapter of the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 2 (Jan. 13, 1954)
(on file with author).
Jonathan A. Brown & Howard C. Bronson, New York Stock Exchange Research Program
on Share Ownership, 8 J. FIN. 129, 129-30 (1953).
KIMMEL, supra note 5, at 90 (stating that there were 3,230,000 female stockholders and
3,260,000 male stockholders in the United States); id. at 75 (“Of the estimated 27.4
million shareholdings in common stocks, about 10.3 millions or 37.5 per cent are in the
names of women. The comparable figures for men are 10.2 millions and 37 per cent.”);
see also Wubbels, supra note 27, at 3 (discussing an unidentified “recent survey” which
found that 51% of all stockholders were women).
N.Y. STOCK EXCH., WHO OWNS AMERICAN BUSINESS?, supra note 29, at 6 (showing that
in 1956, women were 51.6% of individual stockholders); N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SHARE
OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA: 1959, at 9 (1960) [hereinafter N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SHARE
OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA: 1959] (showing that in 1959, women were 52.5% of individual
stockholders); N.Y. STOCK EXCH., THE 17 MILLION: 1962 CENSUS OF SHAREOWNERS IN
AMERICA 6 (1963) [hereinafter N.Y. STOCK EXCH., THE 17 MILLION] (showing that in
1962, women were 51% of individual stockholders); N.Y. STOCK EXCH.,
SHAREOWNERSHIP U.S.A.: 1965 CENSUS OF SHAREOWNERS 6 (1966) (showing that in 1965,
women were 51% of individual stockholders). Starting in 1954, the NYSE launched an
advertising campaign with “advertisements frequently featuring husbands and wives
talking together about stocks, with wives explicitly looking to their seemingly more
footnote continued on next page
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After the publication of the first stockholder census, a University of California
economist, William Crum, recommended in the Harvard Business Review that
companies standardize public disclosures of sex-disaggregated data about their
shareholders.225 Crum offered no explanation for the recommendation and, in
an accompanying article, did not discuss the recommendation.226 Apparently,
the usefulness of sex-disaggregated information about stockholders was selfevident to a reader of the Harvard Business Review.
Writers tended to assume that women came to stock ownership mainly
through inheritance, or that men were putting stock in their wives’ names for
tax reasons.227 As late as 1978, the head of AT&T’s stock and bond division told
the New York Times that “[a]ll the women owners would suggest a lot of
widows.”228 The implication was that women were not “real” stockholders
with the aptitude and interest to participate in corporate affairs.229 But these

225.
226.
227.

228.
229.

knowledgeable spouses to make investing decisions.” JANICE M. TRAFLET, A NATION OF
SMALL SHAREOWNERS: MARKETING WALL STREET AFTER WORLD WAR II, at 153 (2013).
Editorial, A Proposal to American Business, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1953, at 33, 34-35;
W.L. Crum, Analysis of Stock Ownership, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1953, at 36, 37.
See Crum, supra note 225, at 36 (suggesting in general terms that data concerning “other
characteristics of the corporation’s individual stockholders” could be useful).
See, e.g., Who Owns American Business?, supra note 153 (“Women bulk so large on the
[stockholder] list today because of inheritances and gifts.”). In an early study of the
diffusion of stock ownership, Gardiner Means considered the matter of wealthy men
putting stock in their wives’ names for tax purposes. Means, supra note 206, at 582.
Means’s study, based on income-tax returns, proclaimed a “shift of almost
revolutionary proportions” in stock ownership from 1916 to 1921: He found that the
very wealthy owned 57.2% of corporate stock in 1916, but only 36.8% in 1921, while
“individuals with small to moderate incomes” increased their ownership from 21% to
44% over the same period. Id. at 573-74. In producing his analysis, Means considered
whether the income tax data was distorted because men were distributing their stock
among members of their families, including their wives, to save on taxes. See id. at 582.
He concluded that less than one-eighth—and “probably” not more than onetwentieth—of the shift in ownership was attributable to married couples splitting their
incomes and filing separate tax returns. Id. at 584. Means attributed the rise in stock
ownership by low-income and middle-income Americans during and immediately
after World War I to several factors: a surtax on the highest-earning taxpayers, the
receipt by lower-income workers of greater income, and the Liberty Bond campaigns.
Id. at 585.
N.R. Kleinfeld, A.T.&T. Stockholders: Valuing Stability and Yield, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1978, at D1.
For an example, see J.A. Livingston, Funston Abets Myth That Women Control Wealth,
WASH. POST, June 26, 1959, at B8 (conceding the “statistical side of the story” but
arguing that “[m]any women own stock in name only” because “women in our society
have a big enough job—raising children and running the household”). The academic
statistician Edwin Burk Cox, who published a major study of shareholder
demographics using 1960 data, openly refused to recognize married women as
legitimate stockholders. Cox wrote, “Women are often the legal owners of stock only
because their husbands chose to register the stock that way. It would be misleading to
footnote continued on next page
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assumptions relied on gender stereotypes and ignored the changing role of
women as economic actors.230 Among other factors, the “rise of the
independent business woman, who is buying investment securities out of her
own earnings,” contributed to women’s growing participation in business as
shareholders.231
In its censuses, the NYSE surveyed stockholders to learn how they first
came to acquire stock. In 1952, it found that fewer than one third of women
stockholders had acquired stock primarily by inheritance or gift; most women
cited profit-driven reasons for buying stock, like most men.232 The 1959
stockholder census surveyed new stockholders—those who had acquired stock
for the first time since 1956—and found that only 17% of new women
stockholders had inherited their shares.233 A full quarter had acquired stock
through their employers;234 the greatest proportion had purchased stock
through a broker.235 A different reason may help explain why a large number
of women were investing in common stock. Due to sex discrimination,
women’s wage labor was poorly compensated relative to that of men.236 But

230.

231.
232.
233.
234.

235.
236.

infer that in any real sense such women are stockholders.” COX, supra note 44, at 13.
Cox believed that, for joint husband–wife stockholdings, “perhaps only the
characteristics of the husband should be used in allocating the holding to a category.” Id.
Cox went on to erase women and gender from his statistical analysis; he presented
companies’ data about stockholder age, income, and occupation only. When Cox
fashioned his own surveys, he requested age, income, and occupation data about the
“head of household,” not about the stockholder himself or herself. See id. at 171-72.
Stock owned by a woman in the household would have been attributed to the male
head of household, if there was one.
For example, historians have noted that, during World War I, savings bonds
introduced millions of Americans to the securities markets, encouraging both women
and men to invest in big companies by “equat[ing] investment with the obligations and
rights of citizenship.” OTT, supra note 7, at 76; see id. at 76-99 (describing America’s warloan program during World War I and noting that “women’s, labor, African American,
and ethnic associations” were “particularly important in the financial mobilization of
the home front”).
Who Owns American Business?, supra note 153.
KIMMEL, supra note 5, at 121-22.
N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SHARE OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA: 1959, supra note 224, at 9.
Id. It is hardly surprising that a significant proportion of new women stockholders
obtained stock through their employers; women were moving into the workforce at a
high rate. See Barbara R. Bergmann, The Economics of Women’s Liberation, CHALLENGE,
May 1, 1973, at 11, 12 (“Between 1950 and 1970, the number of men working increased
by 15 percent, while the number of women working increased by 70 percent.”).
N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SHARE OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA: 1959, supra note 224, at 9.
For a history of women’s wage labor in the United States, see generally ALICE KESSLERHARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
(1982) (providing a comprehensive overview); SHENNETTE GARRETT-SCOTT, BANKING
ON FREEDOM: BLACK WOMEN IN U.S. FINANCE BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 79 (2019)
(discussing women’s lower wages in the context of the St. Luke Bank, the first and only
footnote continued on next page
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the dividends paid on a share of stock were the same for all owners, regardless
of their sex. The fact that women could expect equitable returns for their
investment of capital in common stock may have encouraged women to save
and invest when possible. Thus, sex discrimination itself may have played a
role in the feminization of capital. Although little historical work has been
done to understand why women moved into purchasing stock in large numbers
at this time, it seems likely that a significant part of the trend can be attributed
to the working, saving, and investing habits of American women during this
period.237
After World War II, women shareholders began publicizing the
feminization of capital in an attempt to harness its power. A shareholder
campaign to put women on boards of directors began in the late 1940s and
continued for many years, though it suffered a setback in 1954 when the SEC
narrowed the Shareholder Proposal Rule.238 Wilma Soss described herself as
the leader of the “women’s economic suffrage movement”239 and spoke of
women’s “right to be represented on the boards of large corporations” because
of their domination of stockholder rolls.240 Yet women’s efforts to translate
their significant shareholding into managerial power were met with resistance.
An exchange on the floor of the shareholders’ meeting of Standard Oil
New Jersey sheds light on the gender dynamics of corporate power during this
era. At every annual meeting from 1947 to 1952, shareholders had risen to ask
the company to add a woman to the board of directors.241 Every year, Standard

237.

238.

239.
240.
241.

U.S. bank run by Black women); Bergmann, supra note 234, at 14 (arguing that
“[d]iscrimination against women is an important factor in keeping women segregated
by occupation and earning low pay”).
Cf. Christine Sgarlata Chung, From Lily Bart to the Boom-Boom Room: How Wall Street’s
Social and Cultural Response to Women Has Shaped Securities Regulation, 33 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 175, 204 (2010) (noting that “the limited statistics that are available” from the
1930s “raise questions about whether the widow/orphan storyline captured all
women’s stock market experiences”). Another possible factor was the rise of the
woman’s club movement at the turn of the century. One writer suggested that, by
putting women in charge of woman’s club investments, the trend “educated many
women to a broader view of financial conditions and in the ethical questions involved,
in handling the money of others.” Henrotin, supra note 72, at 54.
See Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-4979, 19
Fed. Reg. 246, 246 (Jan. 14, 1954). For additional discussion of the shareholder-proposal
mechanism, see Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering
of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 272-74 (2016).
Michael Norman, Wilma Porter Soss, 86, A Gadfly at Stock Meetings of Companies, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1986, at B20.
Logan, supra note 27, at 34.
In addition to the 1953 transcript quoted in the text and cited below, I have reviewed
condensed stenographic transcripts of Standard Oil New Jersey’s annual stockholder
meetings from 1945 through 1952.
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Oil’s executives gave the same response: The company did not discriminate
against women, but no qualified woman had ever presented herself.
When the subject was raised again at the 1953 meeting, one exasperated
shareholder pointed out that there were “109,000 women shareholders and
90,000 men” at the company. “It looks ridiculous that there isn’t at least one
woman with enough sense to be on the Board,” she said.242 Standard Oil New
Jersey’s chairman, Frank Abrams, repeated the company’s pat response:
“[W]hen we find a woman who can contribute to the problems we have to face
on the Board and help us in their solution we will be glad to get her help.” Then
he said:
I know that there are lots of things that we don’t see that women wouldn’t miss. I
was going to say that first they would start with our interior decorating which
may not be good—but I know there are lots of things they would be helpful with.
But on the average, I don’t think, in all fairness to us, that we have found a
woman who could make the contribution of a man.243

His words revealed not only blatant sexism, but also the confidence of a
corporate leader who knew that his own control over the levers of firm
power—control granted to him by corporate law—allowed him to insult a
major group of stockholders with impunity.
Indeed, the presumption endured that women were low-quality
shareholders. One male writer observed in 1949 that “many” American
investors were “women unversed in finance . . . with little understanding of
industry or its problems. If they are to become members of the corporate
family in any real sense, they must be ‘educated.’” 244 In 1948, the board chair of
General Foods, Clarence Francis, used the company’s Stockholder News to scold
its women stockholders. Francis acknowledged that “[o]n the record,” women
were “the owners” of the company.245 “[B]ut,” he asked women stockholders,
“just how interested are you really in the success of your company?”246 Francis
242. The transcript of this exchange was published in the company’s condensed

243.
244.

245.
246.

stenographic transcript of the 1953 annual meeting, which it sent to its stockholders.
STANDARD OIL CO. (N.J.), ANNUAL MEETING: MAY 28, 1952, at 19-20 (1953).
Id. at 20.
John Beachy Slocum, The Use of Public Relations Activities by Management as a
Means of Securing Stockholders’ Cooperation 10 (Aug. 1949) (M.B.A. thesis, University
of Southern California) (ProQuest). As another example, a 1948 Associated Press article
described female stockholders “weigh[ing] one tidbit of gossip against another” to form
views about a business and quoted one woman who said, “The pictures and colors in
[annual] reports ‘are nice, but there are just too many different figures for me.’ ” Women
Stockholders Ignore Annual Reports, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), July 8, 1948, at
8A.
Slocum, supra note 246, at 67. At the time, women stockholders outnumbered men
three to two. See id. at 86.
Id. at 67 (quoting a spring 1948 newsletter to General Foods stockholders).
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said he had been “disturbed and shocked” to learn the results of a survey “made
recently among you women shareholders” that showed that the average female
stockholder could name only three General Foods products.247 Francis had
apparently overlooked the survey’s implicit finding that women stockholders
were mainly interested in the company as an investment rather than as a
source of consumer products.
“You read that women are the majority owners of our enterprises,”
financial columnist J.A. Livingston wrote in his 1958 book The American
Stockholder.248 “And so, we are told never to underestimate the financial power
of the female. But neither, it must be said in a quiet aside, should we
overestimate women.”249 Livingston was a “personal friend” of the prominent
Yale corporate law professor Bayless Manning, who published an important
review of Livingston’s book in the Yale Law Journal.250 In his review, Manning
sharply criticized the movement for corporate democracy, noting that
“[n]early all” of its “planks”—including “more representation for women” on
boards of directors—“find their analogues in the reform agitations of 1900,”
such as “women’s suffrage.”251 “One would be brave indeed at this date to raise
any question about the nineteenth amendment,” Manning quipped; otherwise,
he said, “the success of these political reforms,” such as the referendum and
proportionate representation, “has been at best debatable.”252 By signaling his
approval of Livingston’s sharp words for women shareholders and adding his
own aside about women’s suffrage, Manning gave credence—and an academic
patina—to the view that women shareholders were unimportant.253
Wilma Soss, pioneer of the “economic suffrage” movement for women,
held a different view.254 “It’s a shameful fact that women own companies but

247. Id.
248. LIVINGSTON, supra note 49, at 14.
249. Id.; see also id. at 33 (“Housewife-shareholders will be more interested in souffles and

garbage disposals than in the movement toward corporate democracy.”).
250. Bayless Manning, Review: The American Stockholder, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1477 (1958) (book

251.
252.
253.

254.

review); MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS 26 (1976).
Manning, supra note 252, at 1486-87.
Id. at 1487.
Manning’s book review spent several pages detailing the results of the 1952 and 1956
NYSE shareowner surveys but omitted any mention of women—neatly sidestepping
the surveys’ findings that roughly half of individual stockholders in 1952 were women,
and that, in 1956, women constituted the majority of individual stockholders. See id. at
1478-81. The surveys themselves treated these as headline findings. In 1964, Manning
became dean of Stanford Law School. Chronology of SLS Leadership, STAN. L. SCH.,
https://perma.cc/T7C3-REC7 (archived Feb. 12, 2022).
Norman, supra note 241.
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can’t get top jobs in them,” Soss asserted.255 Soss’s activism emphasized the
economic power of women and sought to organize women shareholders for
collective action.256 She recruited prominent women as officers and trustees
for her organization, the Federation of Women Shareholders in American
Business. Among them were Ruth Bryan Owen (the former Congresswoman
and daughter of William Jennings Bryan), Nellie Tayloe Ross (the former
governor of Wyoming and the director of the U.S. Mint until 1953), and
Georgia Neese Clark (the first woman Treasurer of the United States).257 In the
early 1950s, the membership of the Federation was estimated at 1,500 men and
women.258
Soss’s feminist brand of shareholder activism inspired a Broadway play,
The Solid Gold Cadillac, coauthored by the Pulitzer Prize–winning playwright
George Kaufman.259 It began and ended with a shareholder’s meeting and
centered on a character named Laura Partridge, modeled on Soss, who owned
ten shares of stock in General Products Corporation of America. In the play’s
opening moments, Partridge appears at the company’s annual meeting to
challenge the high salaries of its top executives. The board adjourns the
meeting and offers Partridge a high-paying executive position. She accepts and
becomes the company’s first head of Stockholder Relations. The play’s final
moments reveal that Partridge had charmed thousands of women shareholders
to send her their proxies, effectively putting her in control of the firm. In 1956,
Columbia Pictures released a movie version of The Solid Gold Cadillac, starring
Judy Holliday, who resembled a young Wilma Soss; it was nominated for a
Golden Globe. Though the movie marked a high point for the cultural
recognition of women as shareholders, it ended with Partridge marrying an
executive of the company and turned a story about women’s shareholding
power into a happily-ever-after romance.

255. Pressure Group, NEW YORKER, June 25, 1949, at 15, 16. Soss asserted that her goal was

256.

257.
258.
259.

not only to get women on corporate boards but “in executive and managerial
positions” as well. Mouthpiece for Women! Organization Formed to Promote Interests of
Feminine Shareholders in Industry, CIN. ENQUIRER, June 14, 1947, at 2-B.
Federation Leader Wants More Say for American Women in Business, BILLINGS GAZETTE,
June 18, 1950, at 14 (“Women have great economic power now through their
shareholding in American industry, and men know it. The trouble is that women don’t
know it and when they do find out, they are afraid to use their power. It’s time they
did.”).
Logan, supra note 27, at 45.
Id.
The play was published as HOWARD TEICHMANN & GEORGE S. KAUFMAN, THE SOLID
GOLD CADILLAC (1954). See Robert E. Wright & Janice Traflet, This Was the Real Life
“Fearless Girl,” HIST. NEWS NETWORK (July 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/B6NS-CPLF
(asserting that the movie was “loosely based on” Soss’s life).
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F. Pro Rata Shareholding and the Feminization of Capital
Data published about women’s shareholding mainly disclosed the
percentage of shareholders who were women, rather than the percentage of
shares that women owned. Thus, unfortunately, we have only a partial picture
of gender differences in pro rata shareholding before the middle of the century.
From the data that exists, it seems likely that women never owned more stock
than men across the market. Evidence indicates, however, that women did own
more stock than men at some companies, for some periods of time.
Information about women’s share ownership is sparse but available for
some companies. For example, a unique snapshot of sex-disaggregated holdings
at the Pennsylvania Railroad exists for 1919, when monthly data was
published.260 Over twelve months, the proportion of women stockholders at
the Pennsylvania Railroad fell slightly while the percentage of shares held by
women rose: At the end of the year, women owned 30.15% of stock.261 Some
holdings data for General Motors was published in at least one major
newspaper in the 1920s; in 1921, women were almost 22% of common
stockholders at General Motors, but owned only 8.7% of common stock.262
Studies of women’s pro rata stockholding before 1952 analyzed data for
small, unrepresentative groups of companies. A study published in 1934
provided data for over twenty industrial and railroad companies.263 Women’s
holdings ranged from 9.4% of shares at Walgreen Co. to 35% at Swift & Co.;
overall, women owned 22.5% of shares.264 A 1948 survey of manufacturing
corporations, which analyzed data for common stock holdings at eighteen
companies that reported sex-disaggregated information, found that women

260. Women Buy More Stock: Own 30.15 Per Cent of Capital of Pennsylvania Railroad, PHILA.
261.

262.

263.
264.

EVENING PUB. LEDGER, Jan. 7, 1920, at 22.
Id.; see also Atchison Stockholders, PITT. POST, Sept. 11, 1926, at 18 (finding that among
56,022 individual shareholders, 25,939 were men, owning 1,375,934 shares, and women
numbered 30,083 but owned only 995,357 shares out of 3,565,823 shares of common and
preferred stock combined).
The Journal ’s reported percentages were incorrectly rounded down, suggesting that the
publication sought to downplay the proportion of women shareholders. See General
Motors Stockholders, supra note 149. Women’s shareholding in preferred stock was more
significant—women were 45% of holders and owned 37.6% of preferred shares. Id.; see
also American Smelting Control Rests with Smaller Owners: Four-Fifths the Stockholders Have
Fifty Shares or Less and Have Ten Shares or Under, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1922, at 7 (showing
that women held 20% of common and preferred shares, combined, at the American
Smelting & Refining Co.).
See BRANCH, supra note 214, at 52-53.
See id. at 53.
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collectively held 28% of the common stock of these companies, including both
individual and joint holdings.265
The 1952 study prepared for the NYSE found that the average woman
shareholder owned less stock than the average man, and that women, as a
group, owned less stock than men as a group.266 The shareholding of General
Mills in 1954 may have been typical of blue-chip public companies during that
decade: More of General Mills’s stockholders were women than men, but men
owned more shares of stock. Women’s share ownership constituted 20.9% of
General Mills’s total, while men owned 26.9%—a difference of six percentage
points.267
265. Who Owns “Big Business”? Analysis of Stockholdings in Largest Corporations: Part 1—

Manufacturing, supra note 45, at 5, 7. The statistician Edwin Burk Cox reported that,
between 1947 and 1957, men’s pro rata stockholding fell “about 20 per cent,” women’s
pro rata stockholding dipped “slightly,” and joint stockholding increased (by an
undisclosed proportion), so that the total percentage of individual stockholding (men,
women, and joint accounts combined) was “only slightly smaller” in 1957 than it was in
1947. COX, supra note 44, at 92-93. This trend suggests that married men were gradually
holding less stock in their individual names, and more stock jointly with their wives.
Cox’s results came from individual company data received from a maximum of eight
companies having at least 50,000 shareholders of record. See id. at 72-73. Cox clearly
possessed comparative data for the stock held by men and women at the companies he
studied, but he did not disclose it. Nor did he present his data as representative of large
companies overall. See id. at 73-74.
266. KIMMEL, supra note 5, at 75 (“[F]or every four shares [of common stock of publicly
owned companies] held or owned by men, a little less than three shares are held by
women.”); id. at 76 (estimating the “average number of shares per shareholding in
common stocks” for men was 167, while the average number for women was 121).
From 1952 to 1965, the NYSE censuses provided some data on the relative stock
holdings of women versus men, but the data cannot be usefully compared from one
census to another because they covered different sets of companies and used different
approaches. The 1952 NYSE study estimated that women stockholders of record
owned 27% of common stocks, while men owned 36.7%. Id. at 76. Another 7.6% of total
shares were held by joint accounts. Id. The 1956 census found that women stockholders
owned 22.6% of common stock, while men stockholders owned 27.8%. N.Y. STOCK
EXCH., WHO OWNS AMERICAN BUSINESS?, supra note 29, at 27. Joint accounts owned
another 7%. Id. In 1959, the NYSE census provided data for common and preferred
issues combined and found a narrower gender gap: Women owned 19.7% of shares and
men owned 22.7%. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SHARE OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA: 1959, supra
note 224, at 34. Joint accounts were 7.2% of total combined shares. Id. By the 1960s,
many wealthy Americans were moving their equity investments into mutual funds. A
1966 study of corporate stock held directly by men and women who also invested in
mutual funds found that for regular account holders, the market value of the median
holding of men was nearly double the value of the median holding of women. See INV.
CO. INST., THE MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDER: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY 46 (1966). The
study also disaggregated gender for “accumulation plan holders,” which similarly
showed a greater market value of the median holding of men compared to women. See
id. at 47 (capitalization altered).
267. Charles B. Forbes, Bullis Sees Bright Future, MIA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 29, 1954, at 10-D
(reporting that General Mills was owned by 9,963 shareholders, of whom 42.3% were
footnote continued on next page
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At particularly large companies, however, women did sometimes own
more stock than men. We know that, in 1948, women owned more AT&T
stock than men because the company published this information in its annual
report.268 At U.S. Steel, women were first reported to have outnumbered men
as common-stock stockholders in 1950, and women’s holdings of common
stock were first reported to exceed the holdings of men in 1956.269 Women
would continue to hold more common stock at U.S. Steel than men until at
least 1978.270 Even at companies where they collectively held more stock,
however, women struggled to translate their holdings into managerial
power—a subject taken up in more detail below in Part II.E.
G. Race and the Feminization of Capital
Although many parties were tracking and publishing data about
stockholders’ gender, none made similar studies of stockholders’ race.271 As a
result, the evidentiary record on race and stockholding in the first half of the
twentieth century is thin.272 However, we know two things: (1) that racial

268.
269.

270.

271.
272.

women, holding 20.9% of the stock, and that men represented 37.3% of stockholders,
owning 26.9% of stock). Banks and firms (4.7% of stockholders) owned 36.6% of shares;
trustees and guardians (31.2% of stockholders) owned 10.5% of stock. Id. This data
underscores how blue-chip public companies, like General Mills, tended to have not
only high proportions of women stockholders, but also significant share ownership by
institutional investors. At these big companies, the story about shareholding started to
shift in the 1950s from “women stockholders are taking over” to “institutional
shareholders are taking over.” See supra note 49; infra Part I.H.
AT&T 1948 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
Compare U.S. STEEL, 1949 ANNUAL REPORT 20 (1950), with U.S. STEEL, 1950 ANNUAL
REPORT 19 (1951); U.S. STEEL, 1955 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1956), with U.S. STEEL, 1956
ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1957).
To obtain this data, I analyzed U.S. Steel’s annual reports for the years 1956 to 1978. See,
e.g., U.S. STEEL, 1956 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 271, at 21; U.S. STEEL, 1978 ANNUAL
REPORT 21 (1979). There is reason to suspect that women continuously held more
common stock than men did even past 1978: U.S. Steel’s annual report from that year
contains figures that are nearly the inverse of those reported in 1977, and in 1979,
women’s shares again outnumbered those of men, suggesting a possible transcription
error. See U.S. STEEL, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1978); U.S. STEEL, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT i
(1980).
Some of the earliest estimates of stockholders’ race were published in the 1960s. See, e.g.,
1/4 -Million Negroes Own Stock Shares, PITT. COURIER, July 10, 1965, at 12.
At least one Black stock brokerage operated on Wall Street in the 1930s; by 1949, a
member of the NYSE, Abraham and Company, had opened an office in Harlem. See
JULIET E.K. WALKER, THE HISTORY OF BLACK BUSINESS IN AMERICA: CAPITALISM, RACE,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 259 (1998). A national organization of Black shareholders, the
Negro and Allied Shareowners of America, was formed in 1964. See Shareholders’ Unit
Maps Rights Drive, ALA. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1964, at 3. Its founder, New Yorker John Silvera,
asserted that Black Americans owned millions of shares of stock. Id. In 1965, a survey
conducted by a Black-owned investment brokerage in Cleveland, Ohio, found that
footnote continued on next page
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discrimination and related disparities significantly reduced the financial
resources of nonwhite Americans to invest in securities, especially in
comparison to white Americans;273 and (2) that some nonwhite Americans did
own corporate stock during this period, including some Black women.274
Intersections of race- and sex-based discrimination would have made it
particularly challenging for most nonwhite women to buy and hold stock.275
At AT&T, for example, where thousands of women stockholders obtained
stock through programs designed to encourage employee stockholding, Black

about 25,000 Black Americans had owned shares of stock in 1952, and that this number
had increased to more than 250,000 by the end of 1964. See 1/4 -Million Negroes Own
Stock Shares, supra note 273, at 12. Harwell Wells has documented how civil rights
leader Bayard Rustin owned stock in the Greyhound Bus Company in the late 1940s.
See Harwell Wells, Shareholder Meetings and Freedom Rides: The Story of Peck v Greyhound
2 (Temp. Univ. Beasley Sch. of L., Leg. Stud. Working Paper No. 2021-29, 2021). In
addition, photos published by Standard Oil New Jersey in 1951 show three Black men
among the shareholders touring the company’s research center. STANDARD OIL CO.
(N.J.), ANNUAL MEETING (1951) (displaying these photos on an unnumbered glossy page
at the end of the publication). A New Yorker reporter who attended AT&T’s 1966
shareholder meeting wrote that he had observed “just two” Black stockholders in
attendance. John Brooks, A Reporter at Large: Stockholder Season, NEW YORKER, Oct. 8,
1966, at 159, 162.
273. See, e.g., Francine D. Blau & John W. Graham, Black–White Differences in Wealth and
Asset Composition, 105 Q.J. ECON. 321, 332-134 (1990) (analyzing 1970s data and
concluding that inheritance and “other intergenerational transfers by race” are the
largest factor influencing the racial wealth gap); VICTOR PERLO, ECONOMICS OF RACISM
U.S.A.: ROOTS OF BLACK INEQUALITY 52-53 (1975) (estimating that the median Black
family income in 1945 was 55.3% of the income of the median white family); James D.
Smith, White Wealth and Black People: The Distribution of Wealth in Washington, D.C., in
1967, in THE PERSONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND WEALTH 329, 350-51, 353 (James
D. Smith ed., 1975) (suggesting that intergenerational transfers helped explain racial
differences in wealth and noting that Black populations held a relatively small
proportion of their wealth in stocks and bonds); see also Ramona Martin, One in Every
Nine Montgomerians is a Stockholder; Investments Total Estimated $60-$100 Million
Annually, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Jan. 2, 1963, at 2 (“Despite the large Negro
population in [the Montgomery, Alabama, area], the number of Negro stock customers
here is minute.”); Angel Kwolek-Folland, The African American Financial Industries:
Issues of Class, Race and Gender in the Early 20th Century, BUS. & ECON. HIST., Winter
1994, at 85, 91 (“Until the 1920s, it is difficult to distinguish a separate black economic
middle class.”).
274. In 1936, when the SEC went after a broker, Howard Roberts, for securities fraud, one
investor who testified against him was “a colored elevator girl, employed [by a]
department store.” Charles C. Willson, Exchange Act Release No. 564, 1936 WL 885, at
*3 (Apr. 2, 1936). A photo published in a brochure by Standard Oil New Jersey in 1957
includes an image of a Black woman shareholder. STANDARD OIL CO. (N.J.), 75TH
ANNUAL MEETING 23 (1957).
275. As Shennette Garrett-Scott has explained, “race and gender mutually reinforce each
other as categories of exclusion and difference . . . in U.S. capitalism.” GARRETT-SCOTT,
supra note 237, at 4.
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women were not hired as telephone operators until the 1950s.276 Racial
discrimination in employment shaped the racial makeup of shareholders and
thus the racial makeup of corporate organization.
This Article argues that shareholder identity influenced corporate theory
and business leaders’ views about the appropriate role of shareholders in
corporate organization. A shareholder’s gender was often discernible from the
stockholders’ list; although not as likely, race may also have been discernible
for some shareholders.277 There is no reason to think that shareholders’ racial
identities did not also influence business leaders’ views about shareholder
governance, to the extent that they were known to business leaders.278 Further
study of the race of shareholders during this period would shed light on the
racialized expression of power through corporate law.279
H. The End of the Feminization of Capital
By the 1960s, the major story in business was the growing power of
institutional investors.280 One contemporaneous expert suggested that the
276. For a discussion of women and employee shareholding in AT&T, see note 14 and the

277.
278.

279.

280.

accompanying text above. See also PERLO, supra note 275, at 133-34 (noting that AT&T
“followed a deliberate and open policy of whites only” for most of its history).
Names and personal titles or honorifics may have given clues about a stockholder’s
race, ethnicity, or religion.
See “Freeze Out” Charged Against Big Oil Co., supra note 104 (describing an earlytwentieth-century lawsuit alleging that the officers and directors of one California
corporation sought to exclude Asian shareholders). The race of some stockholders
might have been known to corporate managers. For instance, big corporations
commonly sold stock to their own employees, and we can assume that companies had
racial information about their own employees.
For scholarship at the intersection of race and corporate law, see generally Veronica
Root Martinez, A More Equitable Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD 47, 47-66 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B.
Thompson eds., 2021); Richard R.W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
2023 (2006); Thomas W. Joo, Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 351 (2004); and Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between
the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389 (2002).
The first major work on institutional investing was published in 1965. See DANIEL JAY
BAUM & NED B. STILES, THE SILENT PARTNERS: INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND
CORPORATE CONTROL 6 (1965) (“Institutional holdings of common stocks listed on the
New York Stock Exchange have risen from approximately 12 per cent of all stocks
listed on the Exchange in 1949 to over 20 percent at the end of 1963 . . . .”). The SEC
issued its first study report on institutional investors in 1971. See SEC, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-64, pt. 8, at v, xii (1971); id. pt. 5, at 2345.
Since then, the rise of institutional investing has been a major narrative in corporate
law. Works documenting the rise across the decades include Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making
Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J.
footnote continued on next page
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“emphasis which has been placed on the growing importance of institutional
investors” seemed out of step with the data, which showed a rather small
increase in institutional shareholding through 1957.281 But while this expert
challenged the institutional-investor narrative, he too ignored the rise of
women shareholders, studying only stockholders’ income, age, and
occupation—not their gender. It remains unclear why academics who wrote
about shareholders during the 1950s and 1960s mostly ignored the rise of
women shareholders, even as the proportion of women shareholders, and of
women’s shareholdings at some companies, reached a zenith.
Institutional investing became an early interest among scholars and has
held their attention ever since. The gendered effect of intermediation has
received less attention. As American women shifted their equity investments
into funds, as did their male counterparts, voting control over their shares
became exercisable by fund managers, who were almost exclusively male.282
Pension funds, which increased in number after 1950, invested increasing
proportions of their growing assets in corporate stock.283 Though many of
their beneficiaries were women, the managers of pension funds were men.284
REG. 174 (2001); and Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520 (1990).
281. COX, supra note 44, at 2. Cox, a statistician at Boston University, wrote:
Between 1949 and 1957 the holdings of institutional investors, including insurance companies,
investment companies, non-profit institutions, non-insured pension funds, and mutual
savings banks, increased from 12.4 per cent to 15.3 per cent of the value of shares listed on the
New York Stock Exchange. This eight-year period was one of extremely rapid growth for the
institutions most often credited with increasing the relative importance of institutional
investments, investment companies and pension funds. Yet the relative importance of
institutional ownership rose less than three percentage points.

Id.
282. See Peter H. Huang, How Do Securities Laws Influence Affect, Happiness, & Trust?, 3 J. BUS. &

TECH. L. 257, 274 (2008) (“The U.S. mutual fund industry grew from just 73 funds in
1945 to 8,000 funds by 2002.”). Fund managers remain overwhelmingly male to this
day. See, e.g., Amrutha Alladi & Gabrielle Dibenedetto, The Percentage of U.S. Female Fund
Managers Is Exactly Where It Was in 2000, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://perma.cc/87XK-E552; Jeff Sommer, Who Runs Mutual Funds? Very Few Women,
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/QK9B-KRFT.
283. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder
Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1355 (1992) (“Investments in
common stock by state and local pension systems ballooned from $10.1 billion in 1970
to $150.2 billion in 1986 and to an estimated $240 billion” in 1990.”); PAUL P.
HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 7 (1959) (observing that “the most
rapid period of growth” in pension funds occurred from 1951 to 1954 when, according
to an SEC survey, “the number of corporations with self-administered plans rose by
about one-third”).
284. Editorial, Time for Real Diversity in Asset Management, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://perma.cc/4MP7-BRLR (reporting that women made up just 25% of executive
employees at the sixty-one businesses that entered the organization’s 2017 Best Places
to Work in Money Management program).
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Although the rise of institutional investing has never before been
understood as a realignment of power along gender lines, it was exactly that. In
addition to restoring voting control over women’s stock to men, the rise of
institutional investing caused the feminization of capital to recede from public
consciousness and, eventually, from memory. For a short time, women
comprised a majority of American public-company stockholders, if not the
holders of a majority of public-company stock.285 With the rise of
intermediation—what one SEC official called the “deretailization” of the stock
market286—women were returned to minority status among stockholders.
Indeed, when the NYSE conducted a stockholder census in 1980, it found that
the gender of the stockholder class had reverted to majority male, albeit by a
small margin.287
The corporate law literature has extensively documented the rise of
institutional investing and the reconcentration of stockholding in a small
number of institutional holders.288 According to some estimates, institutional
investors own about 80% of the outstanding stock at U.S. public companies.289
Although the corporate law literature has spilled much ink exploring the

285. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text (describing the 1950s and 1960s NYSE

stockholder censuses that establish this finding).
286. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the

Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2009) (quoting Brian G. Cartwright, Gen.
Couns., SEC, The Future of Securities Regulation, Speech at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics (Oct. 24, 2007),
https://perma.cc/EUL9-S3CE.
287. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., 1 REPORT ON DIRECT SHAREOWNERSHIP IN SIXTEEN U.S. OIL
COMPANIES: A STUDY OF THEIR DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 7 (1981), reprinted in
Legislation Affecting Oil Merger Proposals: Hearing on S. 2362 Before the Subcomm. on Energy
& Mineral Res. of the S. Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res., 98th Cong. 793 (1984) (noting that,
according to the NYSE 1980 Census, 51% of individual stockholders were men).
288. For some examples, see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99
B.U. L. REV. 721, 725-26 (2019); and Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 363, 36466 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018). If we look at pro rata
stockholding, the trend is clear. In 1940, institutional investors held just 5.9% of publiccompany stock. Raymond A. Enstam & Harry P. Kamen, Control and the Institutional
Investor, 23 BUS. LAW. 289, 297 (1968). By the end of 1966, the percentage had risen to
17%, id., and by the end of 1990, institutions owned 53%, Bernard S. Black, Agents
Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 827
(1992).
289. See Patrick Jahnke, Ownership Concentration and Institutional Investors’ Governance
Through Voice and Exit, 21 BUS. & POL. 327, 328 (2019); cf. Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2029 (2018)
(putting the figure at 70%).
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power and control implications of the “institutionalization” of capital,290 it has
never described or explored the rise of women’s stockholding in the twentieth
century, nor has it acknowledged that this reconcentration had a gendered
effect.291
The rise of institutional investing also obscured the gender of stockholding,
which helped to erase the feminization of capital from memory. When
individuals hold stock through an intermediary, the stockholder list no longer
identifies the beneficial holder of stock, making that person’s gender
unknowable. Institutional investors were not male or female, so their growing
significance tended to make questions of stockholder gender obsolete. Overall,
the rising importance (and voting power) of institutional investors
marginalized human investors, regardless of gender. When Berle and Means’s
blameworthy, passive shareholder was reworked through the lens of law and
economics—to emerge, in the 1970s and 1980s, as the rationally passive
shareholder—its gendered origin had been lost. Until now, these gendered
aspects of corporate history have been hiding in plain sight.
II. Implications of the Feminization of Capital
Part I synthesized evidence from various sources to produce a new history
foregrounding women’s role as shareholders in the development of modern
corporate capitalism. The evidence establishes that women entered the
twentieth century as a minority of equity investors but became the majority of
individual shareholders, first at leading public companies like AT&T and then,
290. See Langevoort, supra note 288 (describing institutionalization as “a shift toward

investment by mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, bank trust
departments, and the like” in “[t]he last thirty years or so”).
291. For example, one of the largest institutional investors in the United States, the
California State Teachers Retirement Fund System (CalSTRS), invests the retirement
savings of nearly one million public school teachers in California, 70% of whom are
women. Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in
ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1983 (2020) (identifying CalSTRS
as one of “the three largest U.S. public pension funds”); CalSTRS at a Glance, CALSTRS,
https://perma.cc/G49K-L67Y (archived Feb. 8, 2022) (noting that CalSTRS has 975,000
members and beneficiaries); CAL. STATE TCHRS.’ RET. SYS., CALSTRS DEMOGRAPHIC
STUDY SURVEY FACT SHEET 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/D6YT-J79U (noting that 70% of
CalSTRS members are women). In 2018, however, only 36% of CalSTRS
nonadministrative investment staff was female. See CALSTRS, DIVERSITY IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF INVESTMENTS: 2019 ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 11, https://perma.cc/
LFM7-L67K (archived Feb. 8, 2022). For a rare mention of the gendered impacts of
institutional investing, see Kristin N. Johnson, Banking on Diversity: Does Gender
Diversity Improve Financial Firms’ Risk Oversight?, 70 SMU L. REV. 327, 363-64 (2017)
(noting that institutional shareholders represent “diverse constituencies” and drawing
on the example of CalSTRS to show that women-dominated institutional investors
may demand increased representation of women on corporate boards).
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around mid-century, across the equity capital market.292 Women’s “invasion”
of shareholding became a subplot in newspaper coverage of corporate
America.293 Leading business thinkers of their eras, including Louis Brandeis,
Owen Young, William Ripley, Alfred Sloan, Jr., and J.A. Livingston,
considered the growing proportion of women shareholders relevant to their
broader views on the American corporation. Yet the twentieth century’s most
influential monograph on corporate theory, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, omitted any mention of women.294 In part due to this important
omission—and in part because the feminization of capital ceased to be
discernible during the rise of institutional investors—the corporate law
discipline has never treated gender as relevant to the evolution of its important
ideas. Yet, as any corporate law expert knows, corporate law’s foundational
ideas were forged during the first half of the twentieth century—the era of the
feminization of capital.
This Part contextualizes the new history provided in Part I within some of
the foundational ideas in corporate law, exploring how the reality of women’s
significant shareholding—and early-twentieth-century views about women
and gender difference—might have played a role in shaping them.295 The five
Subparts that follow are more of a survey than a deep examination; in a single
article, it is not possible to explore every idea from every angle. This Part
examines the “separate spheres” of corporate governance (the separation of
ownership and control), the idea that shareholders are naturally “passive,”
stakeholderism, the idea of the “average” or “reasonable” investor in corporate
law, and women’s role in corporate control. It sketches the contours of a
twenty-first-century research agenda at the intersection of history, gender, and
corporate law. That research agenda points us toward a more accurate view of
our past and a long-overdue perspective on power as expressed by corporate
law.
A. Gender and the Separation of Ownership and Control
One of the central problems in corporate law is the “separation of
ownership and control,” an idea commonly credited to The Modern Corporation

292.
293.
294.
295.

See supra Parts I.A, I.E.
See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 74-80.
See supra Part I.D.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in
the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (identifying the “Path
Dependency Thesis” and summarizing it as the view that “history matters, because it
constrains the way in which institutions can change”).
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and Private Property.296 Berle and Means used the separation metaphor to argue
that the “old property relationships” of the corporation were broken and the
“atom” of private property was splitting into two opposing camps.297 In the
organizational structure of the large corporation, Berle and Means observed
the “surrender and regrouping of the incidence of ownership” itself.298
Corporate ownership was dissolving into “its component parts, control and
beneficial ownership.”299 One group of persons represented “control,” while a
different group of persons represented “ownership.”
The separation of ownership and control has been called the “foundational
instability of American corporate governance.”300 This concept’s widespread
acceptance in the fields of law and economics gave rise to agency-cost theory,
which views agency problems arising between “strong” managers and “weak”
owners as the main inefficiency of corporate organization.301 In the 1980s,
Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen recharacterized the paradigm as the
“separation of decision and risk-bearing functions” in which agency problems
arose between “decision agents” and “residual claimants.”302 Both scholars who
subscribe to Berle and Means’s formulation and those preferring Fama and

296. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Corporate Law and Business Theory, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089,

297.
298.
299.

300.

301.

302.

1091 (2017) (“Great numbers of articles in academic corporate law take ‘the separation
of ownership and control’ famously identified by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means as a
central starting point for analysis.”). For an overview of the influence of The Modern
Corporation on the intellectual development of corporate law, see generally Bratton,
supra note 206 (exploring the “endurance” of ideas articulated in The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, especially the separation of ownership and control).
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 2, 8 (describing the “dissolution of the atom of
property”).
Id. at 8.
Id. (noting that corporate ownership had previously “bracketed full power of manual
disposition with complete right to enjoy the use, the fruits, and the proceeds of
physical assets”).
Mark J. Roe, The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance, in 1 THE HISTORY
OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3, 4 (Brian R. Cheffins ed., 2011); see also
Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 1252
(2010) (“[E]ssential to almost all definitions [of corporate governance] is the need for
mechanisms to minimize problems created by the separation of ownership and
control.”).
See, e.g., Fichtner et al., supra note 38, at 301 (describing how Berle and Means’s work
“led to the recognition of the principal–agent problem that underlies modern
corporate governance theory”); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 282, at 870; see also ROE,
supra note 39, at 5-6 (employing the strong managers–weak owners framework).
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 301, 312 (1983) (concluding that this paradigm is “the problem of separation
of ownership and control that has long troubled students of corporations”).
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Jensen’s contractarian approach have presented the reduction of agency costs
as the core purpose of corporate law.303
Berle and Means did not introduce the separation premise to corporate
governance.304 In fact, business thinkers had been discussing the relationship
of corporate ownership to control for decades before Berle and Means
published their book.305 In 1904, for example, Talcott Williams wrote about
the “diffusion of ownership” in corporations and observed that “[c]ontrol and
ownership are no longer wedded.”306 Metaphors about the “marriage” and
“divorce” of ownership and control, like the one deployed by Williams,
analogized corporate control to spousal relationships.307 Nearly thirty years
after Williams wrote that control and ownership were decoupling, Berle and
303. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,

304.

305.

306.

307.

109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1920 (1996) (arguing that corporate law “is generally
understood to have a largely economic function . . . [that] might be characterized as . . .
minimizing the sum of the transaction and agency costs of contracting through the
corporate form”); Faith Stevelman, Going Private at the Intersection of the Market and the
Law, 62 BUS. L. 775, 896 (2007) (describing the influence of transaction-cost economics
on corporate law in connection with “Berle and Means’ famous treatise” and noting
that “[t]he role of corporate law is to effect a system of organization which will
decrease agency costs overall, but to do so without creating new agency costs”).
See, e.g., Wells, supra note 302, at 1255 (“It is around 1900 that we first find stirring the
popular idea that ownership and control were separating in the modern corporation.”);
Wells, supra note 136, at 588; McCraw, supra note 177, at 578-79. Indeed, Jerome Frank
alluded to this idea in his 1933 review of the book. Jerome Frank, Book Review, 42
YALE L.J. 989, 990 (1933).
Some have traced the origin of the separation of ownership and control to Adam
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Neoclassicism and the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 373, 374 (2009); Wells, supra
note 302, at 1251 (“In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith identified divergent interest
between managers and owners as an, in his eyes, insuperable dilemma for the efficient
operation of the corporation.”); DAVID FINN, THE CORPORATE OLIGARCH 13-14 (1969).
Alexander Bryan Johnson, a wealthy banker from Utica, New York, was another early
thinker who identified the “natural antagonism between the interest of a corporation
and the interests of its managers,” as “the most inveterate danger that attends
corporations.” Johnson, supra note 65, at 629. Neither Smith nor Johnson used a
separation metaphor to describe the problem they observed, however.
Talcott Williams, The Corporation, in ORGANIZED LABOR AND CAPITAL: THE WILLIAM L.
BULL LECTURES FOR THE YEAR 1904, at 67, 118, 122-23 (1904). For other early examples,
see Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 123 N.E. 148, 151 (N.Y. 1919); and Seligman,
supra note 167, at 442 (“The salient characteristic of the corporate form of conducting
business is the separation of control from the other attributes of ownership.”).
See, e.g., Frank, supra note 306, at 991 n.5 (describing “the divorce of stock-ownership
from corporate control”); Henry W. Ballantine, Ripley’s Indictment of Corporate
Skullduggery, 17 CALIF. L. REV. 35, 38 (1928) (book review) (stating that William Ripley,
in his book Main Street and Wall Street, “objects violently to the divorce of ownership
and control”); W.H.S. Stevens, Stockholders’ Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting
Control, 40 Q.J. ECON. 353, 385 (1926) (arguing that nonvoting stocks “tend further to
accentuate an already too extensive divorce of ownership and management”).

575

Corporate Governance and the Feminization of Capital
74 STAN. L. REV. 515 (2022)

Means reinvigorated the idea by using empirical data to show how corporate
control was concentrating in a small number of hands. Importantly, Berle and
Means also popularized the notion that control and ownership were separating
because “passive” shareholders were “surrendering” control over the firm,
ascribing a moral valence to the changes they observed.308
Although the separation premise has been widely accepted in corporate
law as a conceptual framework for understanding corporate organization,
Berle and Means had critics.309 From the book’s publication to the present,
scholars have asserted that no bona fide “separation” or bright line ever
emerged between those who controlled big companies and those who owned
stock in them.310 To the contrary, critics argued, stockholders and controllers
were overlapping groups. Marxist economists in particular rejected the
separation premise. For example, Paul Sweezy argued that what “actually
happens” is that “the great majority of owners is stripped of control in favor of
a small minority of owners.”311 Other critics have broadly challenged
corporate law’s myopic focus on the “shareholder–management nexus.”312
The ownership-and-control separation framework itself resembles the
“separate spheres” of gender difference that would have been familiar to all
Americans of Berle and Means’s era, dividing nearly all aspects of life into
308. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 355; id. at 355-56 (noting that the control groups

309.

310.

311.
312.

“have placed the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation
serve not alone the owners or the control but all society”).
See, e.g., Cheffins & Bank, supra note 37, at 466 (discussing “considerable criticism” of
Berle and Means’s separation premise). A year after winning the Nobel Prize in
economics, George Stigler coauthored a critique of The Modern Corporation and its
separation premise with Claire Friedland. George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The
Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 237 (1983).
Stigler and Friedland argued that “[t]he majority of the voting stock is the ultimate
control over a corporation even if that stock is diffused among many owners . . . . [I]n
an ultimate sense ownership and control cannot be separated.” Id. at 248. They also
concluded that the data showed “no clear evidence that the management-dominated
corporations differed much from owner-dominated companies” in the ways suggested
by Berle and Means’s separation premise. Id. at 259.
See, e.g., Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder
Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1520 n.52 (2006). A few years after The Modern
Corporation was published, the Temporary National Economic Committee conducted a
major study of the concentration of economic power at American public companies
and concluded (contrary to Berle and Means’s findings) that “[i]n the average
corporation the majority of the voting power is concentrated in the hands of not much
over 1 percent of the stockholders.” TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., supra note 41, at xvii.
PAUL M. SWEEZY, THE THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES OF MARXIAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY 262 (1942).
Margaret M. Blair, Rethinking Assumptions Behind Corporate Governance, CHALLENGE,
Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 12, 17 (“[C]orporate governance discussions that . . . focus only on the
power relationship between shareholders and managers have the emphasis wrong.”).
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“public” (for men) and “private” (for women).313 Separate-spheres ideology
imagines a bilateral division of things into masculine versus feminine: strong
versus weak, active versus passive, rational versus emotional, and so on.314 In
1872, Justice Joseph Bradley of the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the separatespheres ideology in a concurrence affirming the view of the Illinois Supreme
Court that it was an “axiomatic truth” that “God designed the sexes to occupy
different spheres of action.”315 As presented by Berle and Means, the separation
of ownership and control reimagined corporate governance as similarly
divided. On one hand were the “active” male managers who ran the business.
On the other were “passive” shareholders who served little purpose other than
to collect dividend checks, and who included large numbers of women. Later in
his career as a corporate law professor, Berle switched to using the term
“passive receptive” to describe the function of shareholding.316 Writing the
year after the NYSE published its first survey results establishing that most
313. See EVANS, supra note 158, at 183 (describing the corporate office of the 1920s as “a

public environment in which males and females were accorded separate and unequal
roles analogous to their traditional roles in the home”); O’Connor, supra note 108, at
658 (“The notion of gender-specific spheres had its roots in the belief that women were
subordinate to men by nature, almost certainly less intelligent, and biologically less
suited to the rigors of business and politics. Even at the turn of the century, the law still
firmly enshrined the separate-spheres theory of gender relationships.”); HENRY CLEWS,
Woman in Politics, Nature, History, Business and the Home, in FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND
MISCELLANEOUS SPEECHES AND ESSAYS 315, 315 (1910) (asserting that “man and woman
were created to perform separate and distinct functions in life” and criticizing women
for participating in business and politics). Clews, the founder of a New York brokerage
firm, was one of the oldest and most venerated members of the NYSE. The Great
Banking House of Henry Clews & Co.: Its Magnitude and Success, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1886, at
4 (describing the firm as “honorable and deservedly prosperous” and tracing its origin
to 1877). Charles O’Kelley has suggested that our understanding of corporate theorists
like Berle is obscured by our “general lack of historical knowledge” about the milieu in
which they wrote. Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1141, 1171 (2010). Though most Americans would recoil from the “separatespheres” ideology today, there is no question that it was a dominant societal framework
during the lives of Berle and Means.
314. As one writer put it: “In all things since the beginning of time there will be found the
two principles, the one primary, the other secondary; the one active, the other passive,
the ‘pair of opposites’ that manifest as sun and moon, day and night, fire and water,
energy and substance, man and woman, and so forth; man the active principle, woman
the passive principle.” Elizabeth E. Goldsmith, Suffrage Unnatural, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
1915, at 1.
315. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 132 (1872) (statement of the case); see id. at 139, 141
(Bradley, J., concurring).
316. A.A. BERLE, JR., ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY 7 (1957) (“The business of
stockholders is primarily to receive.”). “Passive” referred to shareholders’ receipt of
dividends, but it also has a sexual connotation. In its third edition, the Oxford English
Dictionary included, as a historic definition of “passive,” “designating, relating to, or
characteristic of a person who takes a passive sexual role.” Passive, OXFORD ENG.
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005).
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individual American shareholders were women, Berle asserted that the
“‘passive receptive’ side of the corporation” was “functionless.”317
After the publication of The Modern Corporation, the political theorist
James Burnham made a direct connection between the separation premise and
the gender of shareholding. In an influential 1941 book, The Managerial
Revolution, Burnham claimed that the rise of women’s stock ownership
suggested that capitalists were withdrawing from “active and direct
participation of any sort in the economic process.”318 Burnham’s claim echoed
Berle and Means’s suggestion that shareholder passivity involved the choice to
“surrender” control.319 Women’s stock ownership underscored a growing “gap”
between the “legal owners” of business (shareholders) and the “instruments of
production,” Burnham wrote, because “whatever the biological merits, it is a
fact that women do not play a serious leading role in the actual economic
process.”320
The separation premise helped justify the shift in corporate power away
from common stock, owned by an ever-expanding group of women, to male
managers. From 1890 to 1930, a number of leading corporate theorists had
argued that empowering shareholders was the key to reforming corporate
governance and resolving the “corporation problem.”321 At the beginning of
his career, Berle himself had advocated for strategies that would have

317. BERLE, supra note 318, at 7; N.Y. STOCK EXCH., WHO OWNS AMERICAN BUSINESS?, supra

318.
319.
320.

321.

note 29, at 6 (finding that in 1956, women were 51.6% of individual stockholders). Later
generations of corporate law scholars did not agree that “passive” shareholders were
functionless. Rather, a generation of law-and-economics scholars characterized
shareholders as residual claimants who played an important risk-bearing function
within a firm structure characterized by specialization. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson &
Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and
Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231-32 (2008); Fama & Jensen, supra
note 304, at 308. Mark Roe summarized it this way: “The distinctive governance
structure of the large American firm . . . is usually seen as a natural economic outcome
arising from specialization: shareholders would specialize in risk-bearing but wanted
diversification, and firms needed specialized, professional management.” ROE, supra
note 39, at ix.
JAMES BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION: WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE WORLD
101 (1941).
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 338 (“The stockholder has surrendered control over
his wealth.”).
BURNHAM, supra note 320, at 101. Burnham minimized women’s stockholding as
instrumental, asserting (without evidence) that the registration of stock in women’s
names was “often a legal device to aid in the preservation of wealth.” Id.
See, e.g., COOK, supra note 99, at 118; see also Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder
Power: From the Antebellum Corporation to the Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033,
1057-58 (2015) (describing the movement for cumulative voting, which started in the
late 1800s).
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empowered shareholders to act collectively to curb managerial power.322 By
the time he published The Modern Corporation with Means, however, Berle had
changed his view.323 In that book, Berle and Means asserted that, for companies
with liquid stock, the stock market—and not shareholders—would discipline
corporate management.324 Management expert Walter Werner argued that
Berle and Means’s book made “a radical departure from earlier views” by
suggesting that “shareholders’ rights in the market were integral to their rights
in the corporation,” thus making the stock market “the key to shareholder
protection.”325 Here we see the genesis of the New Deal securities laws, enacted
only a few years later, which made market regulation and corporate
disclosure—instead of shareholder empowerment—the key to reforming big
business.326 The market, of course, was introduced as an apolitical—even
egalitarian—mechanism to discipline managers, while simultaneously
rendering the human identity of individual stockholders invisible and making
shareholders’ changing gender irrelevant.
In the 1990s, Mark Roe offered a new, political explanation for America’s
unique corporate structure, which was grounded in the history of this
period.327 In his retelling, American law and politics “fragmented”
322. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 206, at 751-52 (outlining Berle’s early work, including his

323.

324.

325.
326.

327.

suggestion that trust companies gather “many small holdings into an institution
commanding a block so large that [shareholder] protection” was feasible (quoting
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE 39 (1928))); Richard S.
Kirkendall, A.A. Berle, Jr.: Student of the Corporation, 1917-1932, 35 BUS. HIST. REV. 43, 48
(1961) (“At the age of twenty-six, [Berle’s] mind had wandered to thoughts of changing
the location of power in industry.”); RIPLEY, supra note 57, at 133 (describing Berle as
having proposed reforming corporate governance by creating committees
“representative exclusively of shareholders’ interests”).
See Bratton, supra note 206, at 752-53 (describing how Berle’s “attitude toward
regulation” changed through his collaboration with Means, and how Berle
“abandon[ed] a self-regulatory approach in favor of government control of corporate
activity”).
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 287 (“Economically, the various so-called ‘legal rights’
or the economic pressures which may lead a management to do well by its
stockholders, in and of themselves are merely uncertain expectations in the hands of
the individual. Aggregated, interpreted by a public market, and appraised in a security
exchange, they do have a concrete and measurable value; and it is to this value that the
shareholder must and in fact does address himself.”).
Werner, supra note 99, at 397.
Dalia Tsuk Mitchell has argued that, in the 1920s, corporate law scholars like Berle and
Ripley chose “the goal of protecting shareholders” over “trusting shareholders as active
agents.” See Mitchell, supra note 312, at 1511 (“The first attempt to give meaningful
voice to shareholders ended with protection but not empowerment.”). Later, “[t]he
securities acts of 1933 and 1934 did not try to empower or protect shareholders. Their
goal was to reinforce the ideal of a healthy free market.” Id. at 1512.
ROE, supra note 39, at ix-x, 26.
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intermediaries such as banks, insurers, and mutual funds, preventing them
from accumulating large blocks of stock and exercising control in firms.328
Roe argued that Americans made these political choices in part because they
mistrusted private accumulations of power, and he argued that these political
choices helped explain why American corporations ended up with large
numbers of dispersed stockholders.329 Roe’s work was pathbreaking for its
acknowledgment that political choices influenced the evolution of American
corporate structures. His ideas contravened then-popular “natural selection”
theories that presented corporate structure as the product of naturally
occurring “organizational adaptation” to economic pressures.330 Roe’s book,
Strong Managers, Weak Owners, assumed the separation premise and did not
explore individual shareholders’ identities as relevant to the political story.
Lacking a historical narrative recognizing women as an important subgroup of
shareholders, Roe provided only a partial explanation for how “politics created
the fragmented Berle–Means corporation.”331
Gender politics plausibly operated as another factor contributing to the
emergence of the atomized Berle–Means corporation. Part I of this Article
demonstrated how the dispersion of shareholding in the early decades of the
twentieth century was driven, at least in part, by demand for corporate stock
among women. The political and legal status of women at the time helps
explain this process. For example, although women were excluded from
political citizenship until 1920, even married women were embraced as voting
corporate “citizens” by the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, to the extent that
women wished to participate in public-sphere decisionmaking on an equal
footing with men, shareholding offered that opportunity. Indeed, evidence
suggests that some women actively participated in shareholder governance at
big companies before 1920, at a time when they would have been excluded
from participation in other forms of organizational governance dominated by
men, and after 1920, when women’s expanded role in public life remained
controversial.332 In addition, women’s wages were discounted for their
gender,333 while their return on a share of stock was not. This might have
encouraged women, especially wage-earning women, to view shareholding as a
uniquely attractive form of economic activity. Finally, some married women’s
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 26.
See id.
Id. at 285-87.
Id. at 287. Quite reasonably, Roe did not claim that his analysis fully explained the rise
of the Berle–Means corporation.
332. See infra notes 360-65 and accompanying text.
333. See, e.g., Bergmann, supra note 234, at 11-12 (“The economic results of occupational
segregation for women are low wages.”).
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property laws, enacted in the mid- and late-nineteenth century, empowered
married women to hold and vote stock held in their names and might have
encouraged women and their families to channel women’s wealth into
shareholding.334
When combined, all of these factors present a story that is complementary
to the one described by Roe. While American law and politics were evolving to
prevent institutional investors from accumulating block-holding power, they
were also developing in ways that made shareholding a particularly attractive
investment for generations of American women. And corporate managers
might have viewed small shareholdings by women investors as a politically
desirable basis for fighting back against anti-corporate public sentiment.335
The result was a trend in which the shareholder class not only grew, but also
feminized.
The changing identity of American shareholders infused gender politics
into questions of corporate structure—especially the separation of ownership
and control. It encouraged business leaders to perceive a conceptual
“separation” in corporate structure that reified two elements—owners and
managers—who were, in fact, divided by gender. Owners included women, but
managers were exclusively male.
In addition, the changing identity of the shareholder class also likely
shaped business leaders’ views about the best way to curb managerial power—
one of the leading issues of the day. Stereotypes about women’s lack of aptitude
for business, emotional decisionmaking, and submissive personalities
contributed to a trend in which business leaders gradually changed their
thinking about shareholder governance of big companies.336 By the mid-1930s,
334. See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1985, ch. 321, 1851 N.Y. Laws 616 (stating that married women

could own and vote corporate stock held in their names).
335. See, e.g., The Heaviest Sufferers in New Haven, FIN. WORLD, Apr. 18, 1914, at 3, 3 (noting

that the New Haven Railroad had more women shareholders than men and asserting
that “[i]f for no other reason than the plight of these women, many of whom are too
unskilled to fight their way through life, the natural promptings of all right-thinking
persons will be to” help “restore the road its former prosperity and prestige”); A Tax
Problem, OUTLOOK (N.Y.), Apr. 5, 1913, at 763, 764 (reporting that “the familiar ‘plea for
the widowed and orphaned stockholders’ often advanced against bills for the
regulation of corporations”). Evidence also suggests that corporate managers might
have viewed small shareholders as desirable because they helped assure the managers’
own continuing control, a rationale that may have also incentivized managers to
encourage shareholding by women. See, e.g., Many Holders of Railroad Stock, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1907, at 12 (“Railroad managements regard it as highly desirable to have their
stock widely distributed. It is said to be one of President Mellen’s concerns in his plans
to put out another large issue of New Haven [Railroad] stock to fix terms that will
assure the new stock being taken up by the shareholders rather than have it fall into
the hands of any speculative group . . . .”).
336. The emergence of large numbers of women stockholders corresponded with a smaller
but still significant rise in employee stockholders, as companies created employee stock
footnote continued on next page
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few corporate law scholars were arguing in favor of shareholder collective
action.337 Rather, the neutral mechanism of the stock market, regulated
through New Deal securities laws, was gaining favor as a means of disciplining
managers.338 Now, in the twenty-first century, the “mythical battle” between
owners and managers has come under increasing criticism in the corporate law
academy, suggesting that it may be time to reevaluate the separation premise,
its origin, and its continuing value to corporate law and theory.339

purchase programs and gave bonuses in stock. Thus, demographic changes in
stockholding from 1900 to 1960 brought not only women into shareholding but also a
growing chorus of labor voices. See generally Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Interests and
Corporate Power, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1123 (2019) (discussing the relationship of labor to
corporate organization and power).
337. Among the last to do so was William Douglas, who, three years before he became chair
of the SEC, argued that “some method must be devised to mobilize scattered and
disorganized stockholders and other investors into an active and powerful group so
that there may be a competent and respectable patrol of the field of finance.” William
O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (1934); see also
Alden Whitman, William O. Douglas Is Dead at 81; Served 36 Years on Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1980, at 1 (providing an overview of Douglas’s life and work).
338. Another idea that gained traction was the “independent director.” Some Progressive
Era corporate law experts had proposed that the government select directors to
manage railroad corporations in the public interest. See, e.g., William W. Cook,
Industrial Democracy or Monopoly? How American Railways Can Be Taken Over for the
People Safely and Easily, 38 MCCLURE’S MAG. 352, 355 (1912). This idea was revived by
law professor I. Maurice Wormser in 1931. See I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN,
INCORPORATED 139 (1931). A few years later, William Douglas advocated independent
directors in an important article in the Harvard Law Review. See Douglas, supra note 339,
at 1322 (“[W]e begin and end with the assumption that the directors are trustees by
virtue of business ethics as well as law; and that the powers which they exercise are
powers in trust.”); see also William O. Douglas, Comm’r, SEC, Address Before the Bond
Club of New York: Democracy in Industry and Finance 12 (Mar. 24, 1937) (on file with
author) (discussing how to encourage “directors who will represent the public interest”
and proposing as possible solutions “the principle of rotation of directors and the
creation of so-called public directors”). The Investment Company Act of 1940 imposed
a requirement of independent directors on investment companies; that same year, the
SEC recommended that board audit committees have nonmanagement directors. See
Roberta S. Karmel, Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 534, 538, 545 (1984) (describing some of these developments); McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 2707, [Accounting Series Release Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,020 (Dec. 5, 1940) (recommending independent
audit committees).
339. See, e.g., J.B. Heaton, Corporate Governance and the Cult of Agency, 64 VILL. L. REV. 201, 202
(2019) (describing the separation as a “mythical battle” and arguing for an end to the
“cult of agency”).
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B. The Pathology of “Passivity”
Central to Berle and Means’s separation theory was the idea that
shareholders were becoming “passive.”340 The cause of this change, they wrote,
was the dispersion of stock ownership.341 The inability to pressure or control
management, due to the small size of a holder’s stock, was presented as the
condition of passivity. Thus, while the word “passive” might suggest to the
modern reader that the holder was choosing to do nothing, Berle and Means used
it to characterize dispersed shareholding itself.342 In their depiction, ownership
of a small amount of widely held stock was “passive” virtually by definition,
and this passivity was the reason that shareholders were losing power in firms
while corporate managers were gaining it.343
When Berle and Means used the word “passive” to describe dispersed
shareholders, they were not reiterating a common characterization of the
1920s and 1930s.344 Berle and Means were among the first scholars to present
dispersed shareholding in the academic literature as inherently passive. In
doing so, they were also reviving an old trope about women as inactive
shareholders.345 In 1907, for example, the Cincinnati Enquirer reported that
340. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 66 (“Most fundamental of all, the position of [stock]

341.

342.

343.

344.
345.

ownership has changed from that of an active to that of a passive agent.”); see also id. at
346-47 (“Passive property . . . gives its possessors an interest in an enterprise but gives
them practically no control over it, and involves no responsibility . . . . [It consists] of a
set of relationships between an individual and an enterprise, involving rights of the
individual toward the enterprise but almost no effective powers over it.”).
Id. at 84 (“When the largest single interest amounts to but a fraction of one per cent . . .
no stockholder is in the position through his holdings alone to place important
pressure upon the management or to use his holdings as a considerable nucleus for the
accumulation of the majority of votes necessary to control.”).
Accord Black, supra note 290, at 813 (“In the Berle and Means paradigm, shareholder
passivity is inevitable.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate
Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 397 (1983) (“Berle and Means thought that shareholders’
powerlessness is a necessary result of the diffusion of ownership.”).
See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 338 (“The stockholder has surrendered
control over his wealth. He has become a supplier of capital, a risk-taker pure and
simple, while ultimate responsibility and authority are exercised by directors and
‘control.’ ”). Years later, Berle expanded upon his views on “the American passiveproperty system” in a solo-authored book. ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC
REPUBLIC 36-59 (1963). He opined that the “price” of the wide distribution of “passive
property” was “intolerable loss of individual liberty and individual capacity for selfrealization.” Id. at 55. Another group of scholars has suggested that the Berle–Means
corporation “created relationships of economic and political dependency” for stock
owners. ALLEN KAUFMAN, LAWRENCE ZACHARIAS & MARVIN KARSON, MANAGERS VS.
OWNERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3 (1995).
In fact, in finance, the word “passive” had traditionally been used to mean a bond or
debt upon which no interest was paid. Passive, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
The idea of the “passive” stockholder had appeared sporadically in various writings
before The Modern Corporation was published. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nicomen Boom Co. v.
footnote continued on next page
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bankers in the city had a “tough problem”: Too much stock was in “passive
hands.”346 The article described Cincinnati bankers “perusing the lists of
stockholders” only to discover that some banks were “‘waterlogged’ with a
class of stockholders” who wished only to collect dividends and “take no active
interest in” the bank.347 In one bank, which had about 300 stockholders,
it was found that women constitute nearly half of the stockholders. The division
was made into resident and nonresident women, resident active business men,
nonresident men, retired resident men, estates, other banks (competitors) and
corporations. The showing proved that the holdings of the active stockholders
were relatively very small compared with the holdings of the passive
stockholders. There is hardly a bank in the city but that has a large number of
women and estates holding stock.348

The passage suggested that men stockholders could be “active” in business, but
women were always “passive,” and that business leaders ascribed meaning to
the difference. It underscored how passivity was not only associated with
women, but also characterized as a bad quality for shareholders, and ultimately
bad for business.349
The influence of their mentor and former professor at Harvard, William
Ripley, was evident in Berle and Means’s construction of the passive
shareholder.350 In his 1927 book Main Street and Wall Street, Ripley had
contrasted shareholder voting by proxy with shareholders’ “passive
participation in management” and lamented how “the wide distribution of
stock to employees and the consumers of the corporation’s product”—a

346.
347.
348.
349.

350.

N. Shore Boom & Driving Co., 107 P. 196, 199 (Wash. 1910) (Mount, J., dissenting).
Additionally, in 1926, W.H.S. Stevens referred to the “passive attitude” of shareholders
who did not attend the annual meeting, were “unable to interpret accurately the
meaning or significance of the corporation’s income statement and balance sheet,” and
paid “little or no attention to the corporation’s affairs”—at least as long as it was paying
dividends. Stevens, supra note 309, at 384-85. Like other writers of the time, Stevens
presented passive shareholders as both unintelligent and disengaged.
Bankers Have a Tough Problem, CIN. ENQUIRER, Feb. 19, 1907, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Indeed, the “passive” quality of stockholding is often gratuitously characterized in
negative terms. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1171 n.27
(1981) (arguing that “shareholders’ self-interest has led them to be ignorant and
passive”).
At least one reviewer characterized Berle and Means’s book as an extension of Ripley’s
work. See Robert S. Stevens, Book Review, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 634, 634 (1933) (describing
The Modern Corporation and Private Property as “fundamentally a further, more detailed
and up-to-date study, based upon collected data, of [the] same problem” explored by
Ripley in a previous work, and noting that Berle and Means acknowledged “their
indebtedness” to Ripley).
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possible reference to women351—“accentuate[d]” the “nullification” of the
“ordinary shareholder.”352 In the same book, Ripley openly disparaged women
shareholders, judging them “ill-fitted by training—begging the moot point of
sex—to govern” businesses “directly.”353 Berle and Means did not express the
same open contempt for women shareholders, but they described small
shareholders as irresponsible and contrasted the modern, widely held
corporation with an earlier version of corporate capitalism in which “[t]he
number of shareholders was few; they could and did attend meetings; they
were business-men; their vote meant something.”354
Of course, contemporaneous readers probably understood the use of the
word “passive” to mean “feminine.” At the time, passivity was closely associated
with stereotypes about women, often offered in contradistinction to the
“active” character of men.355 “To be passive is woman’s great force,” one
speaker argued in an address published in the Washington Post in 1922.356 As
late as 1989, the Oxford English Dictionary expressly defined “passive” as,
among other definitions, “[o]f, relating to or characteristic of the female . . .
role.”357 Throughout the early decades of the twentieth century, the idea that
351. See supra Part I.D.2.
352. RIPLEY, supra note 57, at 94, 108; see also id. at 97 (describing the “docility of corporate

shareholders”).
353. Id. at 129-30.
354. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 135 n.14, 354. For an earlier moral critique of

shareholders, see Samuel Untermyer, Reasons and Remedies for Our Business
Troubles: An Address Delivered Before the Commercial Club and the Pittsburgh
Industrial Development Commission at Pittsburgh 15 (May 22, 1914) (arguing that
shareholders “deserve just the kind of treatment they have been receiving at the hands
of the men who dominate these corporations” because of their “supineness” and
“criminal inertia”).
355. For one example, see KENNETH E. BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION: A
STUDY IN THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 92 (1953). See also, e.g., Nikki
Mandell, Will the Real Businessman/Businesswoman Stand Up?: The Historical Implications
of Regendering Business Success in the Early Twentieth Century, 15 ENTER. & SOC’Y 499, 501
(2014) (noting how the presumption that “women were inherently passive” played a
role in segregating occupations by sex). It was also common, from the nineteenth
century through at least the middle of the twentieth century, to find women described
as the “weaker sex” in discussions of female shareholders. For an example, see Charlotte
A. Cleveland, Report of the Finance Committee., WOMAN’S J., Nov. 25, 1876, at 379, 379
(quoting Judge Carr, president of the Farmer’s National Bank of New Jersey, using the
term).
356. Woman’s Work Passive Says Mrs. M‘Cormick, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1922, at 3 (quoting
Edith Rockefeller McCormick as stating “[t]he work of the world is accomplished by
two forces, the positive and the negative . . . . Women represent the rails of a railroad—
the negative force—and man the engine, or the positive force.”).
357. Passive, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). An earlier edition, published in 1933,
omitted reference to “the female” but included definitions similar to those in the second
edition, taking “passive” to mean “[s]uffering or receiving something without resistance
footnote continued on next page
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women were naturally passive played an important role in defining the types of
paying work available to women and the career paths they could pursue.358
It is certainly true that in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, shareholders of
major companies often did not attend annual meetings, submit their proxies,
or otherwise participate in shareholder governance. Before Berle and Means,
this was commonly described as absentee shareholding, and it was attributed to
corporate laws and practices, such as the in-person shareholder meeting and
the proxy system, that made shareholder participation exceedingly difficult.359
Berle and Means conflated the rising tide of “passive” shareholders (i.e., women)
with the governance problem of absentee shareholding.
At any rate, there are many reasons to doubt that small shareholders had
made a choice not to participate in corporate governance. Evidence from the
period indicates that small shareholders tried to participate. When only a single
person—a woman shareholder—showed up for the 1913 annual meeting of the
U.S. Reduction and Refining Company, the Wall Street Journal published a short
article that described her searching for a meeting that the company’s own
officers and directors did not hold.360 As shareholding expanded over the
decades that followed, attendance at shareholder meetings climbed.
Shareholders of AT&T were being turned away at the door for a lack of space

or opposition; readily yielding or submitting to external force or influence, or the will
of another; submissive.” Passive, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1933); see also Passive,
CENTURY DICTIONARY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC LEXICON OF THE ENG. LANGUAGE (rev. and
enlarged ed. 1914) (defining “passive” as, inter alia, “[r]eceptive; unresisting; not
opposing; receiving or suffering without resistance: as, passive obedience”).
358. As one historian put it, “Gender analysis has exposed the processes that naturalized
women’s positions on the lower rungs and men’s domination of the upper rungs of
[workplace] hierarchies.” Mandell, supra note 357, at 501-02.
359. See, e.g., Louis D. Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices—The Competition That Kills, HARPER’S WKLY.,
Nov. 15, 1918, at 10, 12 (describing “the huge corporation with its myriad of employees,
its absentee ownership, and its financier control,” as presenting “a grave danger to our
democracy”); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN
RECENT TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA 4 (1923); SEARS, supra note 58, at 216 (noting
“[t]he absentee and apathetic attitude of the typical stockholder”); id. at 8 (quoting a
social scientist, Henry Ward, using the phrase); cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani,
Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1804 (2006)
(attributing shareholder “passivity” in part to “background legal rules that often make
it difficult for shareholders to intervene”). Even in his epic dissent in Louis K. Liggett
Co. v. Lee, in which he repeatedly cited and endorsed Berle and Means’s ideas about the
separation of ownership and control, Justice Brandeis continued to avoid the language
of “passivity.” See 288 U.S. 517, 568-69 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (retaining the term
“absentee ownership”); see also Douglas, supra note 339, at 1317 (using “absentee
ownership” but not “passive ownership”).
360. U.S. Reduction & Refining: Annual Meeting, Supposed to Be Held in Jersey City, Did Not
Materialize, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1913, at 6.
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as early as 1945, for example.361 Meetings also grew in length, as more
shareholders sought to participate actively in debate.362 In 1952, a Wall Street
Journal reporter interviewing three random shareholders who had turned up
for the Standard Oil Indiana annual meeting spoke with a woman who had
driven 350 miles to attend.363 In 1961, twenty thousand shareholders showed up
to AT&T’s annual shareholder meeting in Chicago—more than the number of
attendees at the opening of baseball season.364 Many similar stories suggest
that, especially after the Great Depression, shareholders were trying to figure
out how to participate in the governance of big companies, but no clear
method presented itself.365 During this period, most small shareholders did not
361. See Labor Group’s Plans Lose at A.T.&T. Meet, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1945, at 14 (describing

362.

363.
364.
365.

how “[a]bout 50 to 100” stockholders “were unable to enter the AT&T’s assembly
room—so great was the crush”). AT&T, whose meetings had involved as few as 700
stockholders in 1949, was sending hundreds of stockholders into overflow rooms to
watch the televised proceedings by 1953. For Whom the Bell Toils, COUNCIL COMPASS
(Council of W. Elec. Tech. Emps., Newark, N.J.), May 1949, at 1, 1; A.T.&T. Holders View
Annual Meeting on TV, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1953, at 20. Reports of attendance in 1953
ranged from 1,200 to more than 1,800. Compare A.T.&T. Holders View Annual Meeting on
TV, supra, with Wish You Were Here, COUNCIL COMPASS (Council of W. Elec. Tech.
Emps., Newark, N.J.), May 1953, at 1, 1, 3. International Telephone & Telegraph held its
1953 annual meeting in circus tents in Nutley, New Jersey. I.T.&T. Takes Annual Meeting
to Stockholders, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1955, at 9. That same year, American Airlines held
its annual meeting in a hangar at LaGuardia Field; it was attended by 1,800
shareholders. The Stockholder’s Voice, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1953, at 4. “Each year we get
more and more stockholders at the annual meeting,” said an executive of General
Electric in 1954. Doyle F. Smee, Mr. Stockholder: Encouraged by Industry, He Plays a Bigger
Part at Annual Meetings, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1954, at 1. The company’s “mammoth”
meeting welcomed 2,455 shareholders that year. Alfred R. Zipser, Jr., G.E. Profits Set
Peak in Quarter at $48,029,000, Up 42% in Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1954, at 45. Although
some meetings were attended by thousands of shareholders, those present represented
only a fraction of the overall shareholder population. And in 1949, the Wall Street
Journal noted that “[s]parse attendance and scant comment still typify most corporate
meetings.” Owners Arise ! Annual Meetings Draw Record Attendance and Pointed
Questioning, supra note 218.
For example, AT&T’s 1948 annual stockholder meeting was two hours long. Corporate
Democracy, COUNCIL COMPASS (Council of W. Elec. Tech. Emps., Newark, N.J.), May
1948, at 1, 6-7. Its 1949 meeting lasted four and a half hours. See Owners Arise ! Annual
Meetings Draw Record Attendance and Pointed Questioning, supra note 218. Its 1950 annual
meeting lasted almost seven hours. 950 at Its Stockholders’ Meeting, a Record in History of
A.T.&T., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1950, at 45.
Pickets Bar Holders of Indiana Standard from Annual Meeting, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1952, at
2.
Sylvia Porter, Sylvia Porter Says: Annual Meetings Taking On More Serious Aspect, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 28, 1963, at 43.
For example, shareholder activists pushed for regional shareholder meetings to
encourage greater shareholder participation. General Mills held the first such meetings
in 1939 and 1940, in major cities like New York, San Francisco, Detroit, and Los
Angeles. The company reported that about half of its shareholders in the San Francisco
footnote continued on next page
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hold diversified portfolios of stock.366 With governance rights in few firms, it
would have been possible for shareholders to devote attention to the
obligations of economic citizenship. They were stymied by corporategovernance practices that discouraged their participation and by the lack of
transportation and communication technology that might have allowed
distant shareholders to attend meetings or vote their own shares.
The passivity thesis has had an enduring influence on the evolution of
American corporate-governance theory and law.367 By characterizing
dispersed shareholding as inherently passive, Berle and Means’s popularization
of the passive-shareholder trope foreclosed serious consideration of how
corporate law discouraged small shareholders from participating in
governance.368 The word “passive” itself has been widely deployed in legal
scholarship on corporate and securities law with a range of meanings applied
to corporate boards, shareholders, and investment strategies. For example,
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel famously argued for a “rule of
managerial passivity” in takeover law.369 A recent trend in scholarship has
described index investing as “passive” investing.370 In a thoughtful article,
Adriana Robertson has argued that describing stock market indices as “passive”

366.
367.

368.

369.
370.

area attended the meeting in that city. See Lon Hughes, General Mills, Inc., Stockholders
Meet Here, S.F. EXAM’R, Dec. 12, 1939, at 29 (noting that more than half of General
Mills’s shareholders were women); Owners Invited, TIME, Jan. 29, 1940, at 59, 60
(concluding that “[t]he experiment seemed much more likely to prove that modern
stockholders, although the beneficiaries of a company, are mostly a total failure in the
old-fashioned role of proprietors”).
See supra note 41.
After the 1932 publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, shareholder
passivity became an important theme in corporate law and theory. See, e.g., CHESTER
ROHRLICH, LAW AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL 8 (1933) (describing “the
separation between those who actively controlled and operated the corporation and
those who passively awaited dividends”).
In their book, Berle and Means discussed changes to corporate law that had
disempowered stockholders. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 153-88. However,
they did not argue in favor of changing corporate law to re-empower shareholders.
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 344, at 1177-78, 1198-99.
See, e.g., Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall
Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 19, 58 (2019)
(describing “passively managed funds” as funds “that do not make information-based
trading decisions”). See generally Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder
Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 494 (2018) (describing “passively managed funds” as “passive
funds”); Fichtner et al., supra note 38, at 298-99 (using the term “passive index funds” to
mean “cheap, index mutual funds and exchange traded funds” which “seek to replicate
stock indices while minimizing expense ratios”).
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obscures important truths about them.371 Some scholars, including Bernard
Black, have suggested that “the standard model [of corporate governance]
overstates the case for passivity.”372
When the law-and-economics movement emerged in the 1970s, it
embraced shareholder passivity and refashioned it as “rational apathy.” In this
view, the “natural” passivity of dispersed shareholders evidenced a “free rider
problem” and could be explained by incentives operating on homo
economicus.373 In the 1980s, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel explained
that:
Most shareholders are passive investors seeking liquid holdings. They have little
interest in managing the firm and less incentive to learn the details of
management. . . . Because other shareholders take a free ride on any one
shareholder’s monitoring, each shareholder finds it in his self-interest to be
passive.374

Berle and Means had problematized passivity, presenting it as a
blameworthy debasement of shareholding that justified stockholders’ loss of
prerogatives. The law-and-economics movement reimagined passivity as
rational decisionmaking by overextended, welfare-maximizing investors.375
Passivity had ceased to be a problem, and had become a solution to a problem—
the problem of “bounded resources.” Once reconceived this way, passivity
seemed rational, even desirable.376 Corporate law no longer had to worry
about fixing shareholder passivity and could focus on reducing agency costs.
Business law scholars began writing reflexively about “rationally passive”
shareholders.377 In turn, shareholders’ rational passivity caused them to

371. See Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index”

372.
373.
374.
375.

376.

377.

Investing, 36 YALE J. REG. 795, 797 (2019) (“Far from being passive, [U.S. stock market]
indices represent the deliberate decisions made by their managers.”).
Black, supra note 290, at 822.
See Black, supra note 282, at 522 (“Most modern corporate scholars, especially those
with a law-and-economics bent, accept shareholder passivity as inevitable.”).
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 344, at 1171.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert Jackson, Jr., Joshua R. Mitts & Robert E. Bishop,
Activist Directors and Agency Costs, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 381, 443 (2019) (“Passive
investors are passive because they logically prefer liquidity to control.”).
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm:
A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1430 n.20 (1993) (arguing that to
“require shareholders to actively participate in firm management” in a “large firm”
would “result in chaos”).
See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 282, at 895 (“As in the standard Berle–Means
analysis, beneficial owners are rationally passive; governance rights are of little value
to them.”).
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devalue control rights; law-and-economics scholars explained that the only
thing a rational shareholder cared about was stock price.378
The rise of intermediation in the 1960s and 1970s, which shifted
investment away from retail shareholding, did not just obscure the gender of
shareholding and return voting control to male investment managers. It also
encouraged the use of diversification as an investment strategy, which turned
the “rationally passive” shareholder into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whereas
before 1960 most shareholders held stock in relatively few companies,
diversified investors held equity interests in many companies. As the number
of companies in their stock portfolios grew—and in the absence of mechanisms
that would have made collective action possible—the average investor did
eventually hold a portfolio of stock in too many companies to participate
actively in shareholder governance in all of them.379 Thus, inattentiveness to
company-level governance did eventually become a feature of modern
investment.
Today, business law scholars describe managerial capitalism as a time
when small shareholders lacked both “the aptitude” and “the inclination” to
participate in corporate affairs.380 This version of history elides how gender
bias may have influenced views about shareholders—what they were capable of
and their suitability for shareholder governance—in the early development of
corporate-governance theory. Ideas about how small shareholders were

378. Ralph Winter told a Senate subcommittee in 1977 that “the great bulk of shareholders

in the United States do not regard shareholder power as being a very important issue to
them and certainly do not regard it as anything directly related to the yield on their
investments.” The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Citizens and S’holders Rights and Remedies of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong. 80 (1977) (statement of Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Professor of Law, Yale
University); see also James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 461, 497 (2015) (noting that shareholder passivity “leads individual shareholders to
value the corporations in which they invest primarily, if not exclusively, for the
instrumental financial returns they promise”).
379. One articulation of the standard view is found in Bainbridge, supra note 378, at 1430
n.20 (“Shareholders want to be passive investors holding a diverse portfolio of many
stocks. Fully diversified shareholders have neither the time nor the resources to
monitor actively the conduct of a particular corporation’s business or the solvency of
their fellow shareholders.”).
380. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of the Berle–Means Corporation, 42 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 445, 447 (2019); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 344, at 397 (stating that Berle
and Means believed “the passive investors have neither the willingness nor the ability
to manage”).
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“irresponsible,”381 “docile,”382 “supine,”383 “weak,”384 in need of education,385
and “not qualified to challenge the judgment of management”386 echoed
negative stereotypes about women, who made up a significant proportion of
small shareholders. Evidence establishes that the passive woman–active man
stereotype has distorted even scientific understandings about molecular
biology.387 It is not much of stretch to conclude that gender bias, common to
this period in history, prompted male business leaders to view small
shareholders as unsuited to a role in shareholder governance in part because
they included so many women.
Today, there is little to suggest that the trope of the passive shareholder
retains gender-coded meaning. It is unlikely that twenty-first-century
corporate law scholars who write about “passive shareholders” intend to vest
the phrase with sexist meaning. Corporate law theory would benefit, however,
from deeper thinking about the passive–active dichotomy so prevalent in the
literature. That dichotomy may have obscured an interest on the part of some
shareholders to actively participate in the management of public companies.
Consideration of the trope’s gendered origin may, in fact, shed light on the
current (and rising) popularity of shareholder activism, a trend that
undermines the traditional view, typically asserted as a fact, that shareholders
care only about stock price.
C. Gender and Stakeholderism
At the end of their book, Berle and Means asked: Who should receive the
profits of industry?388 Their answer gave voice to a developing trend in
381. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 354.
382. SEARS, supra note 58, at 62.
383. Id.
384. Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?,
385.
386.
387.

388.

in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 54 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959).
Slocum, supra note 246, at 10.
Corporate Democracy, COUNCIL COMPASS (Council of W. Elec. Tech. Emps., Newark,
N.J.), Jan.-Mar. 1954, at 4, 4.
For example, biologists misunderstood the process of fertilization for years because
they assumed that (male) sperm was the aggressor in fertilization and the (female) egg
was merely a “passive” recipient. Research in the 1980s disproved this characterization,
which attributed stereotypes about human behavior to molecular processes. See Evelyn
Fox Keller, Gender and Science: Origin, History and Politics, 10 OSIRIS 27, 34-35 (1995)
(quoting Emily Martin, The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance
Based on Stereotypical Male–Female Roles, 16 J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 485, 489 (1991));
Martin, supra, at 492 (describing how the erroneous narrative was “rewritten in a
biophysics lab at Johns Hopkins University—transforming the egg from the passive to
the active party”).
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 340-44.
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business law that cast corporate leaders as “industrial statesmen” and
empowered them to operate the corporation in the best interests of society,
according to their own views about what that meant.389
Berle and Means argued not only that passive stock ownership was
“irresponsible,” but also that “the owners of passive property, by surrendering
control and responsibility over the active property, have surrendered the right
that the corporation should be operated in their sole interest.”390 In other
words, Berle and Means believed that shareholders’ passivity justified a move
away from treating shareholders’ interests as primary, opening up the
possibility that shareholders’ interests would be subordinated to those of other
groups, such as labor and consumers. As punishment for shareholders’
passivity, Berle and Means would remove shareholders from the center of the
enterprise to the periphery and give corporate managers the power to balance
their interests against those of other stakeholders. This was a significant loss of
shareholders’ rights, and Berle and Means acknowledged as much.
The demotion of shareholders’ interests from primacy to equal footing
with the interests of labor and other stakeholders would today be called
“stakeholderism.”391 Although the word “stakeholderism” was not in use
during managerial capitalism, many business leaders and corporate law
scholars of that era endorsed ideas that would be described today as
“stakeholder values.”392 Berle and Means wrote that it was “almost essential”
389. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89

GEO. L.J. 439, 444 (2001) (describing “an important strain of normative thought from
the 1930s through the 1960s that extolled the virtues of granting substantial discretion
to the managers of large business corporations” who would “guide business
corporations to perform in ways that would serve the general public interest”);
HERRYMON MAURER, GREAT ENTERPRISE: GROWTH AND BEHAVIOR OF THE BIG
CORPORATION 268 (1955) (describing Owen Young, the chairman of General Electric, as
an “industrial statesman”).
390. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 354-55; id. at 356 (noting that the control groups
“have placed the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation
serve not alone the owners or the control but all society”).
391. For a discussion of stakeholderism and its meanings, see generally Kevin V. Tu, Socially
Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 123, 127-32
(2016) (defining stakeholderism to mean that, since corporations have “broader
obligations to society. . . directors should consider the interests of non-shareholder
stakeholders such as employees, customers, creditors, the environment, and the
community, and balance those interests with profit goals”).
392. For an early articulation of stakeholder values, see Marple, supra note 215, at 12 (“[T]he
management of Monsanto, or of any other company owned by thousands of persons
and organizations, functions just as the management, or government, of a democracy
functions—in the interests of everyone concerned.”). For an example of the term
“stakeholder values” in recent use, see Jayne W. Barnard, At the Top of the Pyramid:
Lessons from the Alpha Women and the Elite Eight, 65 MD. L. REV. 315, 316, 318 (2006)
(developing and discussing a “stakeholder sensitivity index” (capitalization altered)).
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for control of public companies to “develop into a purely neutral technocracy,
balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and
assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy
rather than private cupidity.”393
Once we bring the feminization of capital to the foreground, Berle and
Means’s depiction of “passive” shareholding—that it debased shareholding, and
that shareholders’ passivity justified the subordination of their interests—
appears to reinforce themes of gender bias that were common in that era.394
Over the next decades, the passivity thesis justified both the assumption of
corporate control by managers and the shift of corporate resources away from
shareholders to other groups, such as labor. In both instances, power and
surplus were transferred away from a group that included many women to
groups that included few of them.
In August 2019, the Business Roundtable returned stakeholderism to the
national conversation with a public statement signed by 181 leading CEOs.395
The statement expressed a commitment to deliver value to all of a business’s
stakeholders, not merely shareholders. In response to the Business Roundtable
statement and subsequent events, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the
stock market crash of 2020, a growing literature has examined the stakeholder
theory of corporate governance.396 What the literature makes clear is that, like
the version of stakeholderism that was popular during managerial capitalism,
this new stakeholderism expresses power through corporate governance.397 It
advances a theory about how the corporate surplus should be allocated, and
whose interests within the corporation should predominate. In evaluating new
claims about the benefits of stakeholderism, corporate theorists should recall
the feminization of capital and consider the gendered nature of power expressed
through corporate governance. Even today, women constitute a small

393. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at 356.
394. Cf. Mandell, supra note 357, at 503 (noting the reconfiguration of “the Victorian

equivalency between manhood and entrepreneurial independence into a twentiethcentury equivalency between manhood and managerial status”).
395. See Our Commitment, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/65QU-S4DG;
see also Cathy Hwang & Yaron Nili, Shareholder-Driven Stakeholderism, UNIV. CHI. L. REV.
ONLINE (Apr. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/M4RP-QZTB.
396. See, e.g., Hwang & Nili, supra note 397; Colin Mayer, Shareholderism Versus
Stakeholderism—A Misconceived Contradiction 1 (ECGI Working Paper Series in L.,
Working Paper No. 522/2020, 2020); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The
Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 94 (2020).
397. See, e.g., GRANT M. HAYDEN & MATTHEW T. BODIE, RECONSTRUCTING THE
CORPORATION: FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO SHARED GOVERNANCE 159 (2020)
(observing that “stakeholder theory seems content with the current power structure”).
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proportion of corporate managers,398 which suggests that stakeholder
approaches that empower corporate managers will produce gendered results.
But the gender implications of rebalancing power between shareholders and
managers are not well theorized, particularly because institutional investors
are also dominated by male managers.
D. Gender and the “Average” Shareholder
Much of the earliest economic reasoning applied to corporate law built
upon assumptions about the interests of the “average” stockholder. Bayless
Manning typified this when, in 1958, he asserted that “the average investor” “is
an economic investor,” and “[t]he appeal of common stock to the average
investor lies in its peculiar economic features—greater return, speculative
potential and inflationary hedge.”399 In addition, the archetype of the
“reasonable investor” casts a long shadow over financial regulation.400 Where
do women fit into these paradigms? As the number of women in the
shareholder class grew to exceed the number of men, business experts
sidestepped the “statistical side of the story” to perpetuate a myth that
stockholding was predominantly male.401 To the extent that leading business
experts, like Manning, reasoned from their own assumptions about the
identity of “the average investor,” and in light of the reality of women’s
significant shareholding, we might ask whether it mattered that women were
left out of the story.
1.

Curating the image of stockholding as male

In the 1950s and 1960s, many important business organizations portrayed
shareholding—falsely—as the business of men. Examples abound. In 1955, three
important companies publicly celebrated a milestone stockholder, just as
AT&T had celebrated its millionth shareholder in 1951.402 The companies
were General Motors, Standard Oil New Jersey, and General Electric. All three
398. See AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW,

399.
400.

401.

402.

GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 37 (2015) (“Women, who make up a slim majority of the
population, occupy slightly less than 17 percent of spots in Fortune 500 boardrooms
and just 3.1 percent of board chair positions.”).
Manning, supra note 252, at 1492.
See Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor (s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 466-68 (2015); Joan
MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the Reasonable Investor a
Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 293 (2009).
Livingston, supra note 229 (conceding the “statistical side of the story” but arguing that
“[m]any women own stock in name only” because “women in our society have a big
enough job—raising children and running the household”).
See supra notes 1-2.
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chose a male stockholder to celebrate, even though all three had more women
shareholders than men. In fact, the milestone shareholder at all three
companies shared a particular set of demographic characteristics: He was
white, married, young, and middle class, and, in at least two of the three cases, a
father of young children.403 Standard Oil New Jersey celebrated its 300,000th
shareholder—a twenty-three-year-old white male employee at an Oklahoma
subsidiary—and showed him with his unidentified wife in photos taken at the
annual meeting404:

Later in the same meeting, however, Standard Oil’s president
acknowledged that more women than men were shareholders of the company,
403. General Motors’s 500,000th stockholder was recognized at the annual meeting with his

unnamed wife and son. See GEN. MOTORS CORP., PROCEEDINGS AT ANNUAL MEETING OF
STOCKHOLDERS 25-26 (1955). The 300,000th stockholder of Standard Oil New Jersey was
recognized at that company’s annual meeting, where the chairman specified that his
nineteen-month-old daughter had stayed home with a grandparent. See STANDARD OIL
CO. (N.J.), 73RD ANNUAL MEETING 12 (1955). General Electric promoted its celebration
of its 300th stockholder, William Roesch, in an ad campaign, but did not include
information about whether he and his wife had any children. The ads ran in the July–
December 1955 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, and in the May 29, 1955 issue of the New
York Times. Gen. Elec. Co., Advertisement, Highlights from a Report to the Largest Meeting
of Share Owners Ever Assembled, ATL. MONTHLY, July-Dec. 1955, at 5-6; Gen. Elec. Co.,
Advertisement, Highlights from a Report to The Largest Meeting of Share Owners Ever
Assembled, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1955, at 112.
404. STANDARD OIL CO. (N.J.), supra note 405, at 12 (portraying the couple). I have inferred
race from the photo.
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“by a considerable majority.”405 All of these companies were actively curating
their public images by presenting their “average” stockholder as male.
The NYSE’s 1962 shareowner census provides another example. One of the
headline findings of the census was that women shareholders outnumbered
men. A reader who opened the glossy pages of the report found the
photographs of seven individuals whose images recurred throughout the
publication, with a caption explaining that “[t]he seven people whose photos
appear throughout this booklet represent in many ways a cross-section of
American shareowners today.”406 But six of the seven stockholders pictured
were men:

The images powerfully distorted the reader’s impression of the gender
makeup of American stockholding. The idea, apparently, was to present
shareholding as something that men did, even though the publication’s own
study proved empirically that most individual shareholders were women.
2.

Women’s economic interest in gender equity

It is likely that women’s interests as shareholders were (and are) similar to
those of men.407 But women shareholders expressed a special interest in at least
one documented area: corporate policies concerning gender equality. Especially
after World War II, women shareholders used shareholder activism to try to
open up corporate management opportunities for women. The widespread
economic discrimination experienced by women in the early twentieth

405. Id. at 15.
406. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., THE 17 MILLION, supra note 224, at i.
407. Research for this article did not identify any sex-disaggregated studies of shareholder

interests from the first half of the twentieth century.
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century prompted them, as “owners” of enterprise, to pursue what are today
widely viewed as “social” goals within firms.408
In addition to her campaign to put women on boards of directors, for
example, activist Wilma Soss challenged corporate policies that required
women employees to retire at age fifty-five—ten years before men were
required to retire, and five years before the age at which a woman was eligible
for Social Security benefits. Although women shareholders’ efforts ultimately
failed to open up corporate boards to women, there is evidence that activists
succeeded at changing some companies’ sex-based retirement policies.409
Assumptions about the “average” stockholder that erased women also
erased these “social” interests from shareholder governance. Bayless Manning
might have been correct when he asserted that “the average investor” was “an
economic investor,” but he was wrong to the extent that he assumed this
interest was limited to stock price410 and economic returns. Inequitable
gender-based corporate policies of the era were economic matters for women.
E. Women and Corporate Control
This Article opened with an account of AT&T’s 1951 shareholders’
meeting, where women shareholders demanded board representation, citing
women’s significant shareholding and employment at the company.411
Women shareholders had outnumbered men at AT&T since at least 1910, and
had been demanding board gender diversity there since at least 1933.412 Yet
women shareholders would wait almost forty years for the first woman
candidate to be nominated by management for election to AT&T’s board—and
only then in apparent response to high-profile sex discrimination charges
against the company.413 AT&T’s story reveals the enduring resistance that
408. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring

409.

410.
411.
412.
413.

Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 650 (2016) (describing board diversity as one of
several “topics generally considered to be ‘social’ goals of niche investors”).
See Women Stockholders Ready for New Fight, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 2, 1951, at 2
(describing a fight over women’s mandatory age of retirement at Standard Oil New
Jersey that ended with the company raising the age requirement to sixty years);
STANDARD OIL CO. (N.J.), 70TH ANNUAL MEETING 15-17 (1952) (memorializing a
discussion at the stockholder meeting about raising women’s mandatory age of
retirement to sixty-five years).
Manning, supra note 252, at 1492.
See supra text accompanying notes 9-27.
See supra note 7; Merryle Rukeyser, Women Would Aid Business as Directors, PITT. SUN
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 18, 1933, at 25.
The first woman nominated by AT&T’s management to its board of directors was
Catherine Cleary. See Gene Smith, Woman Nominated to A.T.&T. Board, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 1972, at 47. At the time, AT&T was fighting high-profile charges of
employment discrimination against women. See Abbott Combes, EEOC Bias Report Calls
footnote continued on next page
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women shareholders faced, for most of the twentieth century, when they
sought to leverage their significant shareholding into managerial power at
public companies.
In 1949, Sidney Weinberg, the chairman of Goldman Sachs and a director
at more than thirty big companies, including General Electric, wrote in the
pages of the Harvard Business Review that he saw “no reason why a competent
woman should not be elected to the board, especially now when some
companies have more women than men as stockholders.”414 Weinberg had
served for years on the board of General Foods alongside Marjorie Post Davies,
one of the first women directors of a major U.S. company.415 Davies, credited
with leading General Foods to become (to great profit) a pioneer in frozen
food, had gained a seat on the board of General Foods in 1936 because she was
the company’s largest stockholder.416
In the early 1950s, two big public companies, Western Union and Radio
Corporation of America (RCA), responded to the demands of women
stockholders by adding a woman to their boards. Western Union, whose
shareholders had been evenly divided by gender since the nineteenth century,
was experiencing serious investor dissatisfaction.417 The company added
Madeleine Edison Sloane, the daughter of Thomas Edison, to its board in 1950,

414.

415.

416.

417.

AT&T “Largest Oppressor of Women,” WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1971, at A1; FCC Orders
Hearing on Charges That AT&T Discriminates in Hiring, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1971, at 10.
Sidney J. Weinberg, A Corporation Director Looks at His Job, 27 HARV. BUS. REV. 585, 587
(1949). Weinberg continued: “Moreover, I think it would be desirable to get a woman’s
point of view, particularly for corporations dealing directly with women as
customers.” Id. According to Weinberg’s obituary, he was “in such demand that at one
time he sat on 31 boards of directors, most of them the bluest of the blue chip
companies.” Alden Whitman, Sidney J. Weinberg Dies at 77; “Mr. Wall Street” of Finance,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1969, at 1.
The annual reports of General Foods in 1936 and 1951 show both Marjorie Post Davies
and Sidney Weinberg as directors. GEN. FOODS CORP., 1936 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1937);
GEN. FOODS CORP., 1951 ANNUAL REPORT i (1952).
See Sales and Earnings of General Foods Gain in 1st Quarter, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1936, at 1.
The announcement that Davies had joined the General Foods board as its first woman
ran on the front page of the Wall Street Journal. Id.; see also Mrs. Marjorie Merriweather
Post Is Dead at 86, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1973, at 50.
See Many Holders of Stocks, supra note 78 (reporting that “[a]bout one-half of the
stockholders [of Western Union Telegraph] are women”); European Holdings of
American Securities, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1914, at 5 (reporting that on June 30, 1914,
Western Union had 14,144 stockholders registered on its books—7,175 of whom were
women); Shouting Enlivens Annual Meetings of Nation’s Firms, DES MOINES SUNDAY REG.,
May 8, 1949, at 55 (leading with a description of the “[f]ireworks” at Western Union’s
annual meeting); Owners Arise ! Annual Meetings Draw Record Attendance and Pointed
Questioning, supra note 218 (describing how, at Western Union’s 1949 annual meeting,
shareholder activist Lewis Gilbert “asked why Western Union should not be
liquidated”).
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shortly after a relatively young new president, Walter Marshall, took the
helm.418 That same year, after being targeted for activism by women
investors,419 RCA added Mildred McAfee Horton, the former president of
Wellesley College, to the board of its subsidiary, the National Broadcasting
Company.420 After Horton’s tenure was judged a success, RCA added Horton to
its own board in October 1951.421
Thus, by 1951, three major companies had a woman on their board of
directors: one as a result of sheer shareholding power (General Foods), one at a
company with a significant number of women stockholders and stockholder
dissatisfaction (Western Union), and one at a company that had apparently
acted to preempt an activist campaign by women stockholders (RCA).
In the 1950s, two other major American companies ended up with women
directors due to proxy fights. In both cases—the New York Central Railroad
proxy fight of 1954 and the Montgomery Ward proxy fight of 1955—an
insurgent trying to gain control of the company put a woman on his board
slate to attract votes from women stockholders. At New York Central, the
insurgent won, and Lila Bell Acheson Wallace became the first woman
director of that company.422 At Montgomery Ward, the incumbent president
kept control through a last-minute deal with the Teamsters union, which
pledged to vote its shares for management. Nonetheless, the insurgent group
won three seats on the nine-person board.423 Bernice Fitz-Gibbon, an
advertising executive, was elected to one of those seats, but served only a single
year.424
Around this time, the term “Aunt Janes” became common slang for small
shareholders, reflecting the significant proportion of small shareholders who
were women.425 Although the term would eventually be used pejoratively, it
418. See First Woman Is Named to Western Union Board, CHARLOTTE NEWS, Oct. 26, 1950, at

43; Walter P. Marshall Elected President of Western Union, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 1948, at 39.
419. Logan, supra note 27, at 48 (describing Soss’s efforts to have a woman nominated to the
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

RCA board).
R.C.A. Elects Woman to Board of Directors, BALT. SUN, Oct. 6, 1951, at 16.
Id.; Madam Director, TIME, Oct. 15, 1951, at 112, 112.
DAVID KARR, FIGHT FOR CONTROL 34, 38 (1956).
Id. at 165-66.
Id. at 165, 168; Richard J.H. Johnston, 3 of 9 Ward Seats Won by Wolfson, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 1955, at 23.
See, e.g., KARR, supra note 424, at 15, 27, 35, 38 (discussing the role of “Aunt Janes” in the
New York Central Railroad proxy fight); Aunt Janes and Millionaires, LIFE, June 7, 1954,
at 34, 34; LEWIS D. GILBERT, DIVIDENDS AND DEMOCRACY 7, 99 (1956). By the 1980s,
“Aunt Jane,” and the related “Aunt Millie,” were recognized as derogatory terms. See,
e.g., JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON’S FINANCE & INVESTMENT
HANDBOOK 205 (2003) (defining “Aunt Millie” as a “derogatory term for an
unsophisticated investor”).
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originated in the New York Central proxy fight in a favorable context. To win
control in what would be a very close race, Robert Young needed the
company’s women shareholders to vote for his takeover bid.426 So, he added a
woman to his slate of board candidates, and he won the vote. “Robert R.
Young’s victory proved that it is often the Aunt Janes who hold the key to
victory,” one writer acknowledged.427
The story of how women gained board seats at some of the nation’s most
important public companies in the early 1950s reveals something important
about gender and corporate power. In the middle of the twentieth century,
women were able to gain representation on corporate boards only by
leveraging their shareholding power; contests for corporate control were an
opening for women, but only through the decisions of male business leaders to
nominate women to board slates in the first place. Outside these circumstances,
women’s demands for representation were met with resistance rooted in
gender bias.428
Indeed, evidence suggests that women’s demands for board representation
at AT&T led the company to cease its longstanding practice of disclosing sexdisaggregated data about its shareholders in its company reports. AT&T
published information about the percentage of women shareholders in its
annual reports every year from 1910 to 1950, with only a few exceptions.429
However, after women activists cited this data to support their claim for board
gender diversity at an April 1951 shareholder meeting, AT&T again did not
publish the percentage of its shareholders who were women—with one
exception in 1960.430 This lack of disclosure helped obscure the gender of
AT&T’s stockholders, which may in turn have reduced the ability of
shareholder activists to make claims for women’s board representation.
In the twenty-first century, a growing body of literature has puzzled over
the lack of women on public-company boards. That literature has proposed a
range of explanations and solutions, but it has rarely plumbed history for clues
426. See Gerald M. Loeb, It Is the Time of the Proxy, EVENING SUN (Balt.), Apr. 22, 1968, at C5.
427. KARR, supra note 424, at 38.
428. For examples of gender bias regarding women board candidates, see supra note 153.
429. My review of AT&T’s annual reports from 1900 to 1985 found that AT&T reported

information about the sex of its stockholders from 1910 to 1926; omitted sexdisaggregated data in 1927 and 1928; reported on stockholder sex in 1929; omitted sexdisaggregated data in 1930 and 1931; and then consistently reported sex-disaggregated
data from 1932 to 1950. AT&T’s 1950 annual report, published in early 1951, was the
last annual report to contain sex-disaggregated data, with the exception of its 1960
annual report. See AT&T 1950 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15; AM. TEL. & TEL. CO.,
ANNUAL REPORT 1960, at 7 (1961) [hereinafter AT&T 1960 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting
that 42% of share owners were women; 21% were men; 31% were joint accounts; and 6%
were “other”).
430. See AT&T 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 431, at 7.
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about the problem. The feminization of capital adds a new dimension to this
story by showing that, even when women were widely recognized as a
significant—even dominant—demographic among shareholders, social forces
and gender politics limited their ability to exercise corporate control. The
feminization of capital, and its subsequent erasure from memory, point us at
persistent problems with the gendered nature of corporate power. These
phenomena also reveal that we still have important, and surprising, lessons to
learn from our own history.
Conclusion
From its beginning, modern corporate capitalism involved meaningful
participation by women in share ownership. Among the three groups whose
interrelation defined twentieth-century corporate capitalism—labor, capital,
and management—capital was the first to show significant female participation.
By comparison, women did not become a major part of the wage-earning labor
force until the second half of the twentieth century, and achieved near parity
of numbers with men in the work force only at the century’s end.431 Over the
same period, women never held a significant proportion of managerial jobs,
particularly at the top of the corporate hierarchy.432 By synthesizing a history
of modern corporate capitalism that recognizes women as a major shareholder
demographic, this Article makes an important, original contribution to the
corporate law literature. It has shown that the emergence and growth of stock
markets transformed women’s roles as economic actors, providing them not
only with opportunities to invest and finance businesses as risk-bearers, but to
participate in the management of business through share voting—and that
women’s growing numbers and active participation in shareholder governance
were influential to contemporaneous business leaders.
Women’s significant role in public-company shareholding likely
influenced the path of American corporate governance. While this Article has
431. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 12 (1988) (“Women’s

share of persons employed has increased every year since 1947 with the single
exception of 1953, when it declined a trivial two-tenths of a percentage point. Starting
from a proportion of 28% in 1947, it rose to 32 percent in 1957, 36% in 1967, 41% 1977,
and 45% in 1987.”); Civilian Labor Force by Sex, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://perma.cc/G87P-KGVC (archived Mar. 24, 2022) (showing that, according to
Current Population Survey data, women made up 46.5% of the United States civilian
labor force in 2000).
432. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of Gender Diversity in
Corporate Governance, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 105, 108 (2018) (stating that in 2017, women
held only 19.8% of board seats of companies in the Fortune 1,000); FUCHS, supra note
433, at 14 (noting that “[o]ver two-thirds” of women’s gain in “higher-level professional
and managerial occupations” occurred after 1975).
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not attempted to catalog every dimension of that influence, it poses some
fundamental questions that cut to the heart of modern corporate law theory. In
light of the historical evidence presented in this Article, corporate law must
revisit some familiar ideas. Is a separation of ownership and control really the
core division of corporate organization? Do owners have to be “weak,” and
managers “strong”? In the midst of changing shareholder demographics, why
did corporate law move in a direction that favored market-based solutions
rather than collective action by shareholders as a means to curb managerial
power? Is the condition of stockholding really inherently passive? And, nearly
seventy years after women first outnumbered men as shareholders at
American public companies, why are women still largely excluded from the
management of those companies? The historical record suggests that an influx
of women to shareholding in the early twentieth century shaped the contours
of modern corporate law in ways that, until now, have been hidden from view.
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